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This article is the second of a two-part series in which Professor Gebbia-Pinetti considers how the complexities of state
sovereign immunity apply to bankruptcy actions. The first article laid the foundation by analyzing the source, scope, and nature
of states' immunity from suits filed in federal, court to enforce state and federal law (Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice,
September/October 1998). The present article considers the extent to which the bankruptcy estate may enforce Bankruptcy
Code actions against the states, notwithstanding state sovereign immunity.
IV. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
A. Deconstructing Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Four circuit courts of appeals and a large number of lower courts have expressly held that the Bankruptcy Code's abrogation
provision is unconstitutional. They reason that Congress has no power under the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate states' immunity
from citizen suits filed in bankruptcy court.331 Consequently, abrogation using Congress's Bankruptcy Clause powers is no
longer an effective means of enforcing the Bankruptcy Code *4 against the states.332 The Bankruptcy Code's abrogation
provision should, *5 however, remain valid as a waiver of the federal government's immunity333 and should permit federal
court suits against political subdivisions of states, which are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.334
*6 Notwithstanding these conclusions, commentators advance three theories in an attempt to obviate (in whole or in part)
Seminole's implications in bankruptcy cases. Under the first theory, Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine would not apply
to actions filed in the bankruptcy courts because bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts (Part IV.A.1). Under the second,
the bankruptcy courts would be able to bind states in matters that require only notice, rather than service of process, because
the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits “suits” against states (Part IV.A.2). Under the third, Congress would be authorized
to abrogate states' immunity in Bankruptcy Code cases by using its Fourteenth Amendment powers rather than its Bankruptcy
Clause powers (Part IV.A.3).
1. Does the Eleventh Amendment Apply in Bankruptcy Court?
The Bankruptcy Code complicates immunity doctrine because bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over both federal and
state law causes of action,335 state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal bankruptcy law causes of action,336
bankruptcy actions are virtually always enforced by private parties, and bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges.
Most courts simply assume that states are as immune from suit in federal bankruptcy court as they are in other federal courts.337
Some commentators suggest, however, that the Eleventh Amendment may not apply in bankruptcy court because bankruptcy
courts are “Article I” rather than “Article III” courts.338 The argument, which relies on the “plain meaning” of the Eleventh
Amendment and of Article III, is straightforward: because the Eleventh Amendment only limits federal courts' Article III
“judicial power,”339 the Amendment only applies to courts established under Article III. If bankruptcy courts were established
under Article I and did not exercise Article III powers, then the Eleventh Amendment would not limit bankruptcy *7 courts'
powers.340 Consequently, states would not be immune from suits filed in bankruptcy court. This argument fails, however, for
several reasons.341
First, although the bankruptcy courts are not freestanding, independent Article III courts, and bankruptcy judges are not Article
III judges, the bankruptcy courts are not Article I courts.342 In 1978, when Congress first enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it
established a bankruptcy court for each judicial district (as an “adjunct” to the district court).343 Congress granted the bankruptcy
courts jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases and all civil proceedings that arose under the Bankruptcy Code or arose in or
related to a bankruptcy case.344 Congress also granted bankruptcy judges the power to hear and determine all matters within
the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. Nevertheless, because the bankruptcy judges lacked (and still lack) the critical attributes of
life-tenure, removal only by impeachment, and salary protection,345 they were not (and are not) Article III judges.346
In 1982, the Supreme Court held that the congressional grant of extensive Article III federal judicial powers to an independent
court made up of non- *8 Article III judges was unconstitutional.347 In 1984, Congress resolved this constitutional defect by
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modifying bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. Under the current structure, the bankruptcy judges appointed in each federal judicial
district constitute a “unit” of that district's federal district court.348 This “unit” is “known as” the bankruptcy court.349 In other
words, the bankruptcy courts are administrative components of the district courts rather than freestanding federal courts.350
The jurisdictional statutes grant the district courts, rather than the bankruptcy courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all bankruptcy cases and original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code
or arise in or relate to a bankruptcy case.351 Congress has authorized each district court to refer all bankruptcy matters to the
bankruptcy court for that district.352 Each district court has, in fact, referred all bankruptcy matters to its bankruptcy court.
In summary, bankruptcy courts are not Article I legislative courts. Rather, they are a part of the judicial branch. Indeed they are
a component (a “unit”) of the district courts. At best, a bankruptcy court is a unique hybrid, an arm of an Article III court that
serves only to determine matters that arise under or relate to a specific Article I statute. Simply stated, the bankruptcy court is
an inextricable part of the district court itself. The same immunity concepts apply.
Second, federal courts exercise Article III judicial power over federal question causes of action.353 If there were no bankruptcy
courts, federal district courts would exercise generalized jurisdiction over federal bankruptcy law, as they do over most other
federal laws.354 If district courts heard bankruptcy matters, states would be protected by the same immunity that protects the
states in other federal question matters.
*9 Bankruptcy jurisdiction differs from general federal question jurisdiction, of course, because Congress has created
specialized bankruptcy courts and specialized bankruptcy judges. As a result of the referral of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts, bankruptcy matters rarely come before the district court. Instead, they are filed in and proceed to their conclusion almost
exclusively in the bankruptcy courts (excepting appeals).
Nevertheless, the district court may withdraw the reference any time, with respect to all or any part of a bankruptcy case, on its
own motion or the motion of any party, for cause shown.355 There is no dispute that the states enjoy immunity if a bankruptcy
matter is tried in a federal district court.356 Consequently, if the states were not immune from suit in the bankruptcy courts,
a state that was sued in bankruptcy court could simply move for a withdrawal of the reference.357 The district court is likely
to grant such a motion.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define “cause” for removal, courts have suggested that the district court should consider
factors such as judicial economy, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, reduction of forum shopping and confusion, and
the economic use of the debtor's and creditors' resources.358 Applying these types of factors, courts commonly withdraw
the reference in proceedings in which the defendant demands a jury trial. Removal in these cases fosters efficiency because
bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials without the parties' consent. Also, in non-core proceedings, the parties are entitled
to de novo review of the bankruptcy court's findings, but the Seventh Amendment prohibits de novo review of jury verdicts.359
The immunity issue presents at least as strong a case for withdrawal. Cause would appear to exist if the consequence of
proceeding in bankruptcy court rather than district court would be a substantial impairment of the state's rights. This would
be the case if the state is not immune from suit in bankruptcy court but is immune from suit in district court. Denying the
state immunity *10 in bankruptcy court, but granting it immunity in district court, would also impair uniformity and foster
inappropriate forum shopping.
Third, all of the powers bankruptcy judges exercise derive from the district courts.360 Bankruptcy courts do not exercise all
of the district courts' Article III powers,361 but they clearly exercise some Article III powers.362 The Supreme Court did not
prohibit Article III adjunct courts from exercising any judicial powers; it simply prohibited them from exercising extensive
judicial powers without adequate coordination and review by an Article III court.363 The Eleventh Amendment applies to any
exercise of judicial powers, including by non-Article III bankruptcy judges.364
Fourth, it is unlikely that the drafters or ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment expressly considered whether states would be
immune from suit in “bankruptcy courts.” Although the Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the power to enact uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies,365 the first federal bankruptcy law was not effective until 1800, two years after the Eleventh
Amendment became effective.366 That law, and the other federal bankruptcy laws enacted during most of the ensuing century,
was limited in scope and *11 short-lived in duration.367 Comprehensive federal bankruptcy legislation has been in force
only since 1898, one hundred years after the Eleventh Amendment.368 Even if the drafters had considered the possibility that
Congress would enact federal bankruptcy legislation, they presumably would have expected the federal courts to exercise the
same degree of jurisdiction over federal bankruptcy law as they did over other federal laws. It is hard to imagine that the drafters
could have contemplated the modern hybrid under which specialized non-Article III courts and specialized judges exercise
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jurisdiction by referral over not only bankruptcy cases but also non-bankruptcy matters that arise in or relate to bankruptcy
cases.369
Fifth, some commentators argue that excluding bankruptcy courts from the reach of the Eleventh Amendment violates the spirit
of the Amendment and is inconsistent with the Court's expansive reading of the Amendment in cases such as Seminole.370
*12 In summary, the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits371 filed against states in federal bankruptcy court to the same
extent that it applies to suits filed against states in federal district court.
The next question is whether every bankruptcy action that affects states constitutes a “suit against the state.”
2. Does Every Bankruptcy Action Require a “Suit Against the State?”
A discrete but significant issue blunts Seminole's impact in bankruptcy cases, at least to a limited degree. This issue arises
from the fact that the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar extends only to “any suit at law or in equity” commenced by
a citizen against a state.372 The Supreme Court made clear in Cohens v. Virginia373 that a judicial proceeding might affect
the state's interests without being a “suit” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, even if the proceeding expressly names
a state as a party.
In Cohens, a state had sued an individual in state court. After the state court rejected the individual's federal law defense, the
individual brought a writ of error in federal court to review the state court's decision. The Court held that the writ was not a “suit”
because (i) the individual did not seek to prosecute or pursue a claim, demand or request, in a court of justice, for the purposes
of recovering or being restored to a personal thing that had been withheld from him, (ii) the state was given notice but was
not served with process and could not be compelled to appear, and (iii) the writ was asserted defensively.374 The Court added
that, even if it were a suit, it was not *13 “against” the state because it was asserted defensively in a proceeding reviewing
a decision that had been rendered in a suit by the state.375
A recent bankruptcy court, summarizing Cohens's analysis, has stated that: “a suit consists of: (1) an adversarial proceeding, (2)
which arises as a result of a deprivation or injury, (3) which involves at least two parties, (4) which compels the attendance of the
parties, (5) which asserts and prosecutes a claim against one of the parties, and (6) which demands the restoration of some thing
from the defending party.”376 The last factor must be clarified because a “suit,” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, includes an
action in which the plaintiff seeks any legal or equitable remedy, including injunctive or declaratory relief against the state.377
Do bankruptcy cases involve suits against the state? The answer is complicated because the bankruptcy case itself does not
appear to satisfy the definition of “suit,” yet many of the proceedings within the bankruptcy case do appear to be suits.
In somewhat over-simplified terms, when a bankruptcy case is filed, the court takes jurisdiction over the debtor and property of
the debtor's estate.378 The debtor's primary object is a discharge of pre-existing debt. The price the debtor pays for this discharge
depends on the type of case the debtor files. In a liquidation case, the debtor essentially forfeits all of his non-exempt assets
in exchange for the discharge. A trustee collects and liquidates all of the debtor's (non-exempt) property and distributes the
proceeds to creditors in accordance with the priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code.379 Alternatively, the debtor might
choose to forego a portion of its future earnings in exchange for the discharge. In such a case, the debtor retains control of the
property and pays a portion of its debts over time under an individual wage-earner plan or business reorganization plan.380 In
both types of cases, creditors (collectively, although not necessarily individually) benefit from the cost-savings and efficiency
that accompanies a collective enforcement proceeding.
*14 The bankruptcy case itself has none of the common attributes of a suit. It is not an adversarial proceeding; it does not
assert a claim or cause of action against any creditor or interest holder; it does not seek to remedy an injury or restore any thing
of which the debtor has been wrongly deprived; and it does not compel any person or entity other than the debtor to attend any
judicial proceeding.381 Rather, as in Cohens, creditors (including states) are given notice and an opportunity to participate.382
Also, as in Cohens, a creditor will be bound by the discharge whether or not the creditor participates in the case.383 The discharge
clearly “impairs” creditors' non-bankruptcy law rights, because it prohibits creditors from collecting discharged debts.384 This
impairment does not, however, transform the bankruptcy case into a suit. The bankruptcy case affects the state's interests in a
manner similar to the writ of error in Cohens. The Bankruptcy Code bestows a federal right (the discharge) upon a discharged
debtor just as the federal law at issue in Cohens bestowed a federal right upon the defendants. As in Cohens, the debtor may
assert this right in defense to an action filed by a state to collect on a discharged debt. Consequently, the courts have long held
that the bankruptcy case that bestows this right is not a suit against the state.385
During the course of the bankruptcy case, however, the court may enter a variety of orders that bind particular creditors and other
entities. For example, consider the most common disputes between states and debtors- *15 those relating to taxes. Among
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other matters, the bankruptcy court might: (1) determine the amount of a state tax claim,386 (2) determine whether a tax claim
is entitled to priority of distribution in the bankruptcy case, vis-à-vis other claims,387 (3) determine whether a tax claim is
dischargeable in the bankruptcy case,388 (4) determine whether a lien securing a tax claim is valid,389 (5) avoid a lien securing
a tax claim,390 (6) enforce the automatic stay to prevent the state from collecting on a tax claim during the bankruptcy case
and, perhaps, hold the state in contempt and compel the state to pay damages for violating the stay,391 (7) enforce the discharge
injunction to prevent the state from collecting on a tax claim that was discharged in the bankruptcy case, and, perhaps, hold
the state in contempt and compel the state to pay damages for violating the injunction,392 (8) permit the trustee to sell, lease,
or otherwise dispose of property subject to a tax lien,393 (9) determine the amount of and compel the state to turnover a tax
refund due to the debtor,394 (10) compel the state to return to the trustee tax payments made to the state before the filing of
the bankruptcy case in preference to other creditors,395 or (11) bind the state to the treatment accorded to a tax claim under
a confirmed plan of reorganization.396 Other relationships between the debtor and the state may give rise to other bankruptcy
proceedings. For example, if the state is the debtor's landlord, the debtor might seek to assume or reject the lease.397 If the
debtor is the state's supplier, the debtor might seek to collect from the state in a traditional breach of contract action.398
All of these proceedings ultimately facilitate the collection and liquidate assets, determination of claims, distribution of assets,
and discharge of the debtor. Many, however, particularly those that arise under non-bankruptcy *16 law or seek to bind one
specific party, look suspiciously like “suits.” Can the trustee effectively bind the state in these types of proceedings without
actually “suing” the state and, consequently, without implicating the Eleventh Amendment?
Some argue that bankruptcy proceedings, of any kind, are not suits because they are dependent on the bankruptcy case, which
itself is not a suit.399 This approach is simplistic and overly broad.400 Others suggest that every bankruptcy court proceeding
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.401 This approach is simplistic and overly restrictive. More appropriately, it seems that
some bankruptcy proceedings are suits and others are not. Consequently, the courts should examine each proceeding separately.
A bankruptcy court's orders may flow from three distinct types of proceedings, namely, adversary proceedings commenced by
complaint and summons,402 contested matters commenced by motion,403 and administrative matters based simply upon notice,
an opportunity for objection, and an opportunity for a hearing.404 To determine whether a bankruptcy proceeding involves a
suit against a state, the court should apply the Cohens/Barrett factors in light of both the nature of the action and the process by
which the state is bound. Post-Seminole bankruptcy cases provide little guidance in this venture. Although many cases hold that
the Eleventh Amendment bars bankruptcy court actions against states, the vast majority of these cases do not expressly consider
whether a particular action involves a “suit.”405 The relatively few cases that consider whether a particular proceeding is a *17
“suit”406 generally involve discrete issues such as the binding effect of the discharge or the determination of objections to a
state's claim.407 These cases do not establish broad guidelines applicable to other types of proceedings.
The following discussion tests three broad generalizations that seem to flow from applying the Cohens/Barrett factors to
bankruptcy proceedings. These generalizations are not universally applicable; they must be applied to each type of proceeding
in light of those factors.
a. Administrative Determinations
First, most administrative determinations that are made after the state is given notice and an opportunity to participate probably
do not involve a suit against the state. A corollary to this generalization is that due process requires that the court be vigilent to
ensure that the debtor does not attempt to bind the state based solely on notice in a matter that requires a complaint, summons
and adversary proceeding (which may be a suit).408
The administrative matters most likely to affect a state's claims against the debtor are the automatic stay, the determination of
the amount and priority of the state's claim, the treatment of and/or distribution on the state's claim, and the debtor's discharge
and associated discharge injunction. To determine whether these matters involve “suits,” consider the processes by which these
orders are entered and the substantive effect that these orders have on the state.
First, the automatic stay, as its name suggests, takes effect automatically upon the filing of the bankruptcy case.409 The stay
affects the state because, among other things, the stay prohibits a state from taking action to collect on its pre-bankruptcy
claims.410 Nevertheless, the imposition of the stay does not occur in the context of a suit. No motion, complaint or even advance
notice is required before the stay is imposed. The stay does not assert any claim or demand against the state, seek to redress any
injury or deprivation, *18 threaten the state's treasury, or compel the state to appear in court. Moreover, the stay is imposed
only as a temporary device to maintain the status quo. The state may obtain relief from the stay in appropriate circumstances,411
and the stay will terminate as automatically as it arose when the case is closed or the discharge is granted or denied.412 Although
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the imposition of the stay is not a suit, the debtor may be required to take action against the state if the state ignores or violates
the stay. Whether an action to enforce the stay might be a suit will be considered below.
Second, the discharge injunction, in contrast, is imposed only after notice. If the debtor is liquidating, the creditors will receive
notice and an opportunity to object to the debtor's discharge.413 The Bankruptcy Code determines the treatment accorded to
each claim in a liquidation case.414 In contrast, if the debtor is establishing a plan for the repayment of all or a portion of its
debts, the plan will determine the treatment of each creditor's claim (within constraints imposed by the Bankruptcy Code).415
Creditors will be given an opportunity to object to the confirmation of the plan.416 Moreover, secured creditors will be given
an opportunity to vote to accept or reject a chapter 12 family farmer plan or Chapter 13 wage-earner plan, and all impaired
creditors will be given an opportunity to vote with respect to a Chapter 11 business reorganization plan.417 Plan confirmation
(and, in chapter 12 and 13 cases, payment under the plan) binds creditors and discharges the debtor from all debts dealt with
in the plan.418 Confirmation essentially replaces old the debts with the debtor's new obligations under the plan. Discharge is
accompanied by a discharge injunction that prohibits creditors from collecting discharged debts.419
Plan confirmation, treatment of the state's claims under the plan, discharge of the state's claims, and the attendant discharge
injunction flow from proceedings in which the state is given notice and an opportunity to participate. As in Cohens, the state
is neither served with process nor compelled to *19 appear. Although the state will be bound whether or not it chooses to
participate, the proceedings concern the debtor and the distribution of the debtor's property, not the state. They are not adversarial
proceedings and they involve no action directly “against” the state. They do not assert any claim or demand against the state,
seek to redress any injury or damage, or demand the restoration or recovery of anything from the state. In short, these orders
are not entered in the course of any “suit” against a state, for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Two circuit courts and several lower courts have held that the discharge, discharge injunction, and plan provisions concerning
the treatment of a state's claims do not involve suits against the state, at least where the state initiates the action challenging the
discharge, discharge injunction, or plan. Texas v. Walker420 involved a former state university professor who filed a bankruptcy
case. He received a discharge of his debts, including a debt arising from the state's claim for conversion and breach of contract.
The state had not participated in the case.421 When the state later sued the former professor to enforce the claim, the professor
raised the discharge injunction as a defense.422 The state argued that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the discharge and that
the state could not have waived its immunity because it had not participated in the bankruptcy case.423 The Fifth Circuit held
that the debtor's discharge did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment because the state had never been compelled to appear as
a defendant in federal court against its will.424 The state had the option to participate in the case. If it received notice but chose
not to participate, its claim would be discharged. The discharge injunction would bar the state from collecting on the claim.425
*20 Similarly, in Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust,426 state taxing authorities sued to recover taxes from
a trust that had been created under a confirmed plan of reorganization. The taxing authorities had received notice of the plan
confirmation hearing but had chosen not to object to the plan. The Fourth Circuit held that the taxing authorities were bound
by the terms of the plan confirmation order.427 As in Walker, the court reasoned that the state had never been named as a party
or compelled to appear in federal court.428 The taxing authorities had the option to appear and object to the plan. If they chose
not to, they would be bound.429 The court also reasoned that the confirmation order did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment
because the confirmation of the plan had nothing to do with the federal courts' jurisdiction over the state. Instead, it was entered
under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the debtor and over property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.430
In both Walker and Antonelli, the actions challenging the bankruptcy courts' orders were commenced by the state, rather than
against the state. As with the automatic stay injunction, however, the debtor may be forced to initiate action against a state if
the state ignores or violates the discharge injunction or the provisions of a confirmed plan. Again, whether such an enforcement
proceeding is a suit against the state is discussed below.
Third, the debtor may also ask the bankruptcy court to determine the amount, allowability and priority of a state's claim.431
Although nonbankruptcy law determines the amount of a claim, the Bankruptcy Code determines the allowability432 and
priority433 of a claim. If the state is listed as a creditor on the debtor's schedule of liabilities, the state will receive notice *21
of the case and an opportunity to file a claim.434 If the state chooses not to file a claim, the amount of the claim will be fixed at
the amount listed by the debtor.435 If, however, the state disputes the amount listed by the debtor, the state may file a claim.436
If the debtor has listed the state's claim as being contingent, unliquidated or disputed, the state must file a claim in order to vote
on a plan and receive distribution on the claim.437 If the state properly files a claim, the claim is deemed allowed unless a party
in interest objects.438 The debtor also may file a motion to determine the amount and priority of state's claim.
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The question that commonly arises is whether the proceeding commenced by an objection to the state's claim is a suit against
the state. The courts have virtually unanimously held that it is not, for two distinct reasons. First, the filing of a proof of claim
usually constitutes a waiver of the state's immunity, at least with respect to the determination of the claim and compulsory
counterclaims.439 Second, some courts have held that the proceeding commenced by the objection to a claim is an action by
the state (to enforce the claim), rather than a proceeding against the state (to determine the objection).440 The leading case
considering these issues is Gardner v. New Jersey,441 a railroad reorganization case.
In Gardner, the state had filed a claim for unpaid taxes. The proof of claim also asserted that the amounts due were secured by a
lien on all of the debtor's land and tangible property located in the state.442 The debtor and trustee objected to the amount of the
claim and priority of the lien. The state argued that any determination of the objections would be an improper suit against the
state.443 The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that neither the determination of the amount of the claim, nor the determination
of the validity, *22 priority and extent of the liens constituted a “suit” against the state.444 The Court reasoned that, by filing a
claim with the reorganization court, the state had used a “traditional method of collecting a debt.”445 “It is traditional bankrupcy
law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide
by the consequences of that procedure.”446 “If the claimant is a State, the procedure of proof and allowance is not transmitted
into a suit against the State because the court entertains objections to the claim.”447
Similarly, in In re Barrett Refining Corporation,448 the debtor had filed a plan that treated the state's tax pollution fine and
penalty claim partially as a priority claim and partially as a non-priority claim. The state argued that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited the bankruptcy court from exercising jurisdiction to adjudicate the state's claim.449 The court disagreed, reasoning
that the bankruptcy case was not a suit, that the state had waived its immunity in any event by filing a claim, and that the filing
of a claim constituted an affirmative demand for relief by the state against the debtor.450
These cases establish that a proceeding to determination objections to a state's proof of claim does not constitute a suit. We
must also consider whether the process by which a claim is allowed in the absence of a proof of claim involves a suit. In such
a case, the debtor controls the determination of the state's claim, either by listing the claim on the schedules or commencing
a contested matter (by motion) to determine the amount of the claim. In either case, there is no action by the state that might
constitute a waiver of immunity. Moreover, a contested matter looks like a suit because it is an adversarial matter between
two parties, involving a claim. Absent bankruptcy, the state could choose the forum in which to prosecute its claim. Thus, one
might argue that forced determination of a claim in federal court is akin to a *23 declaratory judgment action, which would
be barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
Most courts agree, nevertheless, that the determination of a claim is not a suit even in these circumstances. The court is called
upon to determine the amount of a claim asserted by the state, not a claim against the state.451 Moreover, a motion to determine
the amount of a claim does not compel the state to appear. Finally, fixing the amount of the state's claim is merely a necessary
prelude to making distributions to the state.
Fourth, the final inquiry relevent to administrative determinations concerns proceedings to enforce bankruptcy injunctions. As
previously noted, no suit is required for the issuance of the automatic stay or discharge injunction. If, however, the state ignores
these injunctions by attempting to collect its claims, the debtor or trustee may be required to take action against the state to
enforce the stay or discharge. The debtor might assert an affirmative defense in a case commenced against the debtor by the
state, commence a contested matter by motion in the bankruptcy court, commence an adversary proceeding by complaint in
bankruptcy court,452 or commence a suit by complaint in state court to enforce the injunction. It is necessary to distinguish
between the action in which the injunction is obtained and the action in which the injunction is enforced.
An adversary proceeding or contested matter to enforce a bankruptcy injunction has many of the classic elements of a suit. It is
an adversarial proceeding by one party against another, that seeks to redress an injury (the violation of the injunction), through
equitable relief (enforcement of the injunction), and that may request monetary damages, costs or sanctions.453 Nevertheless, if
the proceeding in which the injunction in entered is not a suit, it seems odd that the proceeding to enforce the injunction would be
a suit. If that were the case, the state could simply ignore the injunction and then claim immunity in the enforcement proceeding.
Moreover, if the debtor asserts the stay or discharge injunction defensively, *24 there is no suit against the state.454 Why
should the effectiveness of the injunction turn on whether the debtor asserts the injunction (i) defensively, in the state's suit to
enforce a claim in violation of the stay or discharge injunction, or (ii) offensively, in the debtor's action to prevent the state from
pursuing non-judicial enforcement of the same claim? This is, of course, the heart of immunity doctrine. Claims that may be
asserted defensively when the state sues a citizen may not be asserted offensively when the state has not sued.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

6

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART TWO], 8 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3

At least one court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the debtor's adversary proceeding against the state to
enforce the discharge injunction because the proceeding is not a suit against the state.455 In contrast, most courts have held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars an adversary proceeding to enforce the automatic stay.456 These courts did not, however,
expressly consider whether an action to enforce the automatic stay is a suit for Eleventh Amendment purposes. It seems odd
that the Eleventh Amendment would bar an action to enforce the temporary stay but would not bar an action to enforce the
permanent discharge injunction.
Moreover, an action to enforce the stay merely prevents the state (temporarily) from enforcing its claims against the debtor;
it does not assert claims against the state. Or does it? A valid basis for barring an action to enforce the stay may lie in the
nature of the relief the debtor requests. In stay violation proceedings, the debtor often demands a monetary award, usually
consisting of attorneys' fees and costs of the action. In discharge enforcement, in contrast, the debtor usually seeks only to
enforce the injunction. Although the Eleventh Amendment applies to actions for both monetary and injunctive relief, the relief
the debtor seeks may be significant because the enforcement proceeding does not impose the injunction. The injunction was
already imposed in an action that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar. If the debtor requests sanctions, however, the debtor has
added a claim for additional relief. Consequently, perhaps the debtor's enforcement proceeding *25 is not a suit if the debtor
merely seeks to enforce the automatic stay or discharge injunction, but is a suit if the debtor requests additional relief, such
as sanctions.457 Even the compromise works, however, only if the enforcement proceeding escapes the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment by virtue of its nexus to the original proceeding in which the injunction was imposed, a result which is at best
questionable.
b. Adversary Proceedings
The second generalization is that adversary proceedings by the trustee against the state usually do involve a suit against the
state. A corollary to this generalization is that an adversary proceeding in which the state sues the trustee or debtor does involve
a “suit” but the suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it is a suit “by” rather than “against” the state.458 (Waiver
principles govern the extent to which counterclaims that the trustee or debtor asserts against the state in such a matter are
barred.459)
Adversary proceedings are, essentially, mini-lawsuits within the bankruptcy case. They are commenced by a complaint,
summons and issuance of process; are styled “plaintiff vs. defendant;” and are governed by bankruptcy procedural rules that
incorporate or mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.460
The debtor or trustee must file an adversary proceeding in order to: recover money or property from the state; determine the
validity, priority or extent of the state's lien or other interest in property; determine the dischargeability of certain of the state's
claims; enjoin the state or obtain other equitable relief against the state; or obtain a declaratory judgment against the state
relating to any of these matters.461 Applying the Cohens/Barrett factors, an adversary proceeding clearly is a (1) an adversarial
proceeding, (3) which *26 involves at least two parties, and (4) which compels the attendance of the parties. Whether these
proceedings also (2) arise as a result of deprivation or injury, (5) assert and prosecute a claim against the state, and (6) demand
the restoration of some thing from the state (or injunctive or declaratory relief) depends on the nature of the relief requested
in the proceeding.
First, virtually all proceedings to recover money or property from the state clearly meet these final three Cohens/Barrett factors.
Consider three types of adversary proceedings in which the trustee typically might seek to recover money or property from the
state: state law or non-bankruptcy federal law claims that relate to the case (e.g., breach of contract), avoidance powers (e.g.,
preferential or fraudulent transfers),462 and turnover of property of the estate held by the state (e.g., tax refund).
An action falling in either of the first two categories clearly is a suit. Nonbankruptcy law causes of action seek to remedy an
injury or damage recognized under state or federal law. Avoidance actions seek to recover value transferred from the debtor
to the state before the case was commenced. Not surprisingly, several cases have held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the
debtor or trustee from prosecuting against a state an adversary proceeding seeking to recover money or property from the state
under either bankruptcy law or non-bankruptcy law causes of action.463
Similarly, a turnover action seeks to recover money or property from the state. In theory, a turnover proceeding simply requests
that the state turn property of the estate over to the trustee so that the property may be *27 administered in accordance with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.464 Congress has granted the bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor's
property, wherever located.465 In theory, a “simple” turnover proceeding would not affect the state's interests at all. Turnover
actions rarely present the simple case of a state holding property that clearly belongs to the debtor, however. Often, the debtor
demands the “turnover” of a tax refund or monies due under a contract. These actions are often difficult to distinguish from
disputed tax or contract claims. The state commonly disputes the amount due, or claims an interest in the “property,” often for
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purposes of setoff against claims the state asserts against the debtor. In these situations the court cannot order a turnover until it
first resolves the dispute and determines whether the state holds any interest in the property. The Eleventh Amendment clearly
bars a “turnover” proceeding is these circumstances.466
Nevertheless, at least one court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the court from determining whether property
claimed by the state but held by a third party is subject to turnover.467 That court acknowledged that the Amendment barred
the debtor's complaint to determine and extinguish the state's claims to the property.468 The court noted, however, that, if
the property was turned over, the state might be compelled to waive immunity by filing a claim asserting its interest in the
property.469
In any event, the courts agree that the debtor can bring an action to compel turnover by the state official who has possession
or constructive possession of property that is property of the estate.470 The availability of such relief (which is not so readily
available in actions seeking to recover damages) *28 substantially diminishes the enforcement problem in true turnover
proceedings.471
Second, the debtor or trustee might commence an adversary proceeding to determine the validity, priority or extent of a lien that
the state asserts against estate property. Lien determination presents a more difficult case than an action to recover money from
the state. This is because lien determination, like claim determination, involves a claim by the state rather than a claim against
the state. Nevertheless, a lien determination proceeding probably is a suit against the state (if the state has not filed a claim).
First, the proceeding appears to have all of the elements of a suit. Although it might not seem to seek any recovery from the state,
it does in fact seek to restore property to the debtor. A lien impairs the debtor's interest in property. An adversary proceeding
seeking to determine the validity a lien, or a contested matter seeking to avoid a lien, demands that the state restore the property
to the debtor. Second, a proceeding to determine the validity of a lien is essentially a request for declaratory relief, which the
Eleventh Amendment bars. Third, lien determination is not “merely a necessary prelude” to any distribution to the state. In this
respect, an unsecured claim is fundamentally different from a claim secured by a lien. A claim is a personal right against the
debtor. If an unsecured creditor chooses not to file a claim, the claim will be discharged. If a creditor does file a claim, the court
must determine the amount of the claim and the validity of any lien as a necessary prelude to making any distribution to the
creditor.472 If, however, a secured creditor chooses not to file a claim or bring action in the bankruptcy case to establish the
validity or extent of its lien, the claim may be discharged, but the lien will ride through bankruptcy unimpaired.473 Thereafter,
the lien may be enforced in an in rem action against the property (in that action, the debtor may dispute the lienholder's rights).
Consequently, a proceeding that forces the state to defend and prove the validity and extent of its lien in bankuptcy court
significantly impairs the state's rights. It is not merely a necessary prelude to distribution because the lienholder may choose to
forego any distribution in the bankruptcy case and pursue its in rem rights outside of bankruptcy instead.
This conclusion is not contrary to Gardner.474 The Gardner Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the bankruptcy
court from *29 determining the amount of a claim and validity and priority of a lien. In Gardner, however, the state had waived
its immunity by filing a claim.475 Similarly, where the state has waived immunity by participating in the plan confirmation
process, the terms of the plan may determine and extinguish the lien.476
A third type of proceeding involves “dischargeability.” Even if the debtor receives a general discharge, certain types of debts are
deemed to be “non-dischargeable” in individual debtors' bankruptcy cases.477 A ruling that a particular debt is not dischargeable
allows the creditor to enforce its claim against the debtor notwithstanding the discharge. An adversary proceeding is required to
determine dischargeability. Whether the adversary proceeding is commenced by the debtor or the creditor, however, depends
upon the nature of the claim.
For certain categories of potentially non-dischargeable debts, the creditor is required to file a complaint to determine
dischargeability.478 Such a proceeding is a suit, but it is by, rather than against, the state. If the creditor does not file a timely
complaint to determine dischargeability, the debt will be discharged.479 This result follows even if the state is the creditor
because the state is not excused from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that *30 require the timely filing of claims and
complaints to determine dischargeability.480
For the other categories of non-dischargeable debts, the Bankruptcy Code does not require that the creditor take any action
in the bankruptcy case to determine dischargeability.481 This latter group includes, significantly, priority tax claims.482 The
state has little incentive to file a complaint to determine dischargeability with respect to such claims because the state would
thereby submit to the court's jurisdiction with respect to the complaint and probably with respect to compulsory counterclaims
as well.483 Consequently, the debtor typically will either file a complaint to determine dischargeability or simply wait to see if
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the state attempts to enforce the claim after the bankruptcy case is closed. If the state files suit to collect on its claim, the debtor
will defend on the ground that the claim was discharged. In that case, the state court can determine the dischargeability issue.
The state probably will have waived any state court immunity by commencing the suit. If, however, the state employs nonjudicial collection efforts, the debtor typically will ask the bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy case to hear the debtor's
adversary complaint to determine dischargeability.484
Does the Eleventh Amendment bar the debtor's adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a state's claims?
Several courts have held *31 that it does (although these cases did not expressly consider whether the proceeding was a
“suit”).485 Such a proceeding is adversarial, compels the state's attendance, and is clearly a suit. It is less clear, however, whether
the suit is against the state.
The proceeding concerns the state's claims against the debtor, not the debtor's claims against the state. Also, unlike a lien
determination proceeding, a dischargeability determination does not impair the state's interests in any particular property.
Moreover, the action is closely linked to the discharge itself. Although it may not be a necessary prelude to the discharge, it
essentially seeks to define the scope of the discharge.
Certainly, if a claim is held to be dischargeable, the state's interests will be affected. Nevertheless, the impact is no different
than the impact of the discharge itself, which most courts have held is not a suit against the state. Arguably, it is inconsistent
to allow the discharge of a state's claims, and allow the debtor to raise the discharge as a defense, but to bar the debtor's action
to determine dischargeability simply because it occurs in the context of an action by the debtor. Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Amendment, as interpreted by Seminole, does seem to compel this result. Under immunity doctrine, a party cannot assert a
claim affirmatively against a state, but can assert the same claim defensively against the state if the state has waived immunity
by filing suit against the party.
Fortunately, the circumstances in which the debtor must raise dischargeability offensively rather than defensively are limited
because an unsecured creditor generally must use judicial processes to collect its claim. Tax claimants, however, may impose
liens without judicial process. Debtors have no forum in which to raise the discharge injunction defensively in such a case.
Moreover, even if the state is required to file suit in state court to collect a claim, the debtor may be subjected to the harassment
of non-judicial collection efforts before the suit is filed. The attorney can urge the debtor to remain firm and refuse to pay until
the state files suit, then assert the discharge injunction as a defense. At that point the state court will determine whether *32
the debt was dischargeable. This approach is risky, however, because the debtor cannot be certain that the state court ultimately
will find the debt to have been discharged. If the state court holds that the debt was not discharged, the debtor is likely to have
incurred additional fees and penalties during the period it refused to succumb to non-judicial collection efforts.
Fourth, adversary proceedings are also required for injunctive or other equitable relief.486 An action seeking to enjoin the state
typically is considered to be a suit against the state.487 As previously discussed, proceedings to enforce the stay or discharge
injunction might not be suits (unless they seek affirmative recovery). If, however, the debtor seeks to impose other injunctions
on the state, the action is a suit and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
c. Contested Matters
Finally, the third generalization is that contested matters determined after the debtor or trustee files a motion may or may not
be suits. Contested matters are so varied that it is impossible to extract any general rule. The result will depend on the nature
of the particular proceeding (several examples are discussed above).
It might be argued that no contested matter is a suit because contested matters do not compel any party's attendance. A party may
appear, and will be bound if it chooses not to appear. Some contested matters, however, might be suits. For example, a contested
matter might seek administrative relief, not directed at a particular party (e.g., motion to obtain credit, set a bar date, extend
the time for filing a plan).488 Others may seek specific relief against a particular party (e.g., motion to use cash collateral and
provide adequate protection).489 The former are not suits; the latter might be. In contested matters, the court should determine
on a case by case basis whether the proceeding is a suit against a state.490
In summary, even though a bankruptcy case may affect the interests of a *33 state, the case itself is not a suit against a state.
Also, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar administrative proceedings that do not involve suits against the state. These include
discharge, determination of a claim, determination of objections to a claim, determination of objections to the validity, extent
and priority of a lien, some dischargeability actions, and perhaps actions to enforce the discharge injunction or automatic stay
if the debtor does not seek affirmative recovery.
Certain other proceedings in the bankruptcy case probably are suits against the state. These clearly include adversary
proceedings in which the debtor seeks to recover money or property from the state, such as breach of contract actions, preference
and other avoidance power actions, most turnover actions, and probably actions to determine the validity, extent and priority
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of a lien if the state has not filed a claim. For simplicity, the remainder of this Article will focus on the debtors' options for
enforcing these types of actions against the states.
First, however, because it is clear that some bankruptcy actions do involve suits against the state, it is necessary to consider
whether Congress might abrogate the state's immunity with respect to those actions.
3. Is the Bankruptcy Code a Creature of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Can Congress abrogate states' immunity from suit in bankruptcy court? Seminole suggests that Congress cannot abrogate states'
immunity using its Article I powers, but reaffirms that Congress can abrogate states' immunity using its Fourteenth Amendment
powers.491 Debtors, seeking to take advantage of the Fourteenth Amendment “exception,” have argued that Congress may use
its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate states' immunity in bankruptcy cases, even though the Bankruptcy Code itself
is a creature of the Bankruptcy Clause.492
The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been the principal architect of the Fourteenth Amendment argument.
The DOJ has intervened in several bankruptcy cases and has filed (on behalf of itself and the United States Attorney General
and United States Attorney) a brief supporting the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Code's abrogation provisions (i.e.,
section 106(a)).493 The DOJ contends, inter alia, that the courts must look at the *34 Constitution in its entirety to determine
Congress's powers.494 The Court in Seminole prohibited Congress from using its Article I powers to abrogate states' immunity,
but never considered whether Congress might have achieved the same result using its Fourteenth Amendment powers.495 In the
bankruptcy context, the DOJ argues that bankruptcy relief is an exclusively federal right available to all national citizens.496
Although the rights and privileges of the Bankruptcy Code are secured under Article I, the DOJ suggests that section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is designed to guarantee that the states do not infringe on rights granted to national citizens by federal
law.497 The DOJ concludes that Congress may exercise its powers under section 5 and the Privileges and Immunities/Due
Process Clause of the *35 Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' immunity from federal court suits seeking to enforce
Bankruptcy Code rights.498
The DOJ has raised similar arguments in an effort to justify Congress's abrogation of states' immunity under other Article I
laws.499
Although this argument is simple and, in many ways, compelling, it suffers from several fatal flaws in the bankruptcy context.
The primary problem is that, under the DOJ's reasoning, the Fourteenth Amendment exception would permit Congress to
abrogate states' federal court immunity under any law that both grants federal rights to national citizens and allows citizens
to enforce those federal rights. If this were true, it would extend to so many federal laws that it would effectively eviscerate
Seminole. Although some scholars (particularly advocates of the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment) might
argue that this result would be desirable, it is inconsistent with Seminole's overruling of Union Gas. Consequently, it is necessary
to establish a basis for distinguishing those federal laws under which Congress can use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to
abrogate states' immunity from those laws under which Congress cannot use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate
states' immunity.
The DOJ attempts to distinguish the Bankruptcy Code from other federal laws by noting that Congress has the exclusive right
to regulate bankruptcy and that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy matters. *36 500 In contrast, both
state and federal governments regulate commerce and both state and federal courts exercise jurisdiction over actions arising
under Interstate Commerce Clause statutes.501 There are, however, several defects in this argument.
First, bankruptcy matters are neither the exclusive domain of federal regulation nor the exclusive domain of federal courts. The
Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies;502 however, states can and
do regulate the debtor-creditor relationship, including through receivership and exemption laws. Moreover, although federal
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, state courts share concurrent jurisdiction over federal
bankruptcy matters that arise under the Bankruptcy Code, or arise in a bankruptcy case.503
Second, a stronger exclusivity argument could be made with respect to the Indian Commerce Clause than with respect to the
Bankruptcy Clause because Congress truly does exercise exclusive regulatory power over Indian affairs. Yet, the Seminole
Court held that Congress has no power to abrogate states' immunity under an Indian Commerce Clause statute.
Third, and most significantly, it is not clear why federal exclusivity (even if it existed) should determine the extent to which
Congress can abrogate states' immunity.
The analysis of whether a law legitimately employs the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' immunity should focus,
instead, on the proper scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as a device for implementing federal law. Two questions define this
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inquiry. First, is the law an exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers (i.e., was the law enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment)? Second, is the law a legitimate exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers (i.e., did Congress have
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact such a law)?504
*37 As to the first question, most courts agree that Congress need not expressly state that it is using its Fourteenth Amendment
powers, nor even subjectively “intend” to use its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Instead, many courts undertake an “objective
inquiry,” in which they ask simply whether Congress could have enacted the law under the Fourteeth Amendment.505 It is
possible, however, that a court would decline to find a Fourteenth Amendment basis for a law if Congress clearly stated that it
did not intend to enact the law under its Fourteenth Amendment powers.506
*38 Other courts apply the “logical connection” test articulated in Wilson-Jones v. Caviness.507 In Wilson-Jones, the Sixth
Circuit considered whether one may “regard the legislation as an enactment to enforce the [Fourteenth Amendment].”508 The
court reasoned that “[t]he simplest way to meet this requirement is for Congress to declare explicitly that the legislation is
passed to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights.”509 If Congress does not explicitly identify the source of its power as the
Fourteenth Amendment, “there must be something about the act connecting it to recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims.”510
Some courts have retitled this test the “rationally related” text.511 Others, applying basically the same test, ask whether the
statute has a “rational relation” or “rational connection” to the Fourteenth Amendment.512
Courts that find that a statute was or could have been enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment have employed several different,
although generally compatible, tests to determine whether the law is “appropriate legislation” within the scope of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment powers.
Several courts have expressly applied the test that the Supreme Court established three decades ago in Katzenbach v. Morgan.513
Under this test “a statute is ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if the enactment is ‘plainly
adapted’ to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause *39 and not prohibited by but is consistent with ‘the letter and spirit of
the [C]onstitution.”’514
In 1997, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores,515 the Court emphasized that Fourteenth Amendment legislation must be designed
to remedy or deter constitutional violations, rather than to impose new substantive constitutional rights.516 In determining
whether an act is remedial or deterrent, “there must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect.”517 Boerne modifies Katzenbach by prohibiting Congress from creating new substantive rights, even if those rights are
“not prohibited by” the Constitution.518
*40 Several courts have focused on the Boerne test;519 others have used it in conjunction with the Katzenbach test.520
Courts applying these tests (or less concrete tests) have held that Title IX521 and the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act522 are valid exercises of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate states' immunity. Most courts have
held that abrogation under the Americans With Disabilities Act is legitimate under the Fourteenth Amendment,523 although
a *41 couple of courts have disagreed.524 Courts have rejected arguments that abrogation under the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act,525 Family and Medical Leave Act,526 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,527
Copyright Act,528 Crime Control Consent Act,529 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,530 and Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act531 are valid exercises of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. The overwhelming
majority of courts have refused to permit Congress to abrogate states' immunity under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”),532 although most courts have held that Congress does have *42 authority to abrogate states' immunity under the
Equal Pay Act (an amendment to the FLSA).533 Similarly, most courts have held that abrogation under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (an amendment to the FLSA) is *43 a valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers,534
although several courts have disagreed.535
In the bankruptcy context, three circuit courts of appeal and the vast majority of lower courts have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be used to justify section 106(a)'s abrogation of states' bankruptcy court immunity.536 Most of these
cases have used the rational relation/logical connection *44 test to determine whether section 106(a) was enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment.537
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It is difficult to establish a rational relation or logical connection between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Code
because the Bankruptcy Code was not enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment and is not designed to foster the objectives
of the Fourteenth Amendment.538 Neither the Bankruptcy Code, in general, nor section 106(a), in particular, seek to protect
citizens against state actions or laws that result in civil rights violations, disparate impact, invidious discrimination, takings
without due process, or unequal protection to citizens.539 Instead, the Bankruptcy Code is concerned primarily with establishing
a single forum for collective action against a debtor and granting the debtor a discharge of its debts.
The DOJ argues, broadly, that the Fourteenth Amendment extends to all privileges of citizenship, such that any state action that
infringes on any federal right available to national citizens violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument fails, however,
because bankruptcy is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship.540 Even if it were, it is not clear how a state's immunity
infringes on a debtor's rights in bankruptcy.
Consequently, most bankruptcy scholars and constitutional law scholars reject efforts to extend the Fourteenth Amendment
exception to suits filed in federal bankruptcy court to enforce Bankruptcy Code causes of action.541
To date, only two post-Seminole courts have held that section 106(a) is *45 constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.542
Each of these cases was appealed; however, the circuit courts declined to consider whether abrogation was appropriate because
the states' waiver of immunity mooted the issue543
In summary, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits filed against the states in bankruptcy court to enforce the Bankruptcy Code.
Although some administrative proceedings may not involve “suits” against the state, many other proceedings, including most
adversary proceedings, do involve suits against the state. As to these matters, Congress cannot use its powers under either
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate states' immunity. How, then, can the trustee enforce the
Bankruptcy Code against the states?
B. ENFORCING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AGAINST THE STATES
Justice Stevens argued that the Seminole majority opinion eviscerates Congress's power to enact federal law because it
effectively prevents citizens from suing states to enforce federal law, including the Bankruptcy Code.544
This Part identifies five potential means of enforcing federal law against the states, and considers the viability of these
alternatives in the context of *46 the Bankruptcy Code.545 First, can the trustee sue the state in federal bankruptcy court if
the state waives immunity or consents to be sued (Part IV.B.1)? Second, can the trustee sue the state in state court without
the state's consent (Part IV.B.2)? These first two alternatives have received the most attention by commentators because they
would provide the simplest and most effective means of litigating against the states in the absence of congressional abrogation.
The viability of these enforcement devices depends, however, upon the nature of states' federal court immunity and the scope
of states' state court immunity. Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 consider the extent to which these devices are viable after Seminole
and the extent to which their limitations impair enforcement.546
The next three options are suggested by footnotes in the Seminole majority opinion.547 They are: Supreme Court review of a
question of federal bankruptcy law that arises from a state court action (Part IV.B.3), citizen suits filed in federal court against
state officials rather than the state itself, (Part IV.B.4), and federal government enforcement suits (Part IV.B.5). Although these
methods are viable, they are significantly narrower in scope than the first two options. Parts IV.B.3 through IV.B.5 consider
the extent to which these more limited alternatives might be effective in enforcing the Bankruptcy Code against the states.
For simplicity, Part IV emphasizes those actions to which the Eleventh Amendment clearly applies (i.e., “suits”). These include
actions seeking to recover money or property from the estate, such as preferential transfers, turnover of tax refunds, and state
law contract claims.
1. Sue in Federal Bankruptcy Court if the State Consents or Waives Immunity?
Under traditional common law immunity doctrine, a sovereign may agree (impliedly by waiver or affirmatively by consent)548
to be bound in a citizen *47 suit filed in the state's own court.549 Waiver and consent do not completely obviate the immunity
hurdle because they require some degree of state cooperation before a suit may proceed. Nevertheless, a chance to sue the state
after it has waived immunity or consented to suit is better than no chance at all.
Waiver and consent are compatible with common law immunity doctrine because common law immunity is “merely” a personal
privilege granted to the sovereign.550 This privilege is a practical necessity because a state's own courts cannot impose justice
on the state if the state resists.551 The state's consent obviates this problem.
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Before Seminole, courts assumed that the trustee could sue a state in federal bankruptcy court if the state consented to suit or
was deemed to have waived its immunity.552 This assumption seemed unremarkable because the Supreme Court had routinely
held that a state could waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal court, just as a state might waive its immunity and
consent to suit in its own courts.553 After Seminole, most courts and commentators continue to assume that the trustee may
sue a consenting state in *48 bankruptcy court.554 Seminole throws this conclusion into doubt, however, because it defines
states' federal court immunity as a jurisdictional bar rather than a mere personal privilege of the sovereign.555 Consequently,
after Seminole, implied waiver raises different jurisdictional questions than affirmative consent. This Part considers Seminole's
effect, first, on waiver and, then, on consent.
a. Waiver
Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, a state probably can “waive” immunity and thereby essentially
confer jurisdiction upon a federal court, but only in limited circumstances. For purposes of this discussion, “limited waiver”
occurs when the state initiates action in federal court and, thereby, subjects itself to the determination of both its claim and
compulsory counterclaims.556 “Constructive waiver,” in contrast, may occur (to the extent that it remains a viable doctrine)
when the state subjects itself to suit in federal court by participating in activities that Congress has regulated.557 In contrast,
“consent” occurs when the state voluntarily agrees to a suit (Part IV.B.1.b).
The courts generally agree that when a state sues a private citizen in federal court the state “waives” immunity and subjects
itself to the court's jurisdiction with respect to certain counterclaims. This limited waiver applies only to counterclaims that are
(1) compulsory counterclaims that arise from the same transaction or occurence as the state's claim,558 (2) asserted defensively
to reduce the state's claim but not to allow affirmative recovery *49 against the state.559 Federal court jurisdiction in these
circumstances does not violate the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar because neither Article III nor the Eleventh
Amendment limits federal courts' power over suits by states against citizens. Where the court has jurisdiction over a suit by the
state, judicial economy and fairness dictate that it also exercise jurisdiction over a narrowly defined range of related matters
that are necessary to resolve the state's suit. If waiver were not viable, states could file suit with impunity in a federal forum,
demanding recovery and permitting no objection. Thus, “limited waiver” under the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule,
is a practical necessity. Nothing in Seminole expressly prohibits the courts from exercising jurisdiction over this limited type
of compulsory counterclaim.
In a bankruptcy case, the federal court action that subjects the state to counterclaims usually consists of the filing of a proof of
claim in the bankruptcy case.560 The Supreme Court has long held that objections to the state's claim are not “suits against the
state,” and that the bankruptcy court has jurisdicition to determine those objections in the process of determining the claim.561
These cases do not, however, elaborate the types of counterclaims that the debtor may assert against a state that has filed a
claim. The Bankruptcy Code purports to fill this gap by defining the scope of waiver.
The Bankruptcy Code contains two distinct waiver provisions. The first *50 deals with claims that arise from the same
transaction (i.e., recoupment); the other deals with claims that arise from different transactions (i.e., setoff).562 Each of these
“limited waiver” provisions, however, is more liberal than the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule.
Under the Bankruptcy Code's recoupment rule, a state that files a claim in a bankruptcy case is deemed to have waived immunity
with respect to all of the bankruptcy estate's counterclaims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the state's
claim.563 This rule is broader than the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule because the bankruptcy rule allows affirmative
recovery against the state, including punitive damages.564
If the trustee's action against the state were limited to defensive compulsory counterclaims, then the state would face little risk
in filing a claim in a *51 bankruptcy case. For example, assume that the state files a tax claim of $10,000, expects a ten percent
distribution ($1,000), is aware that the trustee contends that the claim is only worth $5,000, and is aware that the trustee might
seek to recover $40,000 in preferential payments and tax refunds relating to the same taxable event as the state's claim.565
Under a defensive compulsory counterclaim rule, the state's waiver would allow the court (i) to reduce the claim to $5,000 if
the objection is upheld, and (ii) to reduce the claim to zero if the preference and tax refund counterclaims are upheld, but (iii)
not to require the state to make any payments to the estate.
Under the bankruptcy recoupment rule, however, the state faces a choice. It can either forego immunity in order to participate
in the case and receive distributions on its claim, or it can forego distributions on its claim in order to avoid being sued by the
estate for claims arising from the same transaction as the state's claim. In the foregoing example, the bankruptcy rule allows the
court to (i) reduce the claim to $5,000 if the objection is upheld, (ii) reduce the claim to zero if the preference and tax refund
counterclaims are upheld, and (iii) require the state to pay $35,000 to the estate if the objection and the preference and tax
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refund counterclaims are upheld. The state would be better off not filing a claim. It would lose any distribution on its claim,
but would avoid having to pay the preference and refund.
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code contains a “setoff rule” that is broader than the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule. The
bankruptcy setoff rule allows the bankruptcy estate to set off all of its claims against the state's claim, even if the claims arise
from different transactions or occurrences.566 The bankruptcy setoff rule is narrower than the bankruptcy recoupment rule
because the setoff rule simply allows the debtor or trustee to reduce the state's recovery, it does not allow the debtor to obtain
affirmative recovery against the state. The setoff rule is, however, much broader than the defensive counterclaim rule because
the setoff rule is not limited to compulsory counterclaims. For example, if the state files a tax claim, the debtor could set off
a claim arising from the same transaction (such as a refund claim), or a very remote transaction (such as a claim for personal
injury arising from the state's failure to maintain a public walkway). The requirement is simply mutuality of claims.
To the extent that the recoupment rule of section 106(b) and the setoff rule *52 of section 106(c) grant federal courts broader
jurisdiction over states than the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule, they are akin to abrogation. They constitute an attempt
by Congress to expand federal court's jurisdiction beyond that permitted under the Eleventh Amendment. Consequently, if
defensive compulsory counterclaims are the only constitutionally permissible exception to the Eleventh Amendment, then the
Bankruptcy Code's “limited waiver” rules appear to be unconstitutional under Seminole, at least to the extent that they are
broader than the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule.567
*53 Some states have also argued the these rules are invalid to the extent that they permit waiver by an state official who was
not authorized to waive immunity. Most acknowledge, however, that the official cannot assert authority to file a claim yet deny
authority to subject the state to the consequences of filing a claim.568
The final waiver question is whether the Bankruptcy Code's waiver provisions might be constitutionally permissible under the
doctrine of constructive waiver, if that doctrine remains viable after Seminole.569 Under constructive *54 waiver “a state is
deemed to consent to suit in federal court if it voluntarily engages in some activity that Congress previously declared could
lead to liability on the part of the state in federal court.”570 Constructive waiver is viable only if (1) Congress's authority to
regulate within its enumerated powers includes the authority to condition states' participation in federally regulated activities
on states' consent to federal court enforcement, and (2) states' consent, express or implied, can confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. In contrast, the defensive compulsory counterclaim rule is
based on the fairness and judicial efficiency of having the entirety of a claim, including defenses and compulsory counterclaims,
determined in one judicial proceeding. It requires neither congressional authority nor states' consent. Similarly, abrogation does
not require states' consent. It does, however, require that Congress have power to subject states to federal court jurisdiction
without their consent.
As previously discussed, constructive waiver dates back to the 1964 case of Parden v. Terminal Railways.571 In Parden, the
Court held that a state's operation of a common carrier in interstate commerce subjected the state to suit in federal court to
enforce a federal law regulating common carriers.
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court circumscribed the reach of the constructive waiver doctrine in several ways.
First, the Court held that constructive waiver would not be found where the federal regulation related to a core state government
function (in which the state must participate) rather than an activity in which the state could voluntarily choose to participate or
not participate.572 Second, the Court expressly overruled Parden to the extent that it “is inconsistent with the requirement that
an abrogation of *55 Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language.”573
Although the Supreme Court never expressly overruled the portion of Parden that permits a clearly expressed constructive
waiver with respect to non-core governmental functions, many courts have questioned whether constructive waiver remains
constitutionally viable after Seminole.574 These courts reason that constructive waiver is indistinguishable from abrogation.575
This reasoning is consistent with Justice Scalia's argument, in his Union Gas dissent, that the Court should overrule Parden
because constructive *56 waiver is no different than abrogation.576 If, as the Court held in Seminole, the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits Congress from using its Article I powers to expand federal courts' Article III jurisdiction, it should also prohibit
Congress from using those same powers to “condition” states' participation in federal programs on states' consent to federal
court jurisdiction. Moreover, constructive waiver could undermine Seminole's prohibition on abrogation because it would allow
Congress to impose waiver conditions under an extensive array of federal laws.
The Fifth Circuit and at least one lower have concluded that Seminole effectively eviscerated Parden and, consequently, that
constructive waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity is unconstitutional.577
Without an express statement from the Court, however, most courts *57 (including the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits)
have been reluctant to find that the Supreme Court has overruled Parden.578 A few post-Seminole courts have held that a state
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constructively waived immunity.579 These courts generally reason that Welch expressly overruled only part of Parden,580 and
Seminole declined the invitiation (made clear in Justice Scalia's Union Gas dissent) to overrule the remainder of Parden.581
Other lower courts have held *58 that, even if constructive waiver remains viable, its requirements had not been satisfied.582
Those courts that accept the continued viability of constructive waiver define narrowly the circumstances in which a waiver
will be found. As stated by the Third Circuit in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,583 constructive waiver occurs only if:
(1) Congress enacts a law under which a state is deemed to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity if the state engages in
activity covered by the law;
(2) the law imposes this condition through a clear statement that gives notice to the states;
(3) the state voluntarily engages in the activity covered by the federal law; and
(4) the activity in question is not an important or core government function.584
*59 In the bankruptcy context, constructive waiver raises the narrow question whether a state that files a proof of claim thereby
subjects itself to setoffs and counterclaims other than defensively asserted compulsory counterclaims.585
The first two elements of the narrowed Parden doctrine appear to be satisfied. The Bankruptcy Code is a federal law regulating
bankruptcy, including the determination of claims in a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy Code sections 106(b) and 106(c) clearly
express the terms and scope of the waiver that may occur if the state files a claim in a bankruptcy case.586 Focussing only on
these considerations, a few bankruptcy cases have held that a state may constructively waive immunity by filing a claim in a
bankruptcy case.587 The remaining elements, however, are not clearly satisfied in the bankruptcy context.
First, it may be argued that the filing of a proof of claim is not a “voluntary” determination to enter a regulated activity if the
filing of such a claim is the only means by which the state can enforce its pre-existing state law rights.588 This argument seems
inconsistent, however, with the cases that have long held that the filing of a claim is a waiver, at least for purposes of defensive
compulsory counterclaims.
*60 Second, and perhaps more significantly, debt collection may fall within the scope of the essential government function
exception. The core government function element has not been elaborated extensively by the courts. The only recent nonbankruptcy cases that have found a constructive waiver have involved the Telecommunications Act and Title XI.589 Under
these laws, the state may choose to accept some tangible, optional new benefit from the federal government, conditioned on
the state's waiver of federal court immunity. A state that chooses to use the public airwaves is regulated in its use of those
airwaves. A state that chooses to accept federal funding for education is regulated in its use of those funds. In contrast, federal
regulation of bankruptcy offers the state no quid pro quo. The state already has a right to have its debts paid. Debt collection
is a basic function in which states typically have engaged since long before the enactment of federal bankruptcy law. It is not
an optional activity that a state might choose to pursue or not pursue. One might argue that the Bankruptcy Code accords states
an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy distribution scheme. That scheme, however, confers no new substantive rights
on the state. Instead, it imposes strict limits on the state's exercise of its pre-existing state or federal law debt-collection rights.
Consequently, even if constructive waiver remains viable after Seminole, the Bankruptcy Code's waiver and setoff provisions
may impose an improper condition on a core state function (debt collection).
Finally, constructive waiver is viable only if the state's consent (either express or implied through participation in a federally
regulated activity) is adequate to confer jurisdiction on a federal court after Seminole. Part IV.B.1.b considers this issue.
b. Consent
For purposes of this discussion, “consent” occurs when the state affirmatively agrees to be bound as a defendant in a suit to
which it would otherwise have been immune.
A state might simply agree to be bound in a particular case.590 More commonly, however, consent is evidenced by state statutory
or constitutional provisions under which the state agrees to forego immunity, under defined *61 circumstances,591 for specific
categories of suits.592 A state's waiver will be construed to apply only to suits in the state's own courts, not federal court,
however, unless the statute expressly provides that the state intends to subject itself to suit in federal court.593
Consent differs significantly from waiver because consent may permit suit against a state other than for defensively asserted
compulsory counterclaims. Such suits raise two questions. First, how likely is it that the state will consent to suit in federal
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bankruptcy court? Second, can the federal bankruptcy court exercise jurisdiction over a suit that exposes the state to liability
beyond defensively asserted compulsory counterclaims if the state consents?
*62 In the bankruptcy context, a state might choose to file a claim or adversary proceeding, even though it will thereby waive
immunity with respect to defensive compulsory counterclaims, because the benefits of recovering on its claim may outweigh
the risks.594 It is harder to understand why a state would simply agree to be bound in a bankruptcy court suit seeking recovery of
a preference, turnover of property, or damages under a contract claim. Consequently, as a practical matter, cases that raise true
“consent” issues, as distinguished from “waiver” issues, are likely to be quite rare. These issues remain important, however,
because they also underlie constructive waiver (to the extent that that doctrine remains viable) and define the extent to which
the debtor may assert counterclaims and setoff rights against a state that files a claim.
Can a suit filed by the trustee against the state in federal bankruptcy court to recover a preference, compel the turnover of
property or enforce a contract claim, proceed with the state's consent?
Under Seminole, states' “immunity” in federal question suits filed in federal court is not merely a personal privilege accorded
to the sovereign. Rather, the state is “immune” from suit because, under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts have no
“judicial power” over citizen suits against states.595 In other words, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.596 Only
by raising immunity to a jurisdictional bar was the Court able to prohibit congressional abrogation. First, if states' federal court
immunity arose under federal common law, Congress probably could abrogate that immunity.597 Moreover, by characterizing
states' immunity as a jurisdictional bar, the Court overcame arguments that a countervailing constitutional principle would allow
Congress to abrogate states' immunity.598 Consequently, it seems that the majority's view of not only the *63 constitutional
source but also the jurisdictional nature of states' immunity is fundamental and critical to the Court's holding.599
If federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction is defined by the Constitution and cannot be modifed except under a constitutional
amendment, how can jurisdiction possibly be expanded merely by a party's “consent”? A party cannot waive a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (unlike a lack of personal jurisdiction).600 Consequently, a jurisdictional bar that can be waived is doctrinally
incoherent.
Refusing to permit states to consent to suit in federal court would be shocking in light of a long line of cases in which the
Supreme Court has held that a state may waive immunity and consent to jurisdiction in federal court.601 Before Seminole,
however, consent was permissible because the jurisdictional nature of states' federal court immunity was far from clear.
First, the justices were split concerning whether state's immunity in federal question cases arose under the Eleventh Amendment
or the common law.602 Moreover, those cases that referred to states' federal question immunity as being jurisdictional did so
primarily in the context of whether a state could raise the immunity defense for the first time on appeal and whether the court
could raise the issue sua sponte.603 These cases generally did not discuss a comprehensive bar, but rather, noted that “the
Eleventh *64 Amendment immunity defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be
raised in the trial court.”604
Similarly, constitutional law scholars have explained the consent cases by suggesting that, even if the Eleventh Amendment
imposes a jurisdictional bar, it is a bar only in the sense that it may be asserted for the first time on appeal. It is not a complete bar
that would prohibit consent or abrogation.605 This rationale may explain the Court's earlier decisions, but it is hard to reconcile
with Seminole's insistence that the Amendment limits federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction.
After Seminole, it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment does impose a jurisdictional bar. The effect of such a bar on states' ability
to consent to suit in federal court should have been expected. Before Seminole, judges and commentators issued dire warnings
against interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar that extended to citizen suits filed against states in federal
court to enforce federal law. Justice Stevens, for example, repeatedly argued that states' immunity in federal question actions
filed in federal court must arise from the common law rather than from the Eleventh Amendment because the Amendment
imposes a jurisdictional bar that cannot be reconciled with jurisdiction by consent.606 Yet, some commentators who earlier
argued that a jurisdictional bar might preclude states from consenting *65 to federal court jurisdiction, are now reluctant to
accept Seminole's consequences.607
Post-Seminole bankruptcy cases that purport to allow states to consent to suit in bankruptcy court are of little guidance because
most of these cases actually involve waiver (i.e., whether the state waived immunity by filing a claim or adversary proceeding)
rather than consent.608
*66 A true consent issue did arise, however, in Gorka v. Sullivan.609 In Gorka, the Seventh Circuit applied Seminole to a case
in which the state had essentially “consented” to suit in federal court by removing the case from state court to federal court.610
The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to state court, reasoning that removal is permitted only in cases in which the federal
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court would have had original jurisdiction.611 Because the underlying suit was a federal question suit against a state, the federal
court would not have had original jurisdiction.612 Because Seminole held that federal courts have no original jurisdiction over
citizen suits against state, the state could not confer jurisdiction by consent.
Seminole never actually considered whether a state could consent to suit in federal court because the issue was not presented. The
majority opinion states, in passing, that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment prevents Congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States.”613 In the Court's elaboration of alternative methods of enforcing federal law against the
states, however, the Court never suggests that a citizen might sue a state in federal court with the states' consent. This omission
seems particularly significant because the Court does expressly note that a citizen could sue a state in state court with the state's
consent.614 Thus, the Court's earlier reference to “unconsenting” states may simply mean that a citizen *67 can sue a state in
state court with the state's consent to enforce federal law. It could be argued, however, that the Court failed to include suit in
federal court with the state's consent because that doctrine was so well established that it required no mention.
There is no evidence that the Seminole Court intended to prohibit states from consenting to suit in federal court. Rather, the
Court intended to prohibit Congress from abrogating states' federal court immunity. To achieve this result, the Court raised
immunity to a jurisdictional bar. Although Seminole's result has been heavily criticized, the result is unlikely to change (at least
until the composition of the Court changes).
Is there a way to reconcile or reinterpret Seminole in order to obviate the doctrinal incoherence of a waivable jurisdictional
bar? In other words, might Seminole prohibit Congress from abrogating states' federal court immunity but still allow states to
consent to citizens' federal question suits filed in federal court?
There are three possibilities, none of which provide an entirely satisfactory resolution.615
First, the nature of the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar has never been precisely defined.616 Perhaps it could be
construed as barring personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction.617 A party over whom a court has no personal
jurisdiction may voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction (if the court has subject matter jurisdiction). This approach would
also prohibit abrogation. If the Eleventh Amendment confers upon states a personal jurisdiction defense, Congress cannot
abrogate that constitutional defense. Thus, a personal jurisdictional bar can be reconciled with a doctrine that allows consent
but prohibits abrogation. Perhaps it could even be *68 reconciled with the Amendment because the Amendment focusses on
particular party, i.e., the states.
The personal jurisdiction approach, in fact, underlies early Supreme Court consent cases.618 Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent
with Seminole, which seems to view the Amendment as imposing a subject matter jurisdictional bar. Also, it would not explain
the cases that allow the state to raise the Amendment's jurisdictional bar for the first time on appeal, because a lack of personal
jurisdiction is waived if not raised in the trial court.619
Second, perhaps the Eleventh Amendment simultaneously imposes a jurisdictional bar and contains a countervailing
constitutional principle that allows jurisdiction by consent. In other words, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over citizen suits against unconsenting states. This would cleanly eliminate the incoherence. The
difficulty, however, lies in identifying anything in the crisp language of the Amendment that permits consent. Such a principle
exists, if at all, in an underlying “postulate.” What would the nature of such a postulate be? In essence, it would hold, that the
Amendment itself incorporates some aspects or characteristics of common law immunity. Specifically, it retains the notion that
the state may consent to or waive immunity. It would not permit Congress to abrogate immunity because the common law did
not allow abrogation (a state could waive its immunity, but no outside power could eliminate its immunity). Even if Congress
can modify common law doctrines, it cannot modify a doctrine that has been transformed into a constitutional principle. This
approach probably can be reconciled with earlier cases, but it imposes a heavy burden on the language of the Amendment.
Third, if the Court had not interpreted the Amendment to impose a jurisdictional bar, the Court could easily have devised a
doctrine that would grant states immunity, prohibit Congress from abrogating that immunity, and allow states to consent to
suit. The Court could simply reinterpret states' federal court immunity as a constitutional right but not a jurisdictional bar. This
interpretation would allow waiver because, although a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, constitutional rights
may be waived. This approach would prohibit abrogation because Congress cannot abrogate *69 a constitutional right (an
obvious example is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which a defendant may waive but Congress cannot eliminate). This
approach is compelling in its simplicity, but it is, of course, impossible to reconcile with Seminole's specific reasoning that the
Amendment imposes a jurisdictional bar. It is also difficult to reconcile with the language of the Amendment.
In summary, if a state files a claim (or adversary proceeding) in a bankruptcy case, the limited waiver rule appears to provide a
viable means of subjecting the state to defensive compulsory counterclaims. Consequently, the trustee should be able to assert
(at least defensively) a preference, turnover, or breach of contract claim that arises from the same transaction as the state's claim.
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It is less clear whether the Parden constructive waiver doctrine would permit the debtor either to assert counterclaims for
affirmative recovery or to setoff claims that arise from transactions other than the transaction underlying the state's claim.
It is difficult to imagine that the Court will prohibit states from consenting to citizen suits filed in federal court to enforce federal
law. It may be even more difficult, however, to reconcile states' consent to suit with the Court's characterization of immunity
as a jurisdictional bar.
Finally, even if consent is a viable means of obtaining federal court jurisdiction, the state is unlikely to consent to the trustee's
preference, turnover or breach of contract suit.
2. Sue in State Court Without the State's Consent?
In Seminole's wake, several state attorneys general have suggested that the trustee should simply sue the state in state court to
enforce federal bankruptcy law620 causes of action.621
*70 State court is usually a less desirable forum than federal bankruptcy court as a matter of bankruptcy policy. Forcing the
trustee to litigate in multiple fora increases cost and inconvenience for the trustee and decreases efficiency for both the trustee
and the courts.622 Bankruptcy judges have extensive expertise applying the complex language of the Bankruptcy Code. They
are also well-versed in the literally thousands of cases that elaborate the scope, limitations, defenses and other intricacies of
common bankruptcy actions such as the automatic stay,623 and the avoidance of preferential transfers.624 Even if state court
judges ultimately decide bankruptcy issues correctly, they can not do so as efficiently as bankruptcy courts because state courts
have little, if any, experience in bankruptcy matters.
A state might argue that state court is more convenient and less costly for the state. It is not clear, however, why this would
be true if the federal court and state court were in the same state. Moreover, cynics might wonder whether the state attorneys
general who so adamently insist that suits proceed in state court rather than federal court expect some other advantage of being
sued in their home fora.
In any event, despite the drawbacks of suing in state court, state court would be preferable to no forum at all.
The trustee should have little problem obtaining subject matter jurisdiction in state court. Even though federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case itself, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over virtually every federal
bankruptcy law cause of action that the trustee might *71 assert against the states.625 Thus, in most situations, the trustee
probably “can” sue a state in state court to enforce federal bankruptcy law.
The more significant question, however, is whether the trustee can sue an unconsenting state in state court to enforce federal
law, including the Bankruptcy Code.626 In the bankruptcy context, it is unlikely that a state will simply consent to be sued
in, for example, an action to recover damages for a violation of the automatic stay,627 or to recover money or property from
state as a preferential transfer.628
Commentators who argue that citizens can sue unconsenting states in state court to enforce federal law reason, correctly, that
the Eleventh Amendment only bars suit in federal court, not in state court.629 Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment cannot
possibly accord states immunity from suits filed in state courts. They conclude that the Eleventh Amendment is “merely” a
“forum-selection” provision that requires the federal court to transfer a suit to state court if the state does not consent to suit
in the federal court.630
*72 It is true that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts; but this begs the question. Traditional immunity631
protects an unconsenting state from a state court federal question suit unless the Constitution eliminated (or granted Congress
power to eliminate) states' traditional immunity with respect to federal question actions.
Under even the narrowest interpretation of traditional immunity, a state is immune from all suits filed against the state in its
own courts.632 The source of the law is irrelevent; a state is as immune from suit under another state's law or a foreign country's
law as it is from suit under its own law.633 Federal law, however, is the law of a higher sovereign. Does the supremacy of
federal law under the Constitution eliminate (or permit Congress to eliminate) state's traditional immunity with respect to suits
to enforce federal law?
Nothing in the Constitution refers directly or indirectly to states' immunity. The Supremacy Clause, however, provides that the
Constitution and federal laws are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
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in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”634 Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is the
law in every state, state court judges must enforce federal law,635 and states may not enact laws that conflict with federal law.
Some commentators argue that the Supremacy Clause either abrogates or *73 permits Congress to abrogate state's traditional
immunity.636 This argument reasons that any federal law that binds the states overrides any state law that grants the state
immunity (in contrast, states enjoy immunity in federal court under federal, constitutional law). This conclusion presumably
would extend to claims asserted directly under the Constitution, because the Constitution is federal law that binds the states.
It also would extend to federal statutes that create a cause of action against the states. Congress, acting within the scope of
its enumerated powers, including Article I,637 may enact federal laws that bind the states, within the constraints of the Tenth
Amendment.638
This argument is, at least, plausible. It has traditionally been supposed that Congress can alter the common law, at least the
federal common law.639 Diversity proponents have argued unsuccessfully that states' federal question immunity in federal court
arises only under the common law and is, therefore, subject to congressional abrogation.640 Seminole expressly rejected the
diversity view when it held that states' federal court immunity arises exclusively under the Eleventh Amendment. States' state
court immunity, however, is not rooted in the Eleventh Amendment or elsewhere in the national Constitution. Thus, it might
be supposed that Congress has the power to modify state common law, or state statutes or constitutions, simply by acting under
its enumerated powers. If so, suing unconsenting states in state court would provide a means of allowing citizens to enforce
federal law and would assuage some of the concerns of the diversity proponents.
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of suing unconsenting states in state court, the two lines of cases on which supporters
rely do not clearly establish *74 that citizens may sue unconsenting states in state court to enforce federal law.641 Moreover,
such a rule would be an ironic end to a doctrine that has been characterized by expansion of states' traditional immunity and
restriction of Congress's power to subject unconsenting states to private citizen suits.642 Consequently, some commentators
assume that, even though a citizen may sue a state in state court to enforce federal law, the suit may not proceed without the
state's consent.643
The first line of cases establishes two distinct propositions. First, Congress must create a cause of action against states before a
federal statute may be enforced against a state.644 Second, states may not grant immunity to persons who are subject to federal
law and are not entitled to federal court immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.645 The second line of cases permits federal
courts to review certain state court rulings in favor of states on matters of federal law.646
The first line of cases begins with two important interpretations of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 (“Section 1983”).647 Under Section 1983, any “person” who, under color of state law, deprives a person
of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizenship, is liable to the person injured.648
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,649 an individual filed suit in state court under Section 1983 alleging that the
state police department and the director of state police, in his official capacity, had violated the plaintiff's civil rights.650 The
Court held that neither the state nor the state official *75 acting in his official capacity was a “person” who could be liable
under Section 1983.651 Earlier federal court cases had not addressed this question squarely because the Eleventh Amendment
would have protected the state and its officials from suit, even if the language of the statute covered them.652 Will, however,
arose in state court, where the Eleventh Amendment does not apply.653
First, reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment's clear statement rule should be followed whenever Congress seeks to alter
the balance between the state and federal governments, the Court stated that: “Congress should make its intention ‘clear and
manifest’ if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.”654 Noting that that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity
was a familiar doctrine at common law,”655 the Court held that “[w]e cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard
the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent.”656
Second, Section 1983 was designed to provide a federal forum to remedy civil rights violations by persons acting under color
of state law.657 Congress could have abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to provide a federal forum for
private citizen suits to remedy civil rights violations by states as well, but it chose not to do so. The Court could not accept
that Congress nevertheless had choosen to create a cause of action against states that could be filed in state courts, the very
forum the law was intended to avoid.658
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Under Will, a federal statute does not apply to states unless Congress expressly includes states in the category of permissible
defendants.659 Two limitations caution against blithely interpreting Will to mean that Congress *76 can abrogate states' state
court sovereign immunity simply by making its intention clear and manifest in the language of a federal statute.
First, the issue in Will was whether Congress had created a cause of action against the states, not whether the creation of a
cause of action would also abrogate state's immunity. Will did not even raise an immunity issue. The Court drew strong support
from Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence because it found that Section 1983 was not designed to apply to parties
protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, the Court employed an immunity analysis solely as an aid to statutory
interpretation.660
Second, Congress enacted Section 1983 under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress power
to abrogate states' immunity. Congress has used that power in the past to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.661
Consequently, even if Will does have abrogation implications, it might simply mean that Congress may use its Fourteenth
Amendment powers to abrogate state's traditional state court immunity. Will, alone, however, does not hold that Congress has
abrogation powers other than those granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. As previously established, Congress cannot use its
Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to most laws enacted under
Article I, including the Bankruptcy Code.662
Like Will, Howlett v. Rose663 involved a Section 1983 action filed in state court.664 Howlett presented the converse of Will,
however, because Howlett involved a suit against a Florida state school board. Unlike the state in Will, the school board
was subject to suit under Section 1983 and would not have been protected by the Eleventh Amendment if the suit had been
filed in federal court.665 Will clearly foreshadowed this circumstance by distinguishing between the state (and state officials
acting in their official capacity), which is protected by both the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, *77 666
and municipalities, which are not protected by either the Eleventh Amendment or traditional sovereign immunity.667 Indeed,
Howlett cited Will for the proposition that “an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a “person” within the meaning
of § 1983.”668 In Howlett, however, Florida's law included school boards in the category of state entities entitled to immunity.669
The Florida District Court of Appeal held that sovereign immunity prohibited the court from exercising jurisdiction.670
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Florida court must accept jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the school board's immunity claim.671 The Court supported this conclusion by repeating its previously
established rule that a state court of general jurisdiction may not refuse jurisdiction over a suit to enforce federal law, absent
a valid excuse.672 Although neutral rules of judicial administration might constitute a valid excuse, a state law denying state
courts jurisdiction over suits against select groups, such as state officials or school boards, on the basis of sovereign immunity
was not a valid excuse.673
Commentators often cite Howlett to support the much broader proposition that a state may not assert sovereign immunity as
a defense in a federal question suit commenced against the state in state court.674 Howlett, however, expressly rejects this
proposition. This aspect of Howlett lies in the distinction that the Court drew between the Florida District Court of Appeal
opinion and an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision on which the Florida District Court of Appeal had erroneously relied.
*78 In the Florida Supreme Court case, Hill v. Department of Corrections,675 an individual had sued the state department
of corrections under Section 1983. The Florida Supreme Court held that the suit was jurisdictionally barred because Florida's
sovereign immunity waiver statute did not waive immunity with respect to suits under Section 1983.676 In Howlett, the United
States Supreme Court noted that “the disposition of the Hill case would appear to be unexceptional. The defendant in Hill was a
state agency protected from suit in a federal court by the Eleventh Amendment.”677 The Florida District Court of Appeal erred
by extending Hill's reasoning to a state school board, which would not have been entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
in a federal court suit to enforce Section 1983.678 Indeed, the Court went on to suggest that a state (or state agency) that is
immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is also immune from suit in state court, at least under Section
1983. The Court stated:
The anomaly identified by the State Supreme Court, and by the various state courts which it cited, [footnote
omitted] that a State might be forced to entertain in its own courts suits from which it was immune in federal
court, is thus fully met by our decision in Will. Will establishes that the State and arms of the State, which have
traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court
or state court.679
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Under the obvious extension of this reasoning, whenever a state enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity in a federal question
suit filed in federal court under, it also enjoys immunity in that same federal question suit filed in state court (unless the state
consents to be sued). Howlett's reasoning is narrower than this, however, because Section 1983 does not create a cause of action
against states or state agencies. Consequently, states' freedom from suit under Section 1983 is co-extensive with states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In contrast, other federal laws might both create a cause of against states and purport to abrogate state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. In that case, the question would be whether such a law effectively abrogates states' traditional
immunity from suit in state court. Consider the possiblities.
First, under laws enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may create a cause of action against states and
abrogate states' *79 Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress also, however, might choose neither to create cause of action
nor to abrogate states' immunity, as under Section 1983. Congress also might choose to create a cause of action but not abrogate
states' immunity. These possibilities give rise to two questions with respect to Fourteenth Amendment laws: (i) first, does a law
that creates a cause of action against states also necessarily abrogate states' immunity, and (ii) second, is Congress's power to
abrogate states' federal court immunity also a power to abrogate states' state court immunity?
Second, in contrast, under laws enacted pursuant to Article I, Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
This gives rise to two questions with respect to Article I laws: (i) first, would Congress ever enact a law that creates a cause
of action against states even though Congress has no power to abrogate state's federal court immunity, and (ii) second, even
though Congress has no power to abrogate states' federal court immunity, does Congress have power to abrogate states' state
court immunity?
As to the first question raised concerning Fourteenth Amendment laws and Article I laws, respectively, it seems that Congress
might well create a cause of action without abrogating immunity. First, Congress might apply a federal law's duties to the states
but not create a cause of private right of action to enforce those duties. Second, even if a federal statute creates a private right
of action against states, the mere creation of a cause of action does not necessarily abrogate states' immunity. Congress might
create a cause of action against states in recognition that a state might consent to suit in state court (or perhaps federal court, if
such consent is permissible) notwithstanding its immunity. In contrast, if a federal law does not create a cause of action against
states, then a state cannot consent to suit. A state cannot, merely by consent, establish a cause of action against itself if Congress
chose not to subject states to liability under the statute.680 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that various
statutes abrogate immunity, even if *80 those statutes clearly create a cause of action against the states.681 Thus, under either
Article I laws or Fourteenth Amendment laws, the mere creation of a cause of action does not abrogate states' federal court
immunity. Similarly, the mere creation of a cause of action should not abrogate states' state court immunity.682
The second questions concerning Fourteenth Amendment and Article I laws, respectively, arise only if a federal law contains
a clear abrogation provision. For example, both the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,683 and the Bankruptcy Code684
purport to abrogate states' immunity. In a Fourteenth Amendment law such as the Civil Rights Act, the provision abrogates
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. In an Article I law, such as the Bankruptcy Code, the provision is ineffective to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. In either type of law, does such a provision abrogate state's traditional state court
immunity? Commentators who argue that it does rely *81 primarily on Howlett, as elaborated by Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Commission.685
In Hilton, an employee of a state owned railroad sued the railroad in state court to enforce provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (“FELA”).686 The Court held that FELA created a cause of action against the state, even though FELA did not
contain a clear statement subjecting states to liability.687 The Court reasoned that it was bound by stare decisis. Its earlier
decision in Parden v. Terminal Railways had held that FELA created a cause of action against the states.688 (Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation overruled Parden's general holding that Congress did not need to make a
clear statement in order to compel states to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. Welch did not, however, overrule Parden's
specific holding that FELA created a cause of action against the states, despite FELA's lack of a clear statement.)689 The Court
did not reject Will's clear statement discussion, but rather, held that “the clear statement inquiry need not be made and we need
not decide whether FELA satisfies that standard, for the rule in any event does not prevail over the doctrine of stare decisis as
applied to a longstanding statutory construction implicating important reliance interests.”690
Finally, the Court noted that, if a court concludes that a federal statute does impose liability on the states, “the Supremacy Clause
makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court.”691 Some commentators interpret this statement in
Hilton to mean that if a law does create a cause of action it abrogates states' immunity from suit in their own courts, without
regard to whether Congress could have abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.692 Hilton, however, did not go this far.
First, the Court held only that FELA created a cause of action against states.693 The Court reaffirmed that Congress may abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity only by a clear statement and only under Congress's *82 Fourteenth Amendment
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powers.694 This also reaffirmed that the mere creation of a cause of action does not abrogate states' immunity. The Court did
not consider whether, or under what standard, Congress might abrogate state's traditional state court immunity. The Court's
reliance on Parden and stare decisis does not suggest that Congress can abrogate traditional state court immunity. Parden did
not address this issue because Parden involved a suit filed in federal court.695 The Hilton Court did suggest, in dicta, that the
effect of finding that FELA did not create a cause of action, would be to confer upon the state immunity in state court.696 The
Court never expressly considered, however, whether the creation of a cause of action would automatically eliminate state's
traditional immunity in state court. In fact, the state never raised immunity as a defense; it claimed simply that FELA did
not apply to it. In contrast, at least four Supreme Court justices have suggested that a state might be able to assert sovereign
immunity as a defense in a federal question case filed in state court.697
Second, Seminole continues the Court's long history of expanding state's immunity in federal question cases. Before Article
III, states were immune from suits filed in their own courts by other states' citizens. Article III gave federal courts diversity
jurisdiction over those same suits. Chisholm held that, in so doing, Article III eliminated any immunity states might have
enjoyed in their own courts. The outcry following Chisholm demanded that states be accorded the same immunity in federal
court as they enjoyed in their own courts. The Eleventh Amendment restored states' immunity in federal court cases. Hans
ensured that states' immunity would extend to federal question cases. Consequently, after the Eleventh Amendment, states once
again enjoyed broad immunity in federal courts as well as in their own *83 courts.698 It would be anomolous, at best, to
conclude that the Constitution simultaneously granted states immunity in federal court and abrogated states' immunity in their
own courts. Moreover, the source of such abrogation is unclear. Even if Article III eliminated (and the Eleventh Amendment
restored) states' immunity in federal courts,699 Article III could not have abrogated states' immunity in their own courts because
it speaks only of the federal judicial power. It would be equally ironic to conclude that states' federal court immunity arises
from the virtually impenetrable fortress of a constitutional jurisdictional bar but that states' immunity in their own courts is
merely a weak policy that can easily be swept aside by congressional abrogation. If the states did not understand Article I to
mean that Congress could abrogate states' federal court immunity, how likely is it that they understood Article I to mean that
Congress could abrogate states' state court immunity? Does the Supremacy Clause provide a logical basis for distinguishing
between suits in state and federal court?
Third, Howlett and Hilton cite the Supremacy Clause for the unremarkable proposition that federal laws are enforceable in
state courts.700 This is apparent from the clear language of the Supremacy Clause.701 It does not, however, necessarily mean
that states may not assert immunity in their own courts. Federal laws are also enforceable in federal court, and yet states are
immune from suits in federal court. At a minimum, the Supremacy Clause requires that states enforce federal law in state courts
of competent jurisdiction. If federal law accords state courts concurrent jurisdiction, a state may not refuse to exercise that
jurisdiction by enacting its own laws that prohibit *84 its courts from exercising jurisdiction.702 This principle has nothing
to do with immunity.
The Supremacy Clause is, at best, a vague device for effecting a sweeping abrogation of states' immunity. It might be argued
that the Supremacy Clause merely implements Congress's enumerated powers by granting Congress the power to override state
substantive law on matters of national concern. In other words, Congress can enact laws concerning interstate commerce that
supersede conflicting state laws regulating commerce. It is not clear, however, that this power necessarily allows Congress to
enact laws that determine states' immunities. A parallel might be found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.703 That clause
requires that states honor and enforce other states' laws, just as the Supremacy Clause requires that states honor and enforce
federal law. Yet, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not abrogate a state's immunity. In other words, a state may invoke
sovereign immunity as a basis for refusing to enforce another state's law against itself in its own courts. Similarly, is it possible
that a state may invoke sovereign immunity as a basis for refusing to enforce federal law against itself in its own courts? The
Supremacy Clause does not provide a clear answer.
Fourth, the policies prohibiting citizen suits against unconsenting states in federal court apply just as strongly to citizen suits
against unconsenting states in state court. Suits in either forum threaten states' treasuries and impair their dignity.
Allowing suits in state court but prohibiting suits in federal court also would turn immunity doctrine on its head. The availability
of a federal forum in which citizens may enforce federal law against states levels the playing field by removing states from their
home fora. The Court has significantly restricted the availability of the federal forum by holding that Congress can abrogate
states' federal court immunity only in limited circumstances. Citizens are now forced to sue states in state courts. If one purpose
behind providing a federal forum for suits between citizens and states was to protect citizens from suits by states, it might be
argued that state court remains an appropriate forum for suits against states by citizens. This does not explain, however, why
the Constitution prohibits suits against states in federal court. It also does not explain why states should not be entitled to assert
immunity as a defense in state court.
Fifth, prior to Howlett and Hilton, state courts commonly applied state sovereign immunity law to protect the state from federal
question suits filed *85 in state court.704 These courts relied, in part, on the anomaly of entertaining in their own courts suits
that would be barred in federal court. These cases barred not only actions under Section 1983 (under which Congress had not
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expressly created a cause of action against the states),705 but also actions under other federal laws (under which Congress had
created a cause of action against the states).706
One recent Arkansas Supreme Court case, Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education,707 rejected a state's argument that
sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit filed against the state in state court. The court reasoned that the Supremacy
Clause allows Congress to create a cause of action against the states, provide a state court forum, and abrogate state court
immunity.708 Jacoby, however, relied expressly on Howlett and Hilton, which it interpreted to mean that Congress could
abrogate states' immunity.709 As noted above, however, Howlett and Hilton do not go this far.
Sixth, the relatively vague language in Howlett and Hilton is offset by language in other Supreme Court cases which suggests
that citizens may sue states in state court only with the states' consent. Seminole is a case in *86 point.710 Seminole suggests,
in several passages, that states enjoy immunity from federal question suits filed in a state's own courts unless that state consents
to be sued. First, Seminole repeatedly notes that states may not be sued without their consent.711 Second, the majority only
offers two reasons explaining why the dissents' fears that citizens will be unable to enforce federal law are “exaggerated:” first,
citizens may sue state officials in some circumstances, and second, the Court has never held that the federal statutes such as
the Bankruptcy Code “authorize suits against states.”712 If state court suit against an unconsenting state were such a simple,
obvious solution, then why did the majority “glaringly omit” to suggest that Congress simply give “state courts jurisdiction
over these suits?”713 Third, the Court specifically suggests that the Supreme Court could review federal questions arising in
state court suits to which a state has consented.714 Nothing in Seminole suggests that a citizen can sue an unconsenting state
in state court to enforce federal law.
Finally, some commentators argue that a second line of cases holds that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a forum-allocation
device.715 These cases consider whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review federal questions *87 that arise in state
court cases. This issue arises because the Eleventh Amendment bars any federal court citizen suit against a state; it does not
distinguish original from appellate jurisdiction. The suggestion that these cases authorize state court suits against unconsenting
states reads far more into those cases than they actually hold.
In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,716 McKesson had sued a state agency in Florida state
court complaining that Florida's liquor excise tax violated the Commerce Clause.717 The state supreme court agreed that the
statute was unconstitutional, and enjoined the state from giving future preferences. It refused, however, to award McKesson
a tax refund.718 The United States Supreme Court considered whether the state's refusal to provide a retrospective “remedy”
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on a taking without Due Process:
The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The
answer is no. If a state places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a
postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment obligates the state to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional
deprivation.719
The Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to require that the state provide the taxpayers with (1) “a fair opportunity to
challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation” and (2) a “‘clear and certain remedy’ for any erroneous or
unlawful tax collection to ensure that the opportunity to contest the tax is a meaningful one.”720 The Court reversed the Florida
Supreme Court decision, holding that Florida failed to provide “meaningful backward-looking relief.”721
In response to the suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal *88 court review of the state court judgment, the
Court stated that: “[w]e recognize what has long been implicit in our consistent practice and uniformly endorsed in our cases:
The Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases arising from state
courts.”722
Similarly, in Reich v. Collins,723 a taxpayer sued the state of Georgia in state court to recover a refund of monies he had paid
under an unconstitutional state statute.724 The Georgia state supreme court denied the refund. The court reasoned that Georgia
had reconfigured its tax dispute remedy scheme to eliminate postdeprivation remedies, and that Georgia's predeprivation
remedies adequately protected taxpayers.725 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Georgia's changes to its tax scheme
constituted a “bait and switch” that violated the Due Process Clause.726 “Georgia held out what plainly appeared to be a ‘clear
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and certain’ postdeprivation remedy, in the form of its tax refund statute, and then declared, only after Reich and others had
paid the disputed taxes, that no such remedy exists.”727
Neither McKesson nor Reich supports the proposition that a citizen can sue an unconsenting state in state court to enforce
federal law. First, the Court has long held that Supreme Court review of a question of federal law arising from a state court
determination in favor of a state has no Eleventh Amendment implications. It simply is not a “suit against the state.”728 Second,
the actions in the Supreme Court were not directly against the state, but rather challenged the constitutionality of state statutes.
Third, in each case, the state apparently had consented to the suit in its own courts. Consequently neither case supports the
proposition that an unconsenting state may be sued in its own courts.729 Review of a case in which the state has consented to
suit does not suggest that a citizen can sue an unconsenting state in state court to enforce federal law.
*89 Some commentators favor suits in state court because there must be some remedy for rights violated by the states.730
This is a valid concern; however, the best way to provide this remedy would be to embrace the diversity view, which allows
Congress to abrogate states' federal court immunity. It is only because five justices have rejected this view that commentators
must search for an alternate forum in which to enforce federal law. A better approach might be simply to overrule Seminole —
a postion advanced by four of the sitting justices, include three of the four most recent additions to the court.
Alternatively, even if states are immune from suits without their consent in state court, other remedies may exist.
First, the state may consent to suit. Initially, it may seem unlikely that a state's general waiver statute will provide the trustee
with authority to sue the state in bankruptcy court to enforce federal bankruptcy law causes of action. If the state statute applies
to traditional contract and tort claims, it probably will apply to contract and tort actions that the trustee asserts. It may not,
however, expressly extend to federal bankruptcy law causes of action such as avoidance powers actions. Nevertheless, the state
might be required to extend its waiver to bankruptcy actions if it extends its waiver to nearly identical state law actions. The
state's refusal to do so arguably would be an improper discrimination against federal law, which Howlett and Hilton prohibit.
Howlett suggests that the Supremacy Clause prohibits a state from discriminating against federal law.731 If a state consents
to be sued under its own laws, then it must consent to be sued under nearly identical federal laws. For example, how could a
state claim immunity in a bankruptcy action to determine and turnover a tax refund if the state has waived immunity in state
law actions to determine and pay over tax refunds? How could the state refuse to waive immunity in a bankruptcy action to
recover a fraudulent transfer if the state has waived immunity in state law actions to recover fraudulent transfers? In other
words, the real import of Howlett may lie in its requirement that states employ neutral immunity laws that do not discriminate
against federal laws. It is not clear, however, that a trustee could identify a state law action that parallels every bankruptcy
action (preferences are the obvious example).
Second, even if a citizen can not sue an unconsenting state in the state's own courts to enforce federal law, a citizen probably
can sue an unconsenting state in another state's court. This turns on whether the forum state grants *90 other states immunity
from suit as a matter of comity, because traditional immunity does not protect a state in another state's courts.732
In summary, citizens cannot sue unconsenting states in federal court to enforce federal law because the federal courts have no
jurisdiction. A citizen may sue a state in state court to enforce a federal law that binds the states and creates a private right of
action against the states, if a state court has concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. The state probably can assert traditional
sovereign immunity as a defense if Congress has not expressly abrogated states' state court immunity. Even if Congress has
done so, the state might be able to assert a traditional immunity defense. The Court has not expressly answered this question.
Finally, a citizen can sue a state in another state's courts to enforce federal law. Whether that state will be able to assert an
immunity defense depends upon whether the forum state has chosen to grant other states immunity, as a matter of comity.
Finally, Parts IV.B.3, 4, and 5 consider other methods of enforcing federal law against the states.
3. Supreme Court Review?
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over “any suit against a state” filed by a citizen.
This bar would seem to apply to both federal courts' original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.733 Seminole suggests,
however, that the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar does not prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing a question
of federal law that arises from a state court case in which the state either has sued a citizen or has consented to be sued by
a citizen.734 As noted supra in Part IV.B.2, this type of review does not violate the Eleventh Amendment because it is not a
“suit against a state.”735
In the bankruptcy context, the most significant application of this rule may occur when a state sues a discharged debtor to collect
a debt. If the state *91 court rejects the debtor's federal law defense asserting the discharge injunction, the Supreme Court
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might accept the case to determine whether the state court validly rejected the discharge injunction defense. This rule is of no
benefit, however, unless the state either commenced or consented to the state court suit.
Even if the state does consent to be sued in its own courts, other practical limitations may apply. For example, appellate review
does not provide a citizen the same protection as original jurisdiction because issues have been framed and findings of fact
have already been made.736 Also, appellate review does not obviate the trustee's concerns about being forced to litigate in
multiple fora.
4. Sue a State Official?
In Ex parte Young,737 the Court held that a citizen could sue a state official in federal court in an action seeking prospective
injunctive relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment.738
A suit against a state official is based upon a series of legal fictions designed to obviate the reality that the action is a suit against
the state barred by the Eleventh Amendment.739 These fictions would be unnecessary if the Court had adopted the diversity
interpretation of the Amendment and allowed citizens to sue states in federal court.
These fictions hold that a state official acting in violation of federal law acts unconstitutionally. Because the state has no power
to authorize an official to violate federal law, this unconstitutional act is deemed to be outside *92 of the scope of the official's
official duties. The suit, therefore, is against the official personally. It is not a “suit against the state.”740 In contrast, a suit that
names a state official only in her official capacity is a suit against the state.741
Moreover, in recognition that retrospective monetary damages in a suit against a state official would actually be paid from
the state treasury, the courts generally will not award retrospective money damages in a suit against *93 a state official.742
Prospective injunctive relief may be ordered, however, even if it might require that the state expend funds.743
Seminole further limited Young by refusing to apply Young's “broad remedial tools” to supplement IGRA's narrower, specific
remedial scheme. Even though IGRA's specific remedies applied to states rather than state officials, the Court concluded that
IGRA's remedial scheme indicated that Congress did not intend to make Young relief available against state officials.744 This
limitation should not have a significant impact in bankruptcy *94 cases because the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a
detailed remedial scheme for actions against states.
The availability of relief against state officials blunts some of the impact of Seminole's bar of actions directly against states.
Some commentators even suggest that the availability of suits against officials might pose a threat to states that desire to protect
their officials.745
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the Young doctrine might, for example, permit a trustee or debtor to sue a state official to enjoin
an ongoing violation of the automatic stay.746 It does not, however, permit the bankruptcy trustee to sue a state to avoid a
preferential transfer,747 recover a wrongfully withheld tax refund,748 or collect under a contract claim.
In summary, Young provides some relief, but it does not obviate the restrictions that the Eleventh Amendment imposes on suits
against states to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.749 Some commentators have argued, however, that the truste
could enforce all of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code if the trustee acted as the representative of the United States.
*95 5. Enlist the Services of the Federal Government to Sue the State?
The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from suing a state in federal court to enforce federal law.750
Consequently, in theory, the federal government could enforce the Bankruptcy Code against the states in bankruptcy court. It
is difficult, however, to imagine thousands of “U.S. v. Alabama Department of Revenue” suits filed in individual bankruptcy
cases at federal government expense to recover preferential transfers, compel the turnover of improperly seized property, or
recover damages for automatic stay violations.
Some commentators have suggested that the federal government itself need not sue if the trustee sues as an agent of the federal
government. Under current law, however, there are several problems with this approach.
First, the United States Trustee might be an agent of the federal government, but the United States Trustee's role is
administrative.751 It is not empowered to prosecute bankruptcy actions. Granting it such a power would fundamentally alter
the role of the United States Trustee. Second, the trustee is the representative of the bankruptcy estate. She simply is not an
agent of the federal government.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

25

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART TWO], 8 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3

Any effort to designate the trustee (or, less feasibly, the United States Trustee) as an agent of the federal government would
require an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. Such an amendment would either create a federal bankruptcy enforcer or grant
the trustees (and debtors) the qui tam-like752 powers of private attorneys general to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. There are, however, several potentially insurmountable hurdles to such an amendment.
First, how likely is it that Congress would create a federal bankruptcy enforcer or grant such powers to trustees? How would
such a scheme be funded?
Second, such an amendment might be unconstitutional. In order to avoid *96 challenge under the Eleventh Amendment, the
scheme must create an enforcer who truly acts on behalf of the federal government. Two commentators have suggested a means
of creating a federal bankruptcy enforcer,753 but it is not clear that their scheme satisfies the requirements of the Eleventh
Amendment.
They argue as follows: First, the United States Attorney General is authorized to bring suit on behalf of the United States against
a state for a violation of federal law. The remedy may include a fine measured by and equivalent to the damage suffered by the
person on whose behalf the suit has been filed. Second, the fine that is collected by the United States may be paid to the injured
party.754 Third, Congress may, by statute, authorize a private lawyer to bring suit in the name of the United States. This private
lawyer would “represent the interest of the United States in seeing that the states obey federal law.”755 Fourth, if all of this is
permissible, Congress ought to be able to allow private suits “without the fiction that they are on behalf of the United States.”756
A program that employs the more complicated device of allowing a federal enforcer or trustee to sue in the name of the federal
government might obviate the bold approach of the fourth step. Even this approach, however, faces several hurdles.
First, In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,757 the Court held that the federal government could not delegate to an Indian
tribe the federal government's right to sue a state, even though the federal government might *97 have sued on behalf of
the Indian tribe.758 This problem can be avoided only if the federal government makes the decision to prosecute and actually
retains control of the litigation.
Second, even if the federal government purports to retain control of the litigation through its agent, the trustee or United States
Trustee, an approach that cloaks the trustee or United States Trustee with the power of the federal government in the context
of bankruptcy enforcement appears to be a sham. This is because the federal government can sue only if it is the real party in
interest.759 The federal government may have an interest in prosecuting a suit or granting private groups the right to prosecute
on behalf of the federal government if the state's action affects broad “public rights,” such as environmental protection or public
health. It is difficult to see a broad public interest in prosecuting automatic stay violations and preferential transfer recovery
actions.760
Third, although it may be argued that the federal government has an interest in vindicating violations of federal law, it is not
clear that bankruptcy enforcement always involves a violation of federal law. A violation of the automatic stay might violate
federal law, but receiving a preference does not violate any law.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Eleventh Amendment celebrates its 200th anniversary amidst a sea of confusion and conflict over its meaning. Seminole
held that states' immunity in federal question cases filed in federal court arises solely under the Eleventh Amendment, that
the Amendment imposes a jurisdictional bar on citizen *98 suits against states, and that Congress cannot abrogate that bar
except under its Fourteenth Amendment powers. By this holding, Seminole rejects the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment and exacerbates the doctrinal incoherence that has plagued federal question jurisdiction since Hans. From a broader
perspective, the Court, once again, has failed to develop a single, comprehensive, coherent doctrine of immunity that is suitable
to federalism.
What are the implications in bankruptcy cases?761
The Eleventh Amendment's bar applies in bankruptcy court even though bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges. Congress
has no power under either the Bankruptcy Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' immunity in bankruptcy
cases.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Amendment's application in bankruptcy is limited because the bankruptcy case itself is not a suit
against the state and many administrative orders entered in bankruptcy cases are not suits against the state. Consequently, the
Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to the determination and discharge of a state's claims, or to the imposition of the automatic
stay or discharge injunctions.
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Most adversary proceedings, including proceedings to enforce non-bankruptcy causes of action, avoid preferential and other
voidable transfers, compel the state to turnover property, determine the validity, extent and priority of liens, and obtain damages
for a violation of the automatic stay probably are suits for Eleventh Amendment purposes. As to these matters, the state might
waive its immunity by filing a claim in the bankruptcy case. That claim, however, probably only waives the state's immunity
with respect to defensively asserted compulsory counterclaims.
Creating a “bankruptcy enforcer” or granting the United States Trusteee or trustee the power to prosecute bankruptcy actions
against a state that has not filed a claim is an attractive option. It suffers, however, from potentially insurmountable constitutional
and practical hurdles.
Even if the state has not filed a claim, the doctrine of Ex parte Young alleviates some of these problems because it allows
the debtor to seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials. Such relief may permit the debtor to prevent ongoing
automatic stay violations. It will not, however, allow the debtor to recover damages for a past stay violation.
The most common difficulties that Seminole causes in bankruptcy cases will arise when the debtor seeks to sue a state to recover
preferential or other voidable transfers, or to prosecute a non-bankruptcy contract or tort action. *99 The debtor can prosecute
the non-bankruptcy action in state court. If it is a simple contract or state law tort action, the state may very well have waived
immunity under a state statute. The waiver may not extend, however, to an action to recover a preferential or other avoidable
transfer.
As to such matters, the debtor probably can sue an unconsenting state in another states' court. This will be effective, however,
only if the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the forum state's law does not accord other states immunity.
If the worst implication of Seminole is that debtors cannot sue states to recover preferential transfers, debtors should be leaping
for joy. The preference that might otherwise be recovered likely would be for taxes that the debtor had paid. If such a payment is
avoided, the state will have a claim against the debtor. If the taxes were nondischargeable, priority taxes, the individual debtor's
fresh start will be impaired by the tax obligation. Similarly, if tax payments made by a business debtor are avoided, the state
will simply turn to the responsible officers for payment. If the officers have the ability to pay, the state will be no worse off.
Both the individual debtor and the responsible officers of a business debtor, however, are likely to suffer if the trustee recovers
preferential tax payments from a state.
Bankruptcy is a leverage game. Seminole seems to have shifted the balance in favor of the states. Individual debtors and
responsible officers of business debtors, however, also receive an unexpected windfall. Only the creditors lose in this new
balance.
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contesting state's claim of title to property); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 31 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S. 1998) (involving an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Code § 547 to recover preferential tax
payments); In re Light, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 976, 136 L. Ed. 2d 859 (U.S. 1997) (involving an action
to enforce Bankruptcy Code §§ 362 (automatic stay), 524 (discharge injunction) and 525 (anti-discrimination provision) against the
State Bar Association, which the court found to be an arm of the state); In re Elias, 218 B.R. 80, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 2, 39
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 782 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1998) (involving an adversary proceeding to determine the debtor's tax liability);
In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77512 (D.N.J. 1997) (involving an adversary proceeding seeking a determination
that surcharges from motor vehicle offenses were discharged); State of N.J. v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691 (D.N.J. 1997) (involving the
discharge of a state's claim); In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 680 (D.P.R. 1996) (involving an action
to enforce Bankruptcy Code § 362 (automatic stay)); In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. 68, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 690 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1998) (involving an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a student loan obligation); In re Christie, 218 B.R.
27, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 595 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998), order vacated on reconsideration, 222 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998)
(involving a motion to avoid a lien securing the debtor's past-due child support obligation); In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210, 30 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 176, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 460, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77275 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (involving an
action seeking to enforce Bankruptcy Code § 362 (automatic stay) and to declare a debt to have been discharged); In re Louis;
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Harris, 213 B.R. 796, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 693 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997) (involving an action to enforce Bankruptcy Code §
362 (automatic stay)); In re Morrell, 218 B.R. 87, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 147 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (involving a complaint
to determine dischargeability of a debt); In re Mueller, 211 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997) (involving an adversary proceeding
to determine the debtor's liability for corporate taxes); In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 843 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998) (involving an action against states to recover tax overpayments); In re Rose, 214
B.R. 372, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 906, 122 Ed. Law Rep. 472 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (involving an adversary proceeding to
determine dischargeability of a student loan debt); Matter of Midland Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 200 B.R. 453, 29 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 933, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (involving a suit to enforce contract obligations);
In re-Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (involving an action seeking contempt sanctions for violation of
Bankruptcy Code § 362 (automatic stay)); In re Charter Oak Associates, 203 B.R. 17, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1318, 37 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 321 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (involving a suit to enforce contract obligations); In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358,
382, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (involving claims against a state for reimbursement from a state fund);
In re York-Hannover Developments, Inc., 201 B.R. 137, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1066 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (involving suit
under Bankruptcy Code § 548 (fraudulent transfer)); In re Tri-City Turf Club, Inc., 203 B.R. 617, 620, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
81 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) (involving an adversary proceeding alleging that the state racing commission had violated the automatic
stay by revoking the debtor's racing license). See also In re National Cattle Congress, Inc., 91 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 1996) (remanding
for reconsideration in light of a Seminole case in which a Chapter 11 debtor sought to enforce the automatic stay against a state
commission after the commission revoked the debtor's dog racing license).
Cf. infra notes 420-430 and accompanying text, discussing State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas
System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suit against states in bankruptcy cases; but discharge is not suit against state); State of Maryland v.
Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 475 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that confirmation
order is enforceable against states).

332

See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 199 (1996)
(concluding that § 106(a) is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal bankruptcy
court by private parties); Mark Browning, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look, 15-JUN. AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 10, 10 (1996) (concluding that § 106(a) is unconstitutional as against the states); Meltzer, supra note 82, at 3-5 (arguing that
if Congress cannot abrogate states' immunity under the exercise of Congress's power to regulate Indian affairs, an area in which
Congress's broad control and states' limited control has long been recognized, then it cannot possibly abrogate immunity under its
power to regulate bankruptcy); see also Field, supra note 19, at 15-16 (Seminole potentially invalidates the parts of the bankruptcy
statute that allow individuals to sue states to enforce federal law, because the bankruptcy statute was not “enacted or enactable
under” the Fourteenth Amendment).

333

See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 322, at 201 (arguing that § 106(a) remains valid as a waiver of federal immunity); Honorable Alexander
L. Paskay, Is the Gorilla Spawned by Seminole Really an 800-Pound Gorilla?, 28 No. 25 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 3 (June 4,
1996) (arguing that § 106 is valid with respect to federal government waiver).

334

See Gibson, supra note 322, at 199; see, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.
Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 76 (1977) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to counties and
municipal corporations); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S. Ct. 1785, 36 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to political divisions and departments such as cities, counties, and school districts); Loeb v. Trustees
of Columbia Tp., 179 U.S. 472, 21 S. Ct. 174, 45 L. Ed. 280 (1900) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to
municipal corporations); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530, 10 S. Ct. 363, 33 L. Ed. 766 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to counties); State of Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 786, 31 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 475 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying rule that Eleventh Amendment does not apply to counties in a bankruptcy case);
Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied, (Nov. 22, 1996) and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2511, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 1014 (U.S. 1997) (holding that county sheriff is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mancuso v. New York
State Thruway Authority, 86 F.3d 289, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1961, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. 21418 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 481, 136 L. Ed. 2d 375, 43 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1992 (U.S. 1996) (holding that state Thruway Authority is not entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Robertson v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Morgan, 985 F. Supp. 980, 4 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 443, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33673 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that county board is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity); TM Park Ave. Associates v. Pataki, 986 F. Supp. 96, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 1159 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that Dormitory Authority is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because it is not an arm of the State); Brickey v. County
of Smyth, Va., 944 F. Supp. 1310, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 966, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33493 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding
that political subdivisions are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because they are not arms of the state); In re Christie,
218 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); In re Walters, 219 B.R. 520 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998); cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to state and county
officials where the relief “substantially concerns ... the State”); Peter W. Low & John C. Jeffries, Jr., FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 912 (3d ed. 1994) (unit of state may be given protection of Eleventh Amendment
if money to pay judgment would come from state treasury). Bankruptcy Code § 106(a) expressly allows suits against municipalities.
11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1994), quoted supra at note 252.

335

See discussion infra at notes 351-352 and accompanying text.

336

See infra note 625.
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337

See cases cited supra at note 331.

338

See Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, Seminole Tribe May Not Apply to Bankruptcy Courts, 30 No. 10 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1
(Mar. 25, 1997) (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment may not apply because bankruptcy courts are “Article I” courts, but noting
that he has not decided if this argument is valid); see also Honorable Leif M. Clark, Karen Cordry's Bias on Sovereign Immunity
Undercuts Her Analysis, 30 No. 18 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 5 (May 27, 1997) (suggesting that Judge Bufford's approach may be
valid, but only if Congress created true Article I courts, which bankruptcy courts are not).

339

See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

340

Bufford, supra note 338, at 1 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment applies only to Article III courts and not to courts that Congress
creates under Article I (which he argues includes bankruptcy courts), Article II (which includes administrative courts), or Article IV
(which includes territorial courts)). Karen Cordry, bankruptcy counsel to the National Association of Attorneys General, argues that
these other Articles are not applicable to suits against states because Article II courts deal primarily with court martial actions, which
would not be brought against a state, and territories in which Article IV courts are created have no immunity until they become
states, at which time they gain the benefit of the Eleventh Amendment. Karen Cordry, Seminole: There's No Easy Escape, 30 No.
14 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1 (Apr. 22, 1997).

341

The arguments in this discussion apply equally to federal bankruptcy law questions and non-bankruptcy federal and state law
questions that relate to a bankruptcy case.

342

See also Clark, supra note 338, at 5 (arguing that bankruptcy courts are not Article I courts, they are adjuncts to the Article III
district courts; but suggesting that Judge Bufford's approach might work if Congress created a true Article I court to hear bankruptcy
matters). Cf. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61-75, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598, 6
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 785, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 68698 (1982) (discussing the province of legislative courts).

343

See 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1978) (superseded).

344

See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (a, b, c) (1978) (superseded).

345

Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

346

Bankruptcy judges were (and are) appointed by the Courts of Appeals, rather than by the President with confirmation by the
Senate; they were (and are) appointed for only fourteen-year terms, rather than for life; they were (and are) subject to recall by the
judicial council of the circuit for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability, rather than solely by
impeachment; and they were (and are) subject to salary adjustment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153 (a, b), 154 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).

347

See Marathon, 458 U.S. 50. Under Marathon, if a non-Article III court adjudicates judicial rather than public rights, the adjudication
must occur in coordination with and subject to review by an Article III court. Id.

348

28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).

349

Id.

350

See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.02[2], 1-15 (15th ed. rev. 1996); 1 GINSBERG & MARTIN ON
BANKRUPTCY §§ 1.02[D], 1-23 - 1-29, 1.03 [A], 1-34 - 1-37 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997).

351

See 28 U.S.C. 1334(a), (b) (1994); see also id. § 157 (c).

352

See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994); see, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 350, at ¶ 3.04[1], 3-59 (“Section 157(d) is an attempt to insulate
the 1984 legislation against successful constitutional attack.”).

353

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

354

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the ... laws ... of the United States.”); cf. id. § 1334(a, b) (bankruptcy jurisdiction); id. 157(a) (referral of bankruptcy jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts).

355

Id. § 157(d). For example, the District Court for the District of Arizona sua sponte withdrew the entire bankruptcy cases for the
subsidiaries of Lincoln Savings & Loan Co., which had been pending before Bankruptcy Judge Sarah Sharer Curley.

356

See, e.g., Bufford, supra note 338, at 1.

357

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5011.

358

See, e.g., In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1101, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1139, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1341,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 75459, 123 A.L.R. Fed. 681 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 1026, 114 S. Ct. 1418, 128 L. Ed. 2d
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88 (1994); Holland America Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1256, 13 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 1462, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 70874 (5th Cir. 1985).

359

See generally COLLIER, supra note 350, at ¶ 3.04[1], 3-60 - 3-61; GINSBERG & MARTIN, supra note 350, § 1.03[C], at 1-54
- 1-55.

360

Cf. Bufford, supra note 338, at 1 (acknowledging that the primary complication in his argument is that 28 U.S.C. § 1334 grants
bankruptcy jurisdiction to the district courts, which clearly are subject to the Eleventh Amendment, but suggesting that the Eleventh
Amendment's bar nevertheless is inapplicable if the matter is referred to the bankruptcy courts; also arguing that nothing prohibits
the “district court referring a case to someone else who has greater powers than the district court itself”). The problem with Judge
Bufford's reasoning is that the bankruptcy court derives all of its powers from the district court. Consequently, it cannot have greater
powers than the district court.

361

Significantly, bankruptcy courts may not hear personal injury tort or wrongful death matters, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), and may not
enter final orders in non-core matters that are related to a bankruptcy case, unless the parties consent, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1994).
Moreover, the district court may withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court at any time. See supra notes 355-359.

362

Marathon made clear that the powers delegated to the bankruptcy courts do not merely involve the adjudication of “public rights”
but include private rights, and therefore are judicial powers. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 63-75, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 785, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 68698 (1982). This aspect
of bankruptcy jurisdiction has not changed. Bankruptcy judges still adjudicate private judicial rights. The judges, however, are now
subject to greater coordination and oversight by the Article III district courts. Cf. id. at 76-87.

363

Marathon, 458 U.S. 50.

364

See Gibson, supra note 231, at 325 n.92 (noting that the bankruptcy court is not a court of the United States).

365

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 4.

366

See Act of Apr. 4, 1800 (Bankruptcy Act of 1800), ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.

367

The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, by its terms, was to be effective for five years. It was repealed, however, after only three and onehalf years. The next federal bankruptcy law was not enacted until thirty-eight years later, in 1841. It was repealed in 1843, a little
more than one year after it became effective (in 1842). The third federal bankruptcy law, enacted twenty-five years later, in 1867,
lasted slightly longer, eleven years. See id.; Act of Aug. 19, 1841 (Bankruptcy Act of 1841), ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of
Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Act of Mar. 2, 1867 (Bankruptcy Act of 1867), ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June
7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99.

368

After the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was repealed, ten years passed before Congress finally enacted the first long-lasting bankruptcy
law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“Bankruptcy Act”). See Nelson Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chadler Act, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Bankruptcy
Act remained in force (although with significant amendments and restructurings along the way) for eighty years, until 1978, when
it was superseded by the Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”). The Bankruptcy Code, as amended, remains in force today. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1330 (as amended) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).

369

Cordry, supra note 340, at 1 (arguing that neither the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment nor the states could have contemplated
providing for immunity in bankruptcy courts, because neither could have foreseen that Congress would create a hybrid such as the
bankruptcy courts).

370

See, e.g., Cordry, supra note 340, at 1 (arguing that courts from Hans through Seminole read the Eleventh Amendment as
exemplifying a broad principle of immunity with which the states entered the union and which the states waived only with respect
to suits by the federal government and other states; this “axiom of our constitutional system” was “retained as an inherent, albeit
unstated, part of our federal system that pre-existed the Eleventh Amendment and is not limited by the terms of that Amendment”);
Letter from Donald McCabe, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, reprinted in More Reaction to Judge Bufford's Defense Against
Seminole Tribe, 30 No. 15 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 13 (Apr. 29, 1997) (arguing that Judge Bufford's contention that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply in bankruptcy court is contrary to the broad scope of the Eleventh Amendment, as recognized in Hans
and Seminole, and to states' rights, as preserved in Marathon).

371

See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing what constitutes a “suit against a state” in the bankruptcy context).

372

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For a discussion of what constitutes a suit against the state in the bankruptcy context, see generally State
of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826,
126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998); State of Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 475 (4th Cir. 1997); cf. In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S. Ct. 588, 65 L. Ed. 1057 (1921) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment applies in admiralty; issue was not whether the case was a “suit,” but rather whether the suit was in law or equity).

373

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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374

Id. at 407-412; see also Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 449, 464 (1829) (reasoning that a suit involves adversarial
litigation in a court of justice in which an individual seeks to obtain a remedy); cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281
(1866) (reasoning that “action,” “suit” and “cause” are interchangeable in a legal sense); In re Adoption of a Minor, 136 F.2d 790
(App. D.C. D.C. Cir. 1943) (reasoning that “proceeding” is broader than “action”). For a detailed analysis of Cohens, see Jackson,
supra note 91, at 13-25.

375

See Cohens, 19 U.S (6 Wheat.) at 412.

376

In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 803, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (citing Cohens, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) at 407-12).

377

See, e.g., State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 54 S. Ct. 18, 78 L. Ed. 145 (1933).

378

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a), (b), (d) (1994).

379

See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (1994). Only individual debtors are entitled to retain exempt property. Id. § 522. Also, in a
liquidation case, only individual debtors receive a discharge. A business debtor that liquidates has no continuing operations and,
therefore, no need for a discharge or its attendant protection from future collection efforts. See id. § 727.

380

See generally id. §§ 1101-1330 (Chapter 11 reorganization, chapter 12 adjustment of the debts of a family farmer, Chapter 13
adjustment of the debts of an individual with regular income). The timing and scope of the discharge in these types of cases varies.
Compare id. §§ 1141, 1228, 1328.

381

Cf. Barrett, 221 B.R. at 803-04 (applying the Cohens factors to conclude that a bankruptcy case is not a suit).

382

See 11 U.S.C. § 342; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002. In Cohens, the Court noted that the party who obtains a judgment is given notice
of the writ of error:
[b]ut this notice is not a suit, nor has it the effect of process. If the party chooses not to appear, he cannot be brought into Court, nor
is his failure to appear considered as a default. Judgment cannot be given against him for his nonappearance, but the judgment is to
be reexamined, and reversed or affirmed, in like manner as if the party had appeared and argued his cause.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 411.

383

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141, 1228, 1328; cf. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 411.

384

See generally id. §§ 1141, 1228, 1328.

385

See, e.g., In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 679, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77659 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the state commenced action in
federal bankruptcy court by filing an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeablity of a debt; rejecting the state's argument
that the filing of the bankruptcy case itself was akin to the filing of a suit against the state and that the state's adversary proceeding
was akin to a compulsory counterclaim, which would not waive the state's immunity); State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents
of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the debtor's discharge and assertion of the discharge injunction against the state invoked no Eleventh Amendment
consequences; rejecting the state's argument that the filing of the bankruptcy case itself constituted a suit against the state); Barrett,
221 B.R. at 803-04 (applying Cohens' six factors and concluding that a bankruptcy case does not involve a suit). Although Gardner
v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947), is often cited for the proposition that a bankruptcy case is not a
suit, its holding is much narrower. See infra notes 441-447 and accompanying text.

386

See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1), (b) (1994)

387

Id. §§ 503, 507.

388

Id. § 523.

389

Id. § 506.

390

Id. §§ 522(f). 544, 545.

391

Id. § 362.

392

Id. § 524.

393

Id. § 363.

394

Id. §§ 505(1)(b), 542.

395

Id. § 547.
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396

Id. § 1141.

397

Id. § 365.

398

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (bankruptcy jurisdiction over civil matters relating to a bankruptcy case). The bankruptcy court may
enter a final order in a non-core civil proceeding related to a bankruptcy case only with the parties' consent. Absent consent, the
bankruptcy court issues a report and recommendation to the district court for de novo review. See id. § 157(c).

399

See In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 802-03, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998); cf. State of
Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 786-87, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 475 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting,
in dicta, that an adversary proceeding against the state would cause the bankruptcy court to issue summons for the state to appear
and would be a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes).

400

This discussion does not consider independent actions that may be determined by the bankruptcy court only with the parties' consent.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1994). For example, independent cases in which the debtor has asserted non-bankruptcy state or federal
law claims against a state in state or federal court may be removed to the district court and referred to the bankruptcy court. See 28
U.S.C. 1452 (1994). Similarly, the debtor may assert independent, non-bankruptcy state or federal law claims against the state in
bankruptcy court if the claims are related to the bankruptcy case. See id. § 1334(b).

401

See, e.g., Mark Browning, “Flaws” in DOJ's Seminole Defense, 30 No. 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1 (Feb. 18, 1997).

402

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.

403

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.

404

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.

405

See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 331.

406

Cases that do consider whether a proceeding is a “suit” include In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 679, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77659 (7th
Cir. 1998); State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820, 32 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998); Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786-87; Barrett, 221 B.R. 795; and Gardner v.
State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947).

407

Platter, Walker, Antonelli, Barrett, and Gardner deal only with the determination and discharge of claims, which presents the
easiest case for determining whether a proceeding involves a “suit” against the state. See discussion infra at notes 413-451 and
accompanying text.

408

See infra notes 458-487 and accompanying text (discussing adversary proceedings).

409

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). If the state is listed as a creditor on the debtor's schedule of liabilities, the state will receive notice of
the stay. See id. § 342(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 2002.

410

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

411

See id. § 362(d). The state's request for relief from the stay may constitute a waiver of immunity with respect to issues necessary
to the court's ruling on the motion.

412

Id. § 362(c).

413

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004, 7001(4) (requiring a complaint to object to the debtor's discharge); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727.

414

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 725-26 (order of distribution); see also id. §§ 503, 507 (priority of distribution).

415

See id. §§ 1123, 1129, 1222, 1225, 1322, 1325.

416

See id. §§ 1128, 1224, 1324.

417

See id. §§ 1126, 1225(a)(5)(A), 1325(a)(5)(A).

418

See id. §§ 1141, 1227, 1228, 1327, 1328.

419

See id. § 524.

420

State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998).
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421

See id. at 815.

422

See id. at 816.

423

See id.

424

See id. at 820-21.

425

See id. at 822-23 (holding that the debtor's discharge and assertion of the discharge injunction against the state invoke no Eleventh
Amendment consequences); see also In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did
not prohibit the court from confirming an unopposed Chapter 13 plan that would discharge a state's debt; reasoning that confirmation
and discharge do not involve a suit against the state); In re Ranstrom, 215 B.R. 454 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the state
was immune from a money judgment, but the court could determine whether the state's claims had been discharged); cf. In re Burke,
146 F.3d 1313, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1147, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77755 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that states that filed proofs
of claim waived immunity for purposes of the discharge injunction and automatic stay). Note that, if the debtor failed to list the
state as a creditor and the state had neither notice nor actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case, the state's claim probably would
not be discharged. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1994).

426

State of Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 475 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an order confirming a plan of reorganization, which provided that certain transfers would be exempt from state taxes, binds a
taxing authority that had notice of the plan confirmation hearing; the taxing authority would be prohibited from collaterally attacking
the plan's provisions; reasoning that plan confirmation does not involve a suit against the state).

427

See id. at 786-87.

428

See id. at 786-87.

429

See id. at 787.

430

See id.

431

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (1994); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001-3008.

432

See 11 U.S.C. § 502.

433

See id. §§ 503, 507.

434

See id. § 342; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(7).

435

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(b).

436

See 11 U.S.C. § 501; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c).

437

See 11 U.S.C. § 501; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a), 3003(b), (c).

438

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).

439

See discussion infra at Part IV.B.1. In theory, a debtor could simply list the claim as disputed, even if it is not, in order to force the
state to file a claim and, thereby, waive immunity. The debtor would, however, be subject to sanctions and criminal penalties for
presenting a false oath. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1994 & Supp. 1996).

440

See, e.g., In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 811-12, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).

441

Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947).

442

Id. at 570.

443

Id. at 570 -71.

444

Id. at 572-81

445

Id. at 573.

446

Id.
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447

Id. at 573-74.

448

In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).

449

Id. at 798, 801.

450

Id. at 803-04, 808-11; see also In re Stoecker, 202 B.R. 429, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1044 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), decision
aff'd, 1998 WL 641363 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that immunity did not preclude the court from determining debtor's objection to
state's late-filed tax claim); cf. People of State of New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 53 S. Ct. 389, 77 L. Ed. 815 (1933)
(state is bound by order setting bar date for filing claims); State of N.J. v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691 (D.N.J. 1997) (reasoning that the
state is not excused from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and rules that require the state to file a proof of claim and complaint
to determine dischargeability; holding that the claim is discharged where the state had not filed a claim or a complaint to determine
dischargeability).

451

See, e.g., In re Psychiatric Hospitals of Florida, Inc., 216 B.R. 660, 661 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that the debtor's motion to
determine tax liability was not a suit against the state because it did not seek monetary or injunctive relief against the state and it
named the state property appraiser only because the appraiser had previously valued the property that the debtor was asking the
court to reevaluate); see also Clerk of Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County v. NVR Homes, Inc., 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(holding that the debtor's motion to declare certain real property transfers to be exempt from taxation was not a suit against the state).

452

See also Cordry, supra note 340, at 1 (noting that any determination in state court must be brought to bankruptcy court for allowance,
estimation and allocation anyway).

453

See discussion infra at notes 458-487 and accompanying text (discussing adversary proceedings as “suits”).

454

See supra note 420-430.

455

See, e.g., In re Ranstrom, 215 B.R. 454 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that state was immune from money judgment for violation of
the automatic stay, but the court could determine whether state's claims had been discharged; debtor had filed adversary proceeding
to determine dischargeability of state's tax claims). Note that, in this case, there was a question whether the claim was dischargeable.
See infra notes 477-485 and accompanying text.

456

In re Neary, 220 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that court may not hear adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability
of taxes and for violation of stay); In re TriCity Turf Club, Inc., 203 B.R. 617, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 81 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996)
(holding that court had no jurisdiction to consider debtor's adversary proceeding against state for violation of automatic stay); In re
Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that court had no jurisdiction
to consider debtor's adversary proceeding against state for violation of automatic stay); In re Martinez, 196 B.R 225 (D.P.R. 1996)
(holding that the court had no jurisdiction to determine the debtor's action against the state for violation of the stay)

457

See Ranstrom, 215 B.R. 454 (holding that state was immune from money judgment for violation of the automatic stay, but the court
could determine whether state's claims had been discharged).

458

Cf., e.g., Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821).

459

See discussion infra at Part IV.B.1

460

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003, 7004, 7005, 7010, Official Bankruptcy Form No. 16C, 16D; see generally FED. R. BANKR. P.
Part VII.

461

Bankruptcy Rule 7001 establishes an exclusive list of 10 types of adversary proceedings. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. The
discussion in the text omits 5 of these items. Two of these items are omitted because they might be commenced by, not against,
a state. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(4) (proceeding to object to or revoke discharge); 7001(5) (proceeding to revoke order of
confirmation). A third item would apply only if the debtor and state are co-owners of property. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(3)
(proceeding to sell the interest of the debtor and a co-owner in property). The fourth, subordination of the state's claims other than
in a Chapter 11 plan, occurs rarely. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(8). As to the final item, determination of a removed cause of
action, see infra note 463; FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(10).

462

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1994).

463

See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76, 26 Soc. Sec. Rep.
Serv. 175, 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 514, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1204, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72856 (1989) (barring
adversary proceeding to recover preferential transfer and for “turnover” of amounts due under Medicaid contract); In re Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1246, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 238, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 77604 (3d Cir. 1998), as amended, (Feb. 19, 1998) (barring adversary proceeding to recover amounts due under medical
assistance program contract); AER-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 264, 37 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 512, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77244 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court had no jurisdcition to consider the
debtor's breach of contract action against the state where the state had not waived immunity; also holding that a written payment
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demand did not constitute a proof of claim or a waiver of immunity); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119
F.3d 1140, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S. 1998) (barring an adversary proceeding to recover a preferential transfer);
In re ABEPP Acquisition Corp., 215 B.R. 513, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1195, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 358, Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77591 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 1997) (barring an adversary proceeding to recover a tax overpayment); O'Brien v. Agency of
Natural Resources (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); see also infra note 456 (discussing cases in which the trustee
or debtor sought to recover sanctions for automatic stay violations).

464

See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).

465

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994).

466

See Hoffman, 492 U.S. 96; Matter of Guiding Light Corp., 213 B.R. 489, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 655 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997)
(barring an adversary proceeding by the debtor against the state seeking turnover of Medicaid payments withheld from the debtor;
but allowing the suit to proceed against state officials for prospective injunctive relief); see also Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d 237 (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action to recover amounts due under a medical assistance program contract).

467

See In re Zywiczynski, 210 B.R. 924, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 133, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 632 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the court from determining whether a certificate of deposit held by a bank and
claimed by the state is subject to turnover).

468

See Zywiczynski, 210 B.R. at 932-33; see also In re ABEPP Acquisition Corp., 215 B.R. 513, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1195, 39
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 358, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77591 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the trustee can not avoid the
constraints of the Eleventh Amendment by arguing that the action is simply an action to turn over a “res” held by the state rather
than an action against the state).

469

See Zywiczynski, 210 B.R. at 933 & n.18.

470

See Guiding Light, 213 B.R. at 491-92; Zywiczynski, 210 B.R. 927-29.

471

See generally discussion infra at Part IV.B.4.

472

See, e.g., Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947).

473

See, e.g., Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1159, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76549 (4th Cir.
1995); Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 26 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1195, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 263, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 76423 (7th Cir. 1995).

474

Gardner, 329 U.S. 565.

475

See supra notes 441-447; see also In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61 (D.N.J. 1997) (rejecting state's immunity claim with respect to debtor's
attempt to avoid state's lien through provision of a plan because state had waived immunity by filing a claim).

476

See In re Barton Industries, Inc., 104 F.3d 1241, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 269, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 883 (10th Cir.
1997); In re Be-Mac Transport Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1020, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 69, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 128 (8th Cir.
1996); Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 26 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1195, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 263, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 76423 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that lien was extinguished where creditor participated in the plan and the plan provided distribution
on the creditor's claim); cf. Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1159, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
76549 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that adversary proceeding is required to determine validity of lien where creditor does not participate
in the case); see also In re Andersen, 215 B.R. 792, 794 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998) (authorizing a dischargeability determination under
a plan rather than in an adversary proceeding); see generally Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations on the Modification of Liens
Through Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 43 (1997).

477

See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994). On discharge and dischargeability, see generally GINSBURG, supra note 350, at Part XI.

478

See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2, 4, 6, 15), (c) (requiring the filing of a timely complaint for debts that arise from acts such as fraud, false
pretenses, defalcation, larceny, embezzlement, willful and malicious injury, and certain debts that arise from a divorce or separation).

479

See id. § 523(c).

480

See State of N.J. v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that the state is not excused from the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rules that require the state to file a proof of claim and complaint to determine dischargeability; where the
state had not filed a claim or a complaint to determine dischargeability, the claim was discharged).

481

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1, 3, 5, 7-14, 16-18) (1994).

482

See id. § 523.
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483

See infra Part IV.B.1.

484

See id. § 523(a) (1), (c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6), 4004; see generally GINSBURG, supra note 350, at Part XI. If the state
sues in state court, the debtor might seek to reopen the bankruptcy case or remove the matter to the district court to determine
dischargeability. See id. ¶ 11.07[A], [B].
For example, the debtor might file an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a student loan debt. Such a debt is
dischargeable only if the debt first became due more than seven years before the bankruptcy filing, or if excepting the debt from
discharge would impose an “undue hardship” upon the debtor or the debtor's dependents. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A, B) (1994).
The Higher Education Amendments of 1998 eliminated the seven-year exception for cases filed on or after October 7, 1998. See
Pub. E. 105-244 (H.R. 6, 112 Stat. 1581). The debtor might prefer to have the bankruptcy court determine the “undue hardship”
issue, rather than leave the issue to a less experienced state court judge. Also, the bankruptcy court may provide the logical forum
for relief if the state is using only non-judicial means to collect the student loan debt. In a Chapter 13 case, the debtor might avoid the
problem of suing the state by including a finding of “undue hardship” in its plan of reorganization. Although an adversary proceeding
normally is required to determine dischargeability, at least one court has held that the “undue hardship” finding may be made under a
Chapter 13 plan. See In re Andersen, 215 B.R. 792, 794 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998) (not involving a claim by a state). Cf. supra note 476.

485

See In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998) (student loan); In re Neary, 220 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (taxes);
In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77512 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
debtor's adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of motor vehicle offense surcharges and that state did not waive
immunity by filing a motion to dismiss or by seeking judgment in its favor); In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d
(MB) 680 (D.P.R. 1996) (debtor sought sanctions after state filed tax lien with respect to debts discharged under confirmed plan),
e.g. In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. 68, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 690 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998); In re Rose, 214 B.R. 372, 31 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 906, 122 Ed. Law Rep. 472 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (debtor filed complaint against state to determine dischargeability
of state's claim); see also State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813,
821, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998).

486

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(7).

487

See, e.g., State of N.J. v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691, 693 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting, in dicta, that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking
damages or injunctive relief); see generally Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (“[A] suit ... is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”; noting that a suit against the
sovereign is one that would require an expenditure from the treasury, interfere with public administration, or restrain the sovereign
from acting); cf. Walker, 142 F.3d 813 (holding that the discharge of a state's debt is not a suit against the state even though it
arguably enjoins the state from collecting the debt). See discussion infra at Part IV.B.4 concerning suits seeking injunctive relief
against state officials.

488

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 1121(d); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3), 4001(c).

489

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001.

490

See supra notes 381, 408-457 and accompanying text.

491

See discussion supra notes 317-322 and accompanying text.

492

See, e.g., cases cited infra note 536.

493

See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994). The DOJ set forth its argument in a brief filed in In re NVR, L.P., 206 B. R. 831 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998), and several other bankruptcy cases. See “United States' Memorandum of Law in Support
of the Constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 106” filed January 8, 1997 in In re NVR, L.P., Case No. 92-11704-T, Bankr. E.D. Va. (on
file with author) (hereinafter, “DOJ Brief”); see also DOJ Intervenes in Seminole Case, 30 No. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1 (Jan.
12, 1997) (discussing the DOJ's arguments).
In NVR, the estate had paid $9 million in transfer taxes to six states in connection with property transfers made during the bankruptcy
case. Section 1146 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from state transfer tax any transfers that facilitate a plan of reorganization. See
11 U.S.C. § 1146 (1994). After NVR's plan of reorganization was confirmed, NVR sued the states to recover the tax payments. Two
states, which together owed $6 million in refunds, refused to pay. The bankruptcy court held that NVR was not liable for the taxes.
The Supreme Court issued the Seminole decision the next day. The two states promptly moved for reconsideration, and the United
States moved to intervene. See DOJ Brief, supra at 1-2. The court rejected the DOJ's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
authorized abrogation under § 106(a). The court held that abrogation under § 106(a) was unconstitutional, and that waiver and setoff
under §§ 106(b) and (c) were unconstitutional attempts to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition on congressional abrogation.
See In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998) (also
rejecting an argument that “in rem ” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e), which vests in the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over property of the bankruptcy estate, created a exception to the Eleventh Amendment). Sections 106(b) and
(c) are discussed infra at Part IV.B.1.

494

DOJ Brief, supra note 493, at 8 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I combined with the Privileges and Immunites Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to abrogate states' immunity).
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495

DOJ Brief, supra note 493, at 4.

496

DOJ Brief, supra note 493, at 15.

497

Id. at 15 (arguing that states may not infringe on rights granted to national citizens). The DOJ, drawing upon the Court's reasoning in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10999 (1976), notes that the Civil War Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments) reallocated power between the states and the federal government. Under this reallocation, states' sovereignty
became subordinate to “national citizenship.” DOJ Brief, supra note 493, at 10-12 (citing City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 179,
100 S. Ct. 1548, 64 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1980)).

498

See id. at 12-16 (addressing the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).

499

See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d
Cir. 1997) (Patent Remedy Act); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of University of California, 143 F.3d 1446, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 621, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, en banc suggestion declined, (Aug. 5, 1998) (Patents); CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Board of Public Works of State of W.Va., 138 F.3d 537 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 WL 313246 (U.S. 1998) (Railroad
Revitalization & Regulatory Reform Act); Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 124 Ed. Law Rep. 812 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Title IX); Darne v. State of Wis., Department of Revenue, 137 F.3d 484, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2569 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 122 Ed. Law Rep. 943 (7th Cir. 1997) (Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act); Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 126 F.3d 589, 24 A.D.D. 51,
7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 454 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, judgment vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2339, 141 L. Ed. 2d 710, 8 A.D. Cas.
(BNA) 480 (U.S. 1998) (Americans With Disabilities Act); Hurd v. Pittsburg State University, 109 F.3d 1540, 117 Ed. Law Rep.
95, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44615 (10th Cir. 1997) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Bryant v. New Jersey Dept. of Transp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D.N.J. 1998) (Title VI); Beasely v. Alabama State University, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 1304, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 239 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Title IX); Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp. 993, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 650,
157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act); see also infra notes
521-536 (discussing other cases in which courts considered whether abrogation was proper under the Fourteenth Amendment).

500

“The constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy and under this power Congress can limit that jurisdiction
which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law.” DOJ
Brief, supra note 493, at 15 (quoting Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439, 60 S. Ct. 343, 84 L. Ed. 370 (1940)).

501

Id.

502

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

503

See infra note 625.

504

See Varner v. Illinois State University, 150 F.3d 706, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 96, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33700 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning
that, to determine whether Congress had the power to abrogate a state university's immunity through legislation “validly enacted”
pursuant to § 5 “enforcement power,” courts “were required to consider two questions:” first, “whether Congress in applying the
[legislation] to the States, did so pursuant to its § 5 powers, and if so, (2) whether the [legislation] is within Congress's § 5 powers,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.”) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d
624, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 62, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44785 (U.S. 1997)); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1966) (establishing a three-part test; the first component of which is whether the statute
can be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the other two components of which consider whether the
statute is “appropriate” legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment).

505

See Varner, 1998 WL 407011, at *5-6 (reasoning that the “appropriate question” is whether the objectives of the specific legislation
at issue were “within Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment”) (quoting Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 660,
124 Ed. Law Rep. 812 (7th Cir. 1998)); id. (“the rule remains that Congress need not use magic words to exercise its enforcement
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (quoting Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761,
768, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1179 (7th Cir. 1998))); id. at 6 (“the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of power which it undertakes to exercise”) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S. Ct.
421, 92 L. Ed. 596 (1948))); Franks v. Kentucky School for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 363, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 70, 1998 FED App.
124P (6th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that the proper inquiry is “whether the Congress actually had the authority to adopt the legislation
pursuant to that provision, not whether Congress correctly guessed the source of its authority;” this involves an “objective” inquiry,
“namely, whether Congress could have enacted the legislation at issue pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power
abrogate”) (quoting Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 90, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44579 (8th Cir.
1997)); id. (concluding that, if Congress had the authority to abrogate as an objective matter, “whether it also had the specific intent
to legislate pursuant to that authority is irrelevant”) (quoting Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1283)); Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Public
Utility Com'n of Com. of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that “when determining the sources of Congress's authority
to legislate, we may look beyond the expressed constitutional basis in a statute's preamble or legislative history”); Crawford, 109
F.3d at 1283 (reasoning that “[b]ecause Congress need not expressly invoke the authority of a specific constitutional provision to act
pursuant to it,” the second prong of the Seminole test “requires us to make an objective inquiry” into “whether Congress could have
enacted the legislation at issue pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power to abrogate;” concluding that Congress
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must have the power to abrogate as an objective matter but that Congress's specific intent to abrogate based on that authority is
irrelevant); see also Doe, 138 F.3d at 659; Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 840, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1471, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44543, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33503, 1997 FED App. 15P (6th Cir. 1997); E.E.O.C.
v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 75 L. Ed. 2d 18, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1033, 31 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 74, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33364 (1983).

506

Cf. Varner, 1998 WL 407011 at *6-8.

507

Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 929, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33450, 1996 FED App. 343P
(6th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 107 F.3d 358, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1501 (6th Cir. 1997) (employees
sued the Ohio Civil Rights Commission under the Fair Labor Standards Act).

508

Id. at 209 (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651, and noting that only the first Katzenbach factor provides any real guidance in
analyzing whether a statute was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).

509

Id.

510

Id. at 210 (holding that there was no logical connection between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Labor Standards Act).

511

See, e.g., In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 244, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1246, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas.
2d (MB) 238, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77604 (3d Cir. 1998), as amended, (Feb. 19, 1998) (applying “rationally related test” and
reasoning that “there must be something about the act connecting it to recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims”) (quoting WilsonJones, 99 F.3d at 210)); see also cases cited infra at note 537.

512

See American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Com. of Va., 949 F. Supp. 438, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.
2d (BNA) 1191 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir.
1998); Taylor v. Com. of Va., 951 F. Supp. 591, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1199 (E.D. Va. 1996); see also Franks v. Kentucky
School for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 70, 1998 FED App. 124P (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress had power
to apply Title IX to the states because the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX both proscribe gender discrimination in education);
Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 90, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44579 (8th Cir. 1997).

513

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1966).

514

Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 767, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1179 (7th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650; the Court first articulated this test in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421
(1819) in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause; Katzenbach extended the test to the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1706 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
(July 7, 1998) (applying the Katzenbach test); Wheeling, 141 F.3d 88 (applying the Katzenbach test).

515

City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 62, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶
44785 (U.S. 1997).

516

Id. at 2164; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Board of Public Works of State of W.Va., 138 F.3d 537, 540 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
1998 WL 313246 (U.S. 1998) (noting, in dicta, that “the power granted to Congress by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
is limited to the promulgation of remedial or preventive legislation that enforces the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment”);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (“Congress may only ‘enforce’ the provisions of the Amendments and may do so
only by ‘appropriate legislation”’).

517

117 S.Ct. at 2164.

518

See Varner v. Illinois State University, 150 F.3d 706, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 96, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33700 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that Boerne rejected Katzenbach's substantive “ratchet” theory under which Congress could expand the substantive rights contained
in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).

519

See Coolbaugh v. State of La. on Behalf of Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corr. on Behalf of Louisiana Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
136 F.3d 430, 435, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1730 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, (May 11, 1998) and cert. denied, 1998 WL 289414
(U.S. 1998) (reasoning that “Congress is authorized to adopt legislation that remedies or prevents unconstitutional conduct;” that
there must be a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end;”
and that this “proportionality inquiry” has “two primary facets: the extent of the threatened constitutional violations, and the scope
of the steps provided in the legislation to remedy or prevent such violations”) (quoting City of Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2164)); Varner,
1998 WL 407011 (applying congruence and proportionality test to determine whether statute deters or remedies unconstitutional
conduct); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 359, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(3d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “Congress' power to legislate under section five is quite broad,” but “is not without boundaries;”
that legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the Due Process Clause, “must not
create new substantive rights, but instead must provide a method of protecting against violations of those rights already extant;”
or may “serve the broader purposes of the Due Process Clause;” that “[t]he Due Process Clause itself sets out the boundaries of
what rights it protects: the conduct must involve action by a state; it must deprive an individual of life, liberty or property; and the
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deprivation must occur without due process of law;” and that these three requirements are “at the core of what the [legislation] must
remedy to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

520

See Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 767-769, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1179 (7th
Cir. 1998).

521

See Franks v. Kentucky School for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 70, 1998 FED App. 124P (6th Cir. 1998) (applying
the objective inquiry test but no clear test to determine “appropriate legislation”); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 117 Ed. Law
Rep. 90, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44579 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the objective inquiry test but no clear test to determine
“appropriate legislation”); Lam v. Curators of the University of Missouri at Kansas City Dental School, 122 F.3d 654, 120 Ed. Law
Rep. 948 (8th Cir. 1997) (following Crawford); Thorpe v. Virginia State University, 6 F. Supp. 2d 507, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 114 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (applying the Katzenbach test); but see Litman v. George Mason University, 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 790
(E.D. Va. 1998) (applying the objective inquiry test and holding that Title IX was not enacted pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment).

522

See Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Com. of Pa., 141 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1998); but see Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Burton, 949 F. Supp. 1546, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 703 (D. Wyo. 1996) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not justify
abrogation, but not expressly adopting a test to determine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).

523

See Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1706 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
(July 7, 1998); Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d 430; Muller v. Costello, 997 F. Supp. 299 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Martin v. State of Kan., 978 F.
Supp. 992, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 973 (D. Kan. 1997); Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 974 F. Supp. 1234, 25 A.D.D. 370
(D. Minn. 1997), aff'd, 153 F.3d 681, 8 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1012 (8th Cir. 1998); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 19 A.D.D. 289,
7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1143 (E.D. Mich. 1996). One of these courts applied the Katzenbach test (see Autio), one applied the Boerne test
(Coolbaugh), and the others did not apply any clear test to determine the scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment abrogation
powers (see Muller, Martin, Wallin, Niece).

524

See Garrett v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama in Birmingham, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1247 (N.D. Ala.
1998); Nihiser v. Ohio E.P.A., 979 F. Supp. 1168, 7 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 751 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Nihiser applied the Katzenbach test;
Garrett did not apply a clear test.

525

See College Savings Bank, 131 F.3d 353 (applying the Boerne test).

526

See Garrett, 989 F. Supp. 1409 (no clear test).

527

See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp. 993, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 650, 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not allow abrogation; applying the Katzenbach test); Palmatier v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 981
F. Supp. 529, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow abrogation;
not applying any clear test to determine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).

528

See Rodriguez v. Texas Com'n of Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (N.D. Tex. 1998).

529

See Hodgson v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 963 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1997).

530

See Rowlands v. Pointe Mouillee Shooting Club, 959 F. Supp. 422, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 21167 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not allow abrogation; not applying any clear test to determine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).

531

See Vazquez Morales v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 967 F. Supp. 42 (D.P.R. 1997).

532

See Abril v. Com. of Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir. 1998);
Balgowan v. State of N.J., 115 F.3d 214, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1703, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (LCP) 1265 (3d Cir. 1997);
Close v. New York, 123 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1997); Mills v. State of Me., 118 F.3d 37, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1802, 134 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33585 (1st Cir. 1997); Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dept., 111 F.3d 585, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1540, 133
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33521 (8th Cir. 1997); Raper v. State of Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1727, 133 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33546 (8th Cir. 1997); Bergemann v. State of R.I., 958 F. Supp. 61, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1495 (D.R.I.
1997); Digiore v. State of Ill., 962 F. Supp. 1064, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1542, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33543 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Frazier v. Courter, 958 F. Supp. 252, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1662, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33592 (W.D. Va. 1997);
Palotai v. University of Maryland College Park, 959 F. Supp. 714, 118 Ed. Law Rep. 89 (D. Md. 1997); Whalen v. State of Ariz.,
962 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Ariz. 1997); Adams v. State of Kan., 934 F. Supp. 371, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 626, 132 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 33475 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 489, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1792, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33549 (10th Cir.
1997); American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Com. of Va., 949 F. Supp. 438, 3 Wage & Hour
Cas. 2d (BNA) 1191 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686
(4th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. State of Ark., 957 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Blow v. State of Kan., 929 F. Supp. 1400, 3 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 627, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33445 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 489, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1792,
133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33549 (10th Cir. 1997); Chauvin v. State of La. and Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, 937 F. Supp. 567, 3
Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 927, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33457 (E.D. La. 1996); Close v. State of N.Y., 3 Wage & Hour Cas.
2d (BNA) 856, 1996 WL 481550 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), judgment aff'd, 125 F.3d 31, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 108, 134 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33580 (2d Cir. 1997); Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dept., 1996 WL 819805 (E.D. Ark. 1996), judgment aff'd, 111
F.3d 585, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1540, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33521 (8th Cir. 1997); Rehberg v. Department of Public
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Safety, 946 F. Supp. 741, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1149, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33526 (S.D. Iowa 1996), aff'd, 117 F.3d
1423 (8th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Com. of Va., 951 F. Supp. 591, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1199 (E.D. Va. 1996); Walden v.
Florida Dept. of Corrections, 975 F. Supp. 1330, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33644 (N.D. Fla. 1996). Of these cases, several applied
the Katzenbach test (see Digiore, Whalen, Taylor, Long), a few added the rational or logical connection test (see AFCSME, Taylor,
Digiore), and the rest did not any clear test to determine whether FLSA abrogation was proper under the Fourteenth Amendment
(see Palotai, Raper, Balgowan, Blow, Chauvin, Close, Moad, Walden, Adams, Arnold).

533

See Varner, 1998 WL 407011; Perdue v. City University of New York, 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Ussery v. State of La.
Through Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 962 F. Supp. 922, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (W.D. La. 1997), decision aff'd
and remanded, 150 F.3d 431, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1198 (5th Cir. 1998); but see Larry v. Board of Trustees of University
of Alabama, 975 F. Supp. 1447, 121 Ed. Law Rep. 673 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that the Equal Pay Act was not enacted pursuant
to a valid exercise of power under § 5). With the exception of Varner, none of these cases applied any clear test to determine the
scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment abrogation powers.

534

See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d 761; Hurd v. Pittsburg State University, 109 F.3d 1540, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 95, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1448, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44615 (10th Cir. 1997); Hines v. Ohio State University, 3 F. Supp.2d 859 (S.D. Ohio
1998); Pease v. University of Cincinnati Medical Center, 6 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Young v. Pennsylvania House
of Representatives, Republican Caucus, 994 F. Supp 282 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Hodgson v. University of Texas Medical Branch at
Galveston, 953 F. Supp. 168, 116 Ed. Law Rep. 599, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 108 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Mete v. New York State
Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 984 F. Supp. 125, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D.N.Y.
1997); Pietraszewski v. Buffalo State College, 1997 WL 436763 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Simpson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice,
975 F. Supp. 921, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1754 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Ullman v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
1997 WL 134557 (W.D. Va. 1997). Goshtasby applied both the Katzenbach and Boerne tests, several of the district courts applied
the Katzenbach test (see Young, Simpson), one applied the objective inquiry test (see Pease), but the others did not apply any clear
test to determine the scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment abrogation powers (see Hines, Hodgson, Mete, Pietrszewski).

535

See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d 761; Hall v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n, 995 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Bechtel v. New
York State Banking Dept., 1997 WL 667784 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota,
958 F. Supp. 439, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 606, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1004 (D. Minn. 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 822, 77 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 679 (8th Cir. 1998); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 113 Ed. Law Rep. 301, 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1318, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44327 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd, 139 F.3d 1426, 8 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1,
125 Ed. Law Rep. 341, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1201, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 45419 (11th Cir. 1998). Goshtasby
applied both the Katzenbach and Boerne tests. None of the other courts applied a clear test to determine the scope of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment powers.

536

See In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1246, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 238,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77604 (3d Cir. 1998), as amended, (Feb. 19, 1998) (applying the logical connection test); Matter of Estate
of Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 601, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1249, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77514
(5th Cir. 1997), amended on denial of reh'g, 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.,
119 F.3d 1140, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S. 1998); In re Elias, 218 B.R. 80, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 2, 39 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 782 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1998); In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77512 (D.N.J. 1997); In re
Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); In re Neary, 220 B.R. 864, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 737, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
77715 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); In re Perez, 220 B.R. 216, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 612 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); In re C.J. Rogers,
Inc., 212 B.R. 265, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22195 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Morrell, 218 B.R. 87, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
147 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997); In re Mueller, 211 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 30 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998); In re Rose, 214 B.R. 372, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
906, 122 Ed. Law Rep. 472 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997); In re Tri-City Turf Club, Inc., 203 B.R. 617, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 81
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996). For cases that hold § 106(a) to be unconstitutional but do not expressly consider whether the Fourteenth
Amendment applies, see supra note 331.

537

See, e.g., Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d 237; Elias, 218 B.R. 80; Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837; Neary, 220 B.R. 864; Perez, 220 B.R. 216;
C.J. Rogers, 212 B.R. 265; Mueller, 211 B.R. 737; NVR, 206 B.R. 831; Tri City Turf Club, 203 B.R. 617; cf. Kish, 212 B.R. 808
(applying the Boerne congruence and proportionality test).

538

See Barsalou, supra note 563 at 608 n. 142 (discussing the rational relation requirement).

539

Meltzer, supra note 82, at 49-50 (noting, also, that Seminole raises hard questions concerning the scope of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).

540

See Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1998); Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 817.

541

See, e.g., Browning, supra note 322, at 1 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment argument is contrary to “common sense,” and
that the DOJ should look beyond bankruptcy law; also noting that “[t]here is not even a statutory right to have all bankruptcy issues
heard exclusively in federal bankruptcy court, much less a constitutional right”; and that the DOJ's bankruptcy focus ignores the
fact of concurrent bankruptcy jurisdiction and is myopic because the Fourteenth Amendment arguments would apply equally to
privileges under other statutes such as the FLSA, Clean Water Act, Railroad Revitalization Act, and would in effect repeal the
Eleventh Amendment); Cordry, supra note 340, at 1 (arguing that bankruptcy cannot be a privilege of citizenship when one need
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not be a person let alone a citizen to file bankruptcy; also arguing that the privileges and immunities clause has never been construed
so broadly as to include all federal law); Clark, supra note 338, at 5 (arguing that Cordry's analysis is too simplistic, but agreeing
that the Fourteenth Amendment argument is not viable); Paskay, supra note 323, at 12 (“It is not without doubt, however, that
while this approach [i.e., abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment] may save the 1994 Amendment of Section 106, one would
be less than candid not to admit that this may be an impermissible stretch of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Joseph
E. Miller, III, Abrogating Sovereign Immunity Pursuant to Its Bankruptcy Clause Power: Congress Went Too Far!, 13 BANKR.
DEV. J. 197, 233(1996) (arguing that extending the Privileges and Immunities Clause to permit abrogation under the Bankruptcy
Code is too great a “stretch”); see also Field, supra note 19, at 15-16 (suggesting that Seminole may invalidate the parts of the
bankruptcy statute that allow individuals to sue states to enforce federal law, because the bankruptcy statute was not “enacted or
enactable under” the Fourteenth Amendment).

542

See In re Straight, 209 B.R. 540 (D. Wyo. 1997), judgment aff'd, 143 F.3d 1387, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 877, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 77719 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Burke, 203 B.R. 493, 497, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 62, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 453
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to enact laws to prevent states from abridging
the privileges and immunities of citizenship, which include the right to bankruptcy relief); In re Headrick, 200 B.R. 963 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1996); see also In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. 419, 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 324 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995)
(decided prior to Seminole).

543

See In re Burke, 146 F.3d 1313, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1147, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77755 (11th Cir. 1998) (consolidated
appeal of Headrick and Burke); In re Straight, 143 F.3d 1387, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 877, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77719 (10th
Cir. 1998).

544

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

545

Cf. Browning, supra note 322, at 10 (“One thing is certain: sorting out Seminole's impact in the bankruptcy field will take years and
years of litigation, for there are many issues of uncertain outcome and plenty of room for reasonable minds to differ on those issues.”).

546

This discussion assumes that the trustee or debtor is a “citizen,” within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., In re
Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 376, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (reasoning that the trustee is not a federal agent
acting on behalf of the United States).

547

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 117, 121, nn.14, 16.

548

Waiver and consent are distinguished infra at Parts IV.B.1.a. and IV.B.1.b. The circumstances in which waiver and consent occur
are beyond the scope of this Article.

549

See infra note 655; Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 49 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1664, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39067 (1989).

550

See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890); Christopher L. Lafuse, Beyond Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak: Permitting the Indian Tribes to Sue the States Without Regard to the Eleventh Amendment Bar, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 639, 651-53 (1992); John Burns Taylor, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REV. 513, 515-520
(1983).

551

See supra note 14.

552

See, e.g., In re 995 Fifth Ave. Associates, L.P., 963 F.2d 503, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1420, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
1162, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74546 (2d Cir. 1992).

553

See, e.g., Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1990) (“States may
consent to suit in federal court.”); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97
L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987) (“If a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the suit is not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D.
Cas. (BNA) 758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 35329 (1985) (“[I]f a State waives its immunity
and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.”); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106
S. Ct. 423, 88 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1985) (“Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they
consent to it in unequivocal terms ...”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (holding that
the mere fact that a state participates in a federal program is not sufficient to establish consent to suit in federal court); Employees
of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 280, 93 S.
Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 32876
(1973) (“[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts ....”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17, 10 S. Ct.
504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890) (“Undoubtedly a state may be sued by its own consent ...”); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S. Ct.
878, 27 L. Ed. 780 (1883); but cf. Employees, 411 U.S. at 298, 310, 321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that consent may
be permissible when the suit is by the state's own citizens, which is beyond the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, but that there
is an open question whether the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit against a state by another state's
citizens, even when the state has consented).
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554

See, e.g., cases cited infra at note 608; see also Gibson, supra note 322, at 202, 208-212 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits suit
against unconsenting states only; if a state is found to have consented to such litigation in federal court, the suit may proceed.”).

555

See Seminole, 517 U.S. 44; cf. State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 54 S. Ct. 18, 78 L. Ed. 145 (1933) (defining Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a personal privilege); see discussion supra at notes 304-305 and accompanying text, infra at notes 617-619
and acccompanying text. If states' immunity in federal court either arose from the same source as states' immunity in state court
(i.e., common law) or arose from a different source (i.e., the Constitution) but was identical in nature to common law immunity
(i.e., a privilege), then traditional common law concepts of consent and waiver would apply in federal court actions to the same
extent that they apply in state court actions.

556

The phrase “limited waiver” is coined here to distinguish “constructive waiver.”

557

See discussion supra at notes 140-162 and accompanying text; infra at notes 569-589 and accompanying text.

558

See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 998 F.2d 931, 946-47, 84 Ed. Law Rep. 665, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir.
1993), reh'g denied, en banc suggestion declined, (Sept. 23, 1993) (“The general rule, although not without debate, is that when
a governmental entity has waived its immunity from federal judicial authority by taking legal action in federal court, the person
charged can raise all counterclaims that arise from the same transaction or events.”); U.S. v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of California,
788 F. Supp. 1485, 1493, 35 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 21333 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“A state waives its Eleventh
Amendment and sovereign immunities as to compulsory recoupment counterclaims by filing a complaint in federal court.”); U.S. v.
Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 910, 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1529, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20444 (D.N.H. 1985) (“Filing suit as a plaintiff
constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as well as sovereign immunity with respect to any counterclaim asserted by
a defendant which arises out of the same event underlying the State's claim and which is asserted defensively in recoupment for the
purpose of diminishing the State's recovery.”); Federal Savings & Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1017
(7th Cir. 1969) (waiver by the federal government); see also Gibson, supra note 231, at 346 n.259 (collecting authorities); Gibson,
supra note 322, at 209 (characterizing the rule as arising from lower federal courts that conclude “on the basis of rather limited
Supreme Court authority, that a state that brings a claim in federal courts waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit with
respect to any recoupment claim that the defendant may assert against it”).

559

See Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 910 (collecting cases); Federal Savings, 419 F.2d at 1017; United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc.,
882 F. Supp. 1432, 1453 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 382 F. Supp. 351, 356 n.6, 1974 A.M.C. 302 (D. Me. 1974);
see also Gibson, supra note 322, at 209-10.

560

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) and cases cited infra note 608. The state might also take action in bankruptcy court by filing
an adversary proceeding.

561

See, e.g., Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947); see also Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 448,
2 S. Ct. 878, 27 L. Ed. 780 (1883); see generally discussion supra at notes 439-451 and accompanying text..

562

See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (b), (c) (1994). Common law recoupment involves defenses that arise from the same contract, transaction
or occurrence. Common law setoff, in contrast, involves obligations between the same parties that arise from different contracts,
transactions or occurrences. Cf. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-318.

563

See 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994); cf. FED R. CIV. P. 13(a) (requiring party to assert as compulsory counterclaim any claim that
“arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim”). See also In re Value-Added
Communications, Inc., 224 B.R. 354 (N.D. Tex. 1998). For a discussion of § 106(b), see generally Patricia L. Barsalou, Defining
the Limits of Federal Court Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Court, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 575, 615-17 (1997); Gibson, supra
note 231, at 316. Note that § 106(b) subjects the state only to claims that are property of the estate, and not to the claims of nondebtor parties, even if they arise from the same transaction.
Section 106(b) leaves open several issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, including whether a claim by one state agency
waives immunity with respect to counterclaims against other state agencies. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 231, at 323, 335-36 (arguing
that waiver applies only to the same state agency because § 106(b) applies only to counterclaims against “such governmental unit”).
The 1994 Amendments to § 106(b) clarified that waiver occurs only when the state files a claim, rather than when the state merely
holds a claim. See, e.g., AER-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 264, 37 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 512, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77244 (4th Cir. 1997) (letters filed with clerk of court do not meet requirement
of filing proof of claim for purposes of waiver under § 106(b)); see generally Gibson, supra note 231 (discussing issues that arose
under the prior version of § 106(b) and analyzing the 1994 Amendments); see also id. at 316, 335 & nn. 171-172 (arguing that, after
the 1994 Amendments, a claim must be evidenced by a formal proof of claim, an informal proof of claim is inadequate).

564

11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994). Unlike the abrogation rule of § 106(a), the recoupment rule of § 106(b) is not subject to a punitive
damage limitation. See id. § 106(a),(b); cf. id. § 505 (providing for affirmative recovery of certain tax refunds from the state). See
also Gibson, supra note 231, at 334-35 (noting that counterclaims allowed under § 106(b) are not limited to bankruptcy causes of
actions, and are not subject to the limitations imposed under § 106(a) with respect to the Equal Access to Justice Act and punitive
damages); cf. Browning, supra note 322, at 11 (arguing that, even if the state files a claim, it is not clear that the trustee may pursue
an action under § 505(a)(2)(B), which allows affirmative monetary recovery); Mark Browning, Letter to Editor, reprinted in More
On the Seminole Tribe Case, 29 No. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 5 (July 2, 1996) (noting that § 505(a)(2)(B) envisions affirmative
monetary relief in the form of a tax refund paid out of state treasury; arguing that states will usually file a proof of claim and thereby
waive the immunity defense to a § 505 determination).
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565

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 505(a)(2)(B) (tax refunds), 547(b) (1994) (preferential transfers). Cf. Browning, supra note 322, at 11 (noting that,
if a Chapter 7 debtor's assets are insufficient to pay tax claims, the state may choose not to file a claim if there is a risk of a dispute).

566

See 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994) (providing for deemed waiver for purposes of setoff but not affirmative recovery for claims arising
from different transactions); see also Gibson, supra note 231, at 336-37 (noting that § 106(c) only allows setoff, but applies to any
counterclaims, not simply counterclaims arising from the same transaction as the state's claim).

567

See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1148, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S.
1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998):
The Eleventh Amendment, which applies only to suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States,” presents no
bar to a state affirmatively entering a federal forum voluntarily to pursue its own interest. But it would violate the fundamental
fairness of judicial process to allow a state to proceed in federal court and at the same time strip the defendant of valid defenses
because they might be construed to be affirmative defenses against the state. When a state authorizes its officials voluntarily to
invoke federal process in a federal forum, the state thereby consents to the federal forum's rules of procedure and may not invoke
sovereign immunity to protect itself against the interposition of defenses to its action. The scope of these available defenses and
the state's concomitant waiver of immunity is a question of federal law and procedure, but well-established principles of sovereign
immunity dictate that this waiver be narrowly construed. [citation omitted] For this reason, we hold that to the extent a defendant's
assertions in a a state-instituted federal action, including those made with regard to a state-filed proof of claim in a bankruptcy
action, amount to a compulsory counterclaim, a state has waived any Eleventh Amendment immunity against that counterclaim in
order to avail itself of the federal forum.
Id. (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss trustee's action to avoid preferential transfer because it did not arise out of
the same transaction as the state's proof of claim; therefore the state had not waived immunity as to that action).
While 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) may correctly describe those actions that, as a matter of constitutional law, constitute a state's waiver of
the Eleventh Amendment, it is nevertheless not within Congress' power to abrogate such immunity by “deeming” a waiver. Rather,
in the absence of a constitutional authorization, it lies solely within a state's sovereign power to waive its immunity voluntarily and
to consent to federal jurisdiction. Only if it waives such immunity may a private citizen sue the state in federal court.
Id. at 1147 (holding that § 106(b) is unconstitutional because it amounts to Congressional abrogation); see also AER-Aerotron, Inc.
v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 681-83, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 264, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 512, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 77244 (4th Cir. 1997) (Niemeyer, J. concurring) (suggesting that Congress has no authority to enact a provision under which
state is deemed to waive immunity in federal court); In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that §§ 106(b) and 106(c) are unconstitutional attempts to avoid the Eleventh
Amendment); Barsalou, supra note 563, at 615-17 (concluding that §§ 106(b) and 106(c) may be unconstitutional to the extent that
they allow actions other than compulsory counterclaims asserted defensively against the state); Browning, supra note 322, at 10-11
(noting that because §§ 106(b) and 106(c) go beyond defensive compulsory counterclaims they raise the question whether Congress
has authority to define the scope of waiver; arguing that § 106(b) may be unconstitutional to the extent it allows recovery beyond the
traditional test established for states waiving immunity by filing suit in federal court; § 106(c) raises similar uncertainty); Gibson,
supra note 231, at 346 (noting that the state may waive federal court immunity with respect to compulsory counterclaims but only
for the purpose of reducing the state's claim, not for affirmative recovery against the state; arguing that §§ 106(b) and 106(c) are
constitutionally suspect to the extent that they allow counterclaims beyond these limitations, unless “constructive waiver” remains
valid); Gibson, supra note 322, at 210-11 (concluding that §§ 106(b) and 106(c) can be applied constitutionally to some counterclaims
if the state files a claim, but that § 106(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it allows recovery other than to reduce the state's claim and
§ 106(c) is unconstitutional to the extent it allows setoff other than for compulsory counterclaims); id. at 201-02 (“[E]xcept to the
extent that a state's filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case can be deemed to constitute waiver of its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Congress exceeded its authority in authorizing counterclaims and setoffs to be asserted against states in bankruptcy
court.”) (footnotes omitted); Koehler v. Iowa College Student Aid Comm'n (In re Koehler), 204 B.R 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1997) (holding that state's filing of counterclaim in action against state for violation of stay constitutes affirmative action by state
which waives state's immunity with respect to defensively asserted compulsory counterclaims by the debtor; collecting cases; also
suggesting that § 106(b) may be unconstitutional to the extent it allows affirmative recovery, and § 106(c) may be unconstitutional
to the extent it allows recovery for claims arising from other transactions); id. at 220 (discussing recoupment, arguing that Seminole
does not undermine recoupment jurisdiction; concluding that the filing of a counterclaim constitutes affirmative action just as filing
a complaint would for purposes of recoupment theory). Cases that upheld the bankruptcy waiver rule prior to Seminole include In
re 995 Fifth Ave. Associates, L.P., 963 F.2d 503, 508-09, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1420, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1162,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74546 (2d Cir. 1992); WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1002-03, 17
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 468, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72203 (1st Cir. 1988).

568

See Special Report: Seminole: What it Means/Possible Defenses, 29 No. 8 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1, 11-12 (8/13/96) (“If
we apply the full Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, a lot of our favorite concepts — consent to jurisdiction by filing a claim,
jurisdiction by ambush — run up against the Eleventh Amendment, which says a waiver can only be made by someone with clear
authority to do so.”) (quoting Daniel Amory); Browning, supra note 322, at 10, 27 (arguing that the filing of a proof of claim or
other pleading in federal court cannot constitute a waiver unless the state official who filed the claim has the authority to waive
the state's immunity; aknowledging that, if the official has no authority to waive immunity, the claim is not authorized either); cf.
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147-48 (noting that court must look first to state law to determine if state has waived; only if an
authorized state official state official filed suit does that court then look to federal law to determine the scope of waiver; “a state's
consent to be sued in federal court must be clearly intended by its state law and implemented by an officer acting properly under
that law”); Koehler, 204 B.R at 220 (explaining why authority is not necessary).
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569

In practice, courts have rarely recognized constructive waiver. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (“Constructive
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights.”); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 1998 WL 156678 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Constructive waiver is generally disfavored by the courts.”); Close
v. State of N.Y., 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 856, 1996 WL 481550 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), judgment aff'd, 125 F.3d 31, 4 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 108, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33580 (2d Cir. 1997); Hoeffner v. University of Minnesota, 948 F. Supp. 1380,
1394 (D. Minn. 1996) (“[T]he rarity of a State's constructive waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be overstated.”);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.6 at 410 (2d ed. 1994) (“[C]onstructive waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is virtually nonexistent.”).

570

Gibson, supra note 322, at 211 (citing CHEMERINSKY, supra note 569, § 7.6 at 410).

571

Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 12 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964) (overruled by, Welch
v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113 (1987).. See
discussion supra at notes 140-146 and accompanying text; see generally Field, supra note 136, at 1218-27 (discussing Parden and
the doctrine of conditional consent).

572

See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (holding that “[t]he mere fact that a State
participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of
public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal court”); Employees of Dept. of Public
Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 284-86, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 32876 (1973) (holding
that a constructive waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity should only be found, if at all, in those circumstances where there
is an explicit statement by Congress that it intended to expose the states to liability in federal court if they engaged in a particular
activity, and the activity itself was of a sort that a state might voluntarily elect to implement; but noting that a state cannot be deemed
to have waived its immunity if it is engaged in an important or core government function); see also Florida Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S. Ct. 1032, 67 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1981); see generally
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 362-63, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d Cir.
1997) (discussing the manner in which the courts have modified the Parden doctrine).

573

Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 1987 A.M.C. 2113
(1987).

574

See Abril v. Com. of Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir. 1998);
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 316, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (5th Cir. 1998); AER-Aerotron, Inc.
v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 264, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 512, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 77244 (4th Cir. 1997); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001 (3d Cir. 1997); Close v. State of N.Y., 125 F.3d 31, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 108, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33580
(2d Cir. 1997); Digiore v. State of Ill., 962 F. Supp. 1064, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1542, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33543
(N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 815, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77512 (D.N.J. 1997); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 115 Ed. Law Rep. 699, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (D.N.J. 1996), aff'd, 131
F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d Cir. 1997); American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Com.
of Va., 949 F. Supp. 438, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1191 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir. 1998); In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 849 n.35, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 843 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998); see also Barsalou, supra note 563, at 613-14 nn. 154-60 (questioning continued
viability of constructive waiver doctrine); Gibson, supra note 322, at 211 (noting that the Supreme Court in Welch overruled the
part of Parden that allowed Congress to abrogate states' immunity without unmistakeably clear language; arguing that even though
§ 106 contains unmistakeably clear language, Welch and Edelman suggest that constructive waiver may no longer be valid).

575

Digiore v. State of Ill., 962 F. Supp. 1064, 1075-76, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1542, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33543 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (holding that the state did not constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of the Fair Labor
Standards Act by contracting with the federal government to furnish services under federally funded drunk driver enforcement
and speeding traffic accident reduction programs because the activities were an essential function of state government; reasoning
that “[T]he difference between constructive waiver and abrogation is purely semantic. What Congress is prohibited from doing by
abrogation, it should not be permitted to acomplish through the back door of waiver.”); American Federation of State, County and
Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Com. of Va., 949 F. Supp. 438, 442, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1191 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd,
145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the state did not
implicitly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act by employing individuals to work
in state operated prisons and mental health facilities; reasoning that implied waiver would allow Congress to do indirectly that which
it could not do directly; i.e., abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).

576

See supra note 228.

577

See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504, 507-08, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 316, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that Congress cannot condition states' activities that are regulable by federal law upon the states' implied consent to being sued in
federal court; reasoning that Seminole disavowed the reasoning of both the plurality opinion and Justice White's concurrence in
Union Gas, which was based on Parden, and that Seminole incorporated much of the reasoning of Justice Scalia's dissent in Union
Gas, which explicitly called on the Court to overrule Parden; also reasoning that Seminole prohibits Congress from using Article I to
expand judicial power under Article III); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
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418-20, 115 Ed. Law Rep. 699, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (D.N.J. 1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that Congress may not use its Article I powers to condition a state's participation in a particular market or industry
on that state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity; reasoning that Parden was based upon the “surrender” of sovereignty
theory explicitly rejected by the Court in Seminole, and that Congress may not achieve indirectly through “waiver” what it cannot do
directly through express abrogation) (declining to embrace the district court's holding that Seminole implicitly overruled Parden);
In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 815, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77512 (D.N.J. 1997) (restating its previous holding in College Savings
that Seminole impliedly overruled Parden); see also AER-Aerotron, 104 F.3d at 683 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity requires unequivocal consent; Congress cannot waive states' immunity; “I
do not mean to suggest that the statute [§ 106(b)] incorrectly describes those actions which constitute a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity. But such actions constitute a waiver of immunity not because Congress in § 106 has said so. Seminole Tribe held that
Congress' Article I powers are irrelevant to an Eleventh Amendment waiver. Instead, a state's actions waive immunity when such
actions are independently sufficient under Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine. Thus, although 11 U.S.C. § 106 may restate
the law of Eleventh Amendment waiver, it does not establish the law on the subject.”).

578

See, e.g., Abril v. Com. of Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1110, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33686 (4th Cir.
1998) (reserving decision and assuming the viability of the Parden doctrine despite judicial speculation that it has been impliedly
overruled in Seminole); AER-Aerotron, 104 F.3d at 681 (declining “to offer conjecture as to what ramifications Seminole might have
with regard to Congress's power to define the circumstances under which a State is deemed to have waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity”); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (3d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “a court of appeals should be reluctant to hold that the Supreme Court implicitly has overruled
its own decision when the Court had an opportunity to overrule the decision explicitly and did not do so”); Close v. State of N.Y.,
125 F.3d 31, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 108, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33580 (2d Cir. 1997).

579

See Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F. Supp.2d 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that state university voluntarily waived its
immunity by accepting federal education funds conditioned upon Title IX's clear statement that accepting such funds would be
a waiver); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (holding
that state public service commission constructively waived immunity under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by voluntarily
participating in a federal telecommunications regulatory scheme); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 97 C 2225,
97 C 4096, 1998 WL 156678, *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998) (holding that state commerce commission waived immunity); In re Barrett
Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 810-12, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that state constructively
consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing its proof of claim; stating among other reasons that the clear and
unmistakeable language in § 106 expresses the intent of Congress that if a state files a claim in a bankruptcy case, it waives immunity);
cf. In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 176, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 460, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
77275 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (holding that state student aid commission did not waive immunity under §§ 106(b) and (c) of the
Bankruptcy Code because it did not file a a proof of claim, but it did waive immunity to the extent that the debtor's damages would
be equal to or less than the commission's counterclaim for the underlying debt).

580

See, e.g., Beasely v. Alabama State University, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 239 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that Parden
was overruled “to the extent that its holding conflicts with the requirement that Congress unequivocally state its intent to abrogate
states' eleventh amendment immunity in a statute”); In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210, 217-18, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 176, 37 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 460, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77275 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (noting that “under Welch, a federal statute may
still be used to waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,” although constructive waiver may only be found where there exists
an “unequivocal indication that the state intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment”).

581

See Illinois Bell, 1998 WL 156678, at *5-7 (noting that although Seminole focussed on abrogation rather than waiver, it “explicitly
reaffirmed the ‘proposition that the States may waive their sovereign immunity,”’ and concluding that the limitations Seminole
placed on Congress's ability to abrogate states' immunity are “entirely independent from the well-established exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity known as waiver”); see also Beasely v. Alabama State University, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 127 Ed. Law Rep.
239 (M.D. Ala. 1998).

582

See, e.g., In re Elias, 218 B.R. 80, 86, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 2, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 782 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that state tax board did not consent to jurisdiction or waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity in an adversary proceeding
commenced by a Chapter 7 trusteee to determine the debtor's state tax liability); In re C.J. Rogers, Inc., 212 B.R. 265, 273-74,
Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22195 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that state agency did not waive its immunity with respect to the
Chapter 7 trustee's preferential transfer action, even though the state agency filed proofs of claim in bankruptcy case, because the
state had not by declaration or legislation waived its immunity and had not filed a general appearance in federal court); Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S., 980 F. Supp. 448, 460 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting argument that state water management district
constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by operating a flood control and water management project in conjunction
with the Army Corps of Engineers); Mulverhill v. State, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 15, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33610, 1997
WL 394817 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that state did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act simply by being an employer); Hodgson v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 963 F. Supp. 776, 786-87 (E.D. Wis.
1997) (holding that state department of corrections did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it joined an interstate
compact by enacting the Uniform Act for Out-Of-State Parolee Supervision); Hoeffner v. University of Minnesota, 948 F. Supp.
1380, 1394 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that state university did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by participating in a
federally regulated experimental drug-manufacturing program).

583

College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (3d Cir. 1997).
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584

Id. at 363; see also In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 813, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 937 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (“[T]he
test for “constructive consent” has two prongs: 1) Congress must have stated in clear and unmistakable language the intent that the
state will be liable in federal court if the state participates in the federally regulated conduct and 2) the state voluntarily engages
in the federally regulated conduct.”); AER-Aerotron, 104 F.3d at 681 (“We realize that the power to define waiver can become the
functional equivalent of the power to abrogate. Indeed, defining waiver as anything less than ‘the sort of voluntary choice which
we generally associate with the concept of constitutional waiver’ permits Congress to do indirectly what it perhaps could not do
otherwise.” (quoting Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare,
Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 296, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶
8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 32876 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting))); cases cited supra at note 572; see generally Field, supra note
136, at 1218-27 (discussing imputing consent from the state's participation in essential governmental services).

585

See 11 U.S.C. § 106(b), (c) (1994).

586

Id.

587

See Barrett, 221 B.R. at 813-14 (noting that constructive waiver was an alternate holding because the court found that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to the discharge of the state's claim); Koehler, 204 B.R. 210; cf. AER-Aerotron, 104 F.3d 677; Elias, 218
B.R. 80; C.J. Rogers, 212 B.R. 265; contra Kish, 212 B.R. 808.

588

See Gibson, supra note 322, at 211 (suggesting that the Court may not be willing to find that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes
a voluntary waiver if it is the only means by which the state can collect on its claim); but see In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 380-81, 29
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (reasoning that the filing of a claim is a voluntary act that waives immunity,
relying on pre-Seminole authorities and considering the issue in the context of waiver generally, rather than constructive waiver);
Karen Cordry, State Governments in the Bankruptcy Courts After Seminole: Are They the New 800 Pound Gorillas?, 28 No. 23
BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1, 9 (May 14, 1996) (arguing that § 106(b) and § 106(c) are more likely than § 106(a) to be upheld as
conditions exacted in exchange for a state receiving the benefits of federal bankruptcy law, such as participation in the bankruptcy
distribution); see generally Field, supra note 136, at 1222-28 (discussing what constitutes consent and voluntariness in the context
of constructive consent).

589

See supra note 579; cf. cases cited supra note 577-582.

590

See generally Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1 A.D. Cas. (BNA)
758, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 35329 (1985) (state may waive by statute or constitutional
provision or by otherwise waiving).

591

Because the state is not obligated to forego immunity, it may impose conditions on the scope of its consent, such as statutes of
limitations. See, e.g., Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of Neb., 121 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997).

592

For example, Hawai'i has consented to suit (i) without a jury in all contract claims against the state (see H.R.S. § 661-1 (1993)),
(ii) in all tort actions covered by insurance, to the limit of the insurance policy (see H.R.S. § 661-11 (1993)), (iii) in all tort actions
based upon the torts of state employees, except that the state does not waive liability for pre-judgment interest or punitive damages
in such suits, and the state waives immunity only for those suits filed within a short limitations period (see H.R.S. §§ 662-2, 662-4
(1993)), and (iv) based upon certain claims of Native Hawai'ians (see H.R.S. §§ 673-1 - 673-5; 674-16 - 674-20 (1993)).
The federal government may also waive its immunity from suit by a term in a federal statute. See, e.g., Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S. Ct. 2957, 92 L. Ed. 2d 250, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 85, 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶
36193 (1986); U.S. v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 112 S. Ct. 1011, 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1022, 26
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 9, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74435B, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50109, 69 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ¶ 92-687
(1992) (holding that former Bankruptcy Code § 106 did not evidence a clear Congressional intent by the federal government to
waive immunity in bankruptcy cases).

593

See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 241; Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S. Ct.
1032, 67 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1981); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974); Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S. Ct. 873, 88 L. Ed. 1121 (1944); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92, 24 S. Ct. 766, 48 L. Ed. 1129
(1904); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441, 20 S. Ct. 919, 44 L. Ed. 1140 (1900); Mueller v. Thompson, 133 F.3d 1063, 4 Wage &
Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 558, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33637 (7th Cir. 1998); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of N.M., 131 F.3d 1379,
1384, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (LCP) 1300 (10th Cir. 1997); State of Mont. v. Gilham, 127 F.3d 897, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion
amended and superseded, 133 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998); Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of Neb., 121 F.3d 427 (8th Cir.
1997); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 1997); Thiel v. State Bar of Wisconsin, 94
F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. In re Holoholo, 512 F. Supp. 889 (D. Haw. 1981) (state's statutory waiver of immunity for torts
of employees waives immunity in both state and federal courts); see also Browning, supra note 322, at 11 (concluding that the fact
that the state consented to suit in its own courts does not mean that a nonbankruptcy case can be removed to federal bankruptcy
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, the bankruptcy removal statute that allows all pending litigation to be removed to one forum).

594

See discussion supra at 565-566 and accompanying text.
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595

Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend ....”).

596

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54; Fairport Intern. Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence, 105 F.3d
1078, 1082, 1997 FED App. 38P (6th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1558, 140 L. Ed. 2d 790 (U.S. 1998);
Estate of Ritter by Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 848, 48 Ed. Law Rep. 61 (6th Cir. 1988).

597

See Gibson, supra note 322, at 201 (because states' “immunity” in federal court is constitutionally compelled by the Eleventh
Amendment rather than federal common law, Congress cannot abrogate states' immunity by statute); Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at
2245 (arguing that Seminole had to make immunity a constitutional principle in order to prevent abrogation because Congress can
abrogate common law doctrines); see also discussion supra note 137; infra Part IV.B.2.

598

Article III provides an “exclusive catalogue of permissible federal court jurisdiction.” Seminole, 517 U.S. at 63-66.

599

See id. at 72 (noting that the Court's reasoning is part of its holding).

600

See, e.g., Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411
U.S. 279, 310, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8566, 70 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 32876 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The literal wording [of the Eleventh Amendment] is ... a flat prohibition
against the federal judiciary's entertainment of suits against even a consenting State brought by citizens of another State of by
aliens.”); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S. Ct. 162, 79 L. Ed. 338 (1934) ( “lack of federal jurisdiction cannot be
waived”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 569, at § 5.1, 249 (“consent is never adequate to permit federal jurisdiction where none
would otherwise exist”); Massey, supra note 91, at 63-64 (discussing the anomaly of allowing consent if the Eleventh Amendment
poses a jurisdictional bar).

601

See supra note 553.

602

See discussion supra notes 91-130 and accompanying text.

603

See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 677-68; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S 459, 466-67 (1945); see
also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (referring to the
Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar and noting that state can consent to suit in federal court but not elaborating the nature of
the jurisdictional bar); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682, 102 S. Ct. 3304, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1057, 1983
A.M.C. 144 (1982) (referring to the Eleventh Amendment as jurisdictional); Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179 (3d Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 1998 WL 334030 (U.S. 1998) and cert. denied, 1998 WL 334421 (U.S. 1998) and cert. denied, 1998 WL 423909 (U.S.
1998) (holding that the jurisdictional nature of the Eleventh Amendment allows the court to raise the issue sua sponte; decided after
Seminole); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that court could consider
Eleventh Amendment at any time, even sua sponte); Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997) (same);
Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of
Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); but see Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 91
F.3d 1445, 1448, 1996 A.M.C. 2889 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the “Eleventh Amendment is not jurisdictional in the sense that
courts must address the issue sua sponte.”); see also infra notes 616-617 and accompanying text.

604

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-68; see Ford Motor, 323 U.S at 466-67 (“The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth a
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under the Amendment
in this case even though urged for the first time in this Court.”). Post-Seminole cases expressing a similar view include In re Platter,
140 F.3d 676, 679, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77659 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Eleventh Amendment is sufficiently jurisdictional that a state
may raise it at any time”); State of Tex. By and Through Bd. of Regents of University of Texas System v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813,
819 n.7, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 826, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 92 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Because of the strong federalism concerns behind
the Eleventh Amendment, we may properly consider the issue even at this stage of the proceeding.”); In re Creative Goldsmiths of
Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1144, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S. 1998).

605

See, e.g., Field, supra note 13, at 516 n.8 (suggesting that jurisdiction by consent is permissible because the Eleventh Amendment is
not a jurisdictional bar in that respect but is a jurisdictional bar in other respects; for example, as a jurisdictional bar it is preserved
on appeal even though it was not raised in the lower court).

606

See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23-26, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 29 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 19 Envtl.
L. Rep. 20974 (1989) (overruled by, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43952 (1996)); see also Seminole,
517 U.S. at 79-83 (Souter, J., dissenting).

607

See, e.g., Field supra note 13, at 543 (suggesting that interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to impose a limit on federal courts'
jurisdiction would be problematic because courts allow states to consent to jurisdiction in federal courts and normally jurisdiction in
suits beyond the courts' judicial powers cannot be conferred by a party's consent, citing Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149, 29 S. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908), arguing that the interpretation that avoids this problem is to read the Eleventh Amendment
as simply making common law immunity possible); id. at 545 n.98 (“If sovereign immunity were regarded simply as an established
common law doctrine, Congress could modify it.”); cf. Field, supra note 19, at 7 (suggesting that Seminole's characterization of
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Eleventh Amendment immunity as constitutionally required only affects Congress's authority to abrogate immunity because the
Court has consistently held that states may waive immunity in federal court).

608

See, e.g., DeKalb County Division of Family and Children Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
when state avails itself of bankruptcy court by filing an adversary proceeding, Eleventh Amendment does not apply); In re Burke,
146 F.3d 1313, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1147, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77755 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that, by filing proof of
claim, state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of recovery of attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the automatic
stay and discharge injunction against the state); In re Straight, 143 F.3d 1387, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 877, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 77719 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that state waived immunity with respect to claims against one state department for sanctions for
violating the automatic stay when two other state agencies filed claims); AER-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 104 F.3d
677, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 264, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 512, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77244 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that state did not waive immunity where it did not file claim); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140,
31 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 218, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 574, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77457 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1517, 140 L. Ed. 2d 670 (U.S. 1998) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss trustee's action to avoid preferential
transfer because it did not arise out of the same transaction as the state's proof of claim; therefore the state had not waived immunity
as to that action); In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d 1147, 1152, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1155, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
1658, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77176, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (LCP) 512 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that when state filed proof of claim
under former § 106(a), now § 106(b), it waived immunity with respect to compulsory counterclaims by the debtor); In re Martinez,
196 B.R. 225, 36 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 680 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that territory, which is treated as a state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes, did not waive immunity where it had not filed a claim); Koehler v. Iowa College Student Aid Comm'n (In re
Koehler), 204 B.R 210 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (holding that state's filing of counterclaim in action against state for violation of stay
constitutes affirmative action by state which waives state's immunity with respect to defensively asserted compulsory counterclaims
by the debtor); In re Charter Oak Associates, 203 B.R. 17, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1318, 37 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 321
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (holding that filing a proof of claim did not waive state's immunity with respect to trustee's claim because
it was not a compulsory counterclaim, but did allow setoff); In re Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1311
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that court had no jurisdiction over action against state for violation of the automatic stay where
state had not filed claim or otherwise participated in the proceeding and therefore had not waived immunity); In re York-Hannover
Developments, Inc., 201 B.R. 137, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1066 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that state had not waived
immunity where it had not filed proof of claim or otherwise participated in the case); In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 199 B.R. 129, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 661, Bankr.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77074 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), order rev'd, 204 B.R. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 237, 31 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1246, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 238, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77604 (3d Cir. 1998), as amended, (Feb. 19, 1998); see
also Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 573-74, 67 S. Ct. 467, 91 L. Ed. 504 (1947) (filing proof of claim for taxes subjected
state to adjudication of objections to that claim); In re Operation Open City, Inc., 170 B.R. 818, 25 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1659,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76090 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a post-petition setoff by the state sufficiently asserted a claim to trigger
waiver with respect to compulsory counterclaims; decided prior to Seminole and to the 1994 amendments); cf. Gibson, supra note
322, at 215 (“Moreover, suits against states can still be maintained in state courts, where the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable,
and, with the states' consent, bankruptcy proceedings may be brought against them in federal court.”).

609

Gorka by Gorka v. Sullivan, 82 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 1996).

610

Id. at 774; see 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (removal of cases to federal court).

611

Id. at 774-75.

612

Id. at 775.

613

Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added)

614

Seminole, 517 U.S. at 70, n.13; see also discussion infra at Part IV.B.2 (concerning suit in state court to enforce federal bankruptcy
law).

615

This discussion omits a fourth possibility, which is that the Court could have avoided analyzing the Eleventh Amendment entirely
by concluding that IGRA constitutes an impermissible regulation of the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. This approach,
which has been advanced by leading constitutional law scholars, may have obviated many of the problems raised by Seminole.
It cannot, however, be reconciled with Seminole's actual holding. See Monaghan, supra note 91, at 116-20 (arguing that the
Court could have avoided the Eleventh Amendment issues in Seminole by either placing Indian tribes beyond the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment as separate sovereigns, distinguishing the Indian Commerce Clause from the Interstate Commerce Clause, or
invalidating IGRA as an infringement of states' rights under the Tenth Amendment); Field, supra note 19, at 11-15 (noting that the
Tenth Amendment concerns areas in which Congress cannot regulate states at all whereas the Eleventh Amendment concerns areas
in which Congress generally has power to regulate states but may not regulate states by means of subjecting states to private suits
in federal court; suggesting that the Court could have invalidated IGRA under the Tenth Amendment without causing the problems
created by the Court's Eleventh Amendment rationale).

616

See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burton, 949 F. Supp. 1546, 1550-51, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 703 (D. Wyo. 1996).

617

See In re PEAKSolutions Corp., 168 B.R. 918, 922 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).
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618

See State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24, 54 S. Ct. 18, 78 L. Ed. 145 (1933) (“Immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment is a personal privilege which may be waived.”); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447, 2 S. Ct. 878, 27 L. Ed. 780 (1883)
(“The immunity from suit belonging to a state, which is respected and protected by the constitution within the limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure ...”); see also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
200 U.S. 273, 284, 26 S. Ct. 252, 50 L. Ed. 477 (1906) (“such immunity is a privilege which may be waived”); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 17, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890).

619

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1); cf. cases cited supra at note 603.

620

This discussion focusses only on federal bankrutpcy law causes of action because there should be no doubt that the state may use its
traditional immunity as a defense to a state law cause of action filed in state court, even if that action was commenced in bankruptcy
court as an action related to the bankruptcy case, and then transferred to state court.

621

See, e.g., Barsalou, supra note 563, at 611-12 (concluding that suit may be brought in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), but
not analyzing whether a state's consent is required for suit in state court); id. at 620-22 (arguing that sovereign immunity should
not protect a state from suit in state court to enforce federal law); Browning, supra note 322, at 1 (“The Eleventh Amendment is
concerned not with whether an action can be maintained against a State, but rather where the action can be maintained - i.e., not in
federal court.”); Cordry, supra note 588, at 10 (“[T]he most straightforward way, of course, for the trustees and debtors to obtain
the remedies they seek is to simply gather up their courage and to venture out into state court.”); id. at A10 (“Many states have wellestablished procedures similar to the Federal Court of Claims, whereby it [sic] has waived its immunity and allowed claims to be
filed against it. If so, there is no reason why those procedures should not be adequate.”) (emphasis added); id. (acknowledging that
she does not know whether a state must allow itself to be sued in its own courts if the state has not waived immunity); Cordry, supra
note 340, at 1 (“To require that some additional matters be litigated in state court instead of bankruptcy court signals neither the death
knell of the Code nor the impossibility of providing effective relief for debtors.”); Gibson, supra note 322, at 215 (“Moreover, suits
against states can still be maintained in state courts, where the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable, and, with the states' consent,
bankruptcy proceedings may be brought against them in federal court.”).

622

See generally Barsalou, supra note 563, at 605-06; Clark, supra note 350, at 5; Field, supra note 19, at 16 (suggesting that, although
Congress could subject states to suit in state court for violations of federal law, the federal forum may be more desireable, particularly
if state court judges are elected and must try a state official); William A. Frazell, State Courts and Bankruptcy — Applying the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 14-APR. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (April 1997); Gibson, supra note 322, at 204; but cf. In re Lazar,
200 B.R. 358, 376, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (Seminole may require a return to state court proceedings,
which were common under the former Bankruptcy Act); Cordry, supra note 340, at 1 (noting that many matters are tried outside of
bankruptcy courts, including under mandatory and discretionary abstention, remand of removed matters, and arguing that actions
against the states are just one more; suing in state court does not make relief against states impossible).

623

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).

624

See id. § 547.

625

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (concurrent jurisdiction); cf. id. § 1334(a) (original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases under title
11); see also Matter of Brady, Texas, Mun. Gas Corp., 936 F.2d 212, 218, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1531, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
74121 (5th Cir. 1991); Browning, supra note 322, at 1 (“Put simply, there is not even a statutory right to have all bankruptcy issues
heard exclusively in federal bankruptcy court, much less a constitutional right.”). Certain dischargeability matters must be raised in
the bankruptcy court; however, these would be actions against the debtor, not against the state. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

626

For an in depth analysis of this question see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683 (1997).

627

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).

628

See id. § 547.

629

See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Com'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116 L. Ed. 2d 560, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1465 (1991) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state court); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare,
Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage
& Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 32876 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting
that constitutional limitations on the federal judicial power do not apply in state court).

630

See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 91, at 125 (arguing that, if a state does not consent to suit in federal court, the case will be removed
to state court because “[i]n large measure, the Eleventh Amendment operates only as a forum selection clause.”); see also Employees
of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98,
93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1254, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8566, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶
32876 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that citizens can sue states in state court if law makes states liable and provides
for suit in state court; implying but not expressly stating that states would have no immunity in state court; referring to the Court's
holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit in federal court because Congress had not effectively abrogated states' immunity
as “nothing more than a regulation of the forum in which these petititioners may seek a remedy for asserted denial of their rights”);
Field, supra note 13, at 547 (suggesting the Marshall's concurrence allows suit in state court without states' consent); but cf. infra
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note 697 (noting that Justice Marshall joined the dissent in Will, which seemed to imply that the state's consent would be required
for a suit to proceed in state court); see generally Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1700-1714 (analyzing the forum-allocation approach
to states' federal question immunity; arguing the Seminole rejected this approach in favor of an immunity-from-liability approach).

631

Traditional immunity refers to pre-constitutional common law sovereign immunity, which in same states may be embodied in, or
limited or modified by a state's constitution or statutes.

632

See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 115-16, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas.
2d (MB) 1199, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1289, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43952 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct. 1182, 59 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979) (states are immune from suit in their own courts, but not in other states'
courts; immunity in another state's courts arises only if the other state agrees to grant it as a matter of comity); see also Louis L.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Margaret G. Stewart, The State
as an Unwilling Defendant: Reflections on Nevada v. Hall, 59 NEB. L. REV. 246 (1980).

633

See Jackson, supra note 91, at 78-80.

634

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

635

The reference to state court judges in the Supremacy Clause suggests that federal laws may be enforced in state court. Id.; see
Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-70, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 358 (1990).

636

See, e.g., Barsalou, supra note 563, at 620-22 & nn.177-184 (arguing that if state courts have jurisdiction, they must accept suit;
that common law immunity is not a bar because the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from evading federal law simply because
the federal law conflicts with state law and requires that state rules of judicial administration be neutral and not favor one party
over others; and that sovereign immunity violates this rule because it protects the state only, citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
163, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988), and Martinez v. State of Cal., 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 2d 481
(1980)); Field, supra note 13, at 547-48 (the argument that Congress cannot abrogate states' immunity in states' own courts assumes
that there is a constitutional right to immunity; but she argues that there is no constitutional right to immunity); Meltzer, supra note
82, at 57-60 (federal law requires states to provide retroactive relief in state court; the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable in
state court; federal law trumps state law under the Supremacy Clause; therefore, state sovereign immunity laws are invalid against
congressional regulation; but no decision expressly holds that states may not invoke sovereign immunity in their own courts in suits
to enforce federal law); Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1779, 1794.

637

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

638

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

639

See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 91, at 82-84; Employees, 411 U.S. at 297 (Marshall, J., concurring).

640

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 74, at 489-90; Melzter, supra note 82, at 10-13; Jackson, supra note 91, at 44-51.

641

See discussion infra at notes 644-697, 715-730 and accompanying text.

642

See discussion infra at notes 698-706 and accompanying text.

643

See Field, supra note 13, at 546-47; Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1124-27; Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2240 (the early debate
was concerned that if a broad federal court immunity doctrine applied to both diversity and federal question actions, all citizens
would have to sue the states in state court on federal question actions, where the state would probably assert immunity as a defense);
Melzter, supra note 82, at 57-60; ORTH, supra note 109, at 142-43.

644

See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1664,
50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39067 (1989); Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Com'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116
L. Ed. 2d 560, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1465 (1991).

645

See Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 358 (1990).

646

See discussion infra at notes 715-730 and accompanying text.

647

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

648

Id.

649

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1664, 50
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39067 (1989).

650

Id. at 60.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

50

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE [PART TWO], 8 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3

651

Id. at 64, 71.

652

Id. at 62-63.

653

Id. at 63-64.

654

Id. at 65 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947)).

655

Id. at 67.
The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. State of Tenn.,
101 U.S. 337, 339, 25 L. Ed. 960 (1879). It is an “established principle of jurisprudence” that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts without its consent. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529, 15 L.Ed 991 (1858). Id.

656

Id. at 67. The Court also noted prior cases in which the Court had held that § 1983 was not designed to override well-established
common law immunities or defenses. Id. at 67.

657

Id. at 66.

658

Id.

659

See also Meltzer, supra note 82, at 12-13 (noting, in a different context, that the general rule that federal statutes do not regulate
states absent a clear statement is overriden by the creation of a clear private right of action against the states); cf. Hilton v. South
Carolina Public Railways Com'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116 L. Ed. 2d 560, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1465 (1991) (holding that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act creates a cause of action against a state-owned railroad) (discussed infra at notes 685-697).

660

Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64. The four-justice dissent sharply criticized the majority's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 71
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) (arguing that states are persons within the meaning of
§ 1983 and that the Court should not apply the Eleventh Amendment's clear statement rule to a matter of statutory interpretation).

661

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10999 (1976).

662

See supra Part IV.A.3.

663

Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 358 (1990).

664

Id. at 365-66.

665

Id. at 359; see also id. at 365 & n. 13.

666

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 & n. 10.

667

Id. at 67 n. 7, 70.

668

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 365.

669

Id. at 360.

670

Id. Florida's waiver statute did not extend to § 1983 claims. Id. The state supreme court denied review. Id.

671

Id. at 381-83.

672

Id. at 369-75.

673

Id. at 374-83; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tenn. 1991) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court did not
hold in Howlett v. Rose that a state court must adjudicate a claim made under § 1983 that a federal court would not be required
(or permited) to entertain.”).

674

See, e.g., Barsalou, supra note 563, at 620-622 & nn. 180-184; Gibson, supra note 344, at 207-08 (arguing that Howlett “makes
clear that a state claim of sovereign immunity will not be permitted to prevent the enforcement of a federal cause of action otherwise
maintainable in state court.”).

675

Hill v. Department of Corrections, State of Fla., 513 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1987).

676

Id.; see Howlett, 496 U.S. at 361-65.
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677

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 365.

678

Id. at 365-66.

679

Id. at 365.

680

See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Com'n, 502 U.S. 197, 213, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116 L. Ed. 2d 560, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1465 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (“If States are not within the contemplated category of defendants, then States could not
consent to suit, because they cannot ‘create a cause of action ... against an entity whom Congress has not subjected to liability.”’)
(quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. 356, 376)); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 85, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d
45, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1664, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39067 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) (“If States are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, then they may not be sued under that
statute regardless of whether they have consented to suit. Even if, in other words, a State formally and explicitly consented to suits
against it in federal or state court, no § 1983 plaintiff could proceed against it because States are not within the statute's category of
possible defendants.”); see also id. at 86 (“The question whether States are “persons” under § 1983 is separate and distinct from the
question whether they may assert a defense of common law sovereign immunity.”).

681

See, e.g., Hilton, 502 U.S. at 197; Employees, 411 U.S. at 287; Welch, 483 U.S. 468 (overruling Parden's holding that FELA
abrogated states' immunity but not overruling Parden's holding that FELA created a cause of action against the states); see Field,
supra note 136, at 1206, 1242 (noting that Employees established that Congress could create a cause of action against states without
subjecting states to private citizen suits in federal court). The Tenth Amendment will also bar some regulation of states even if a
statute purports to bind the states. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245, 22
Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1064, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10996, 78 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33390 (1976) (overruled by, Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA)
65, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 34995, 102 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34633 (1985)).

682

See Will, 491 U.S. at 85-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hilton, 502 U.S. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mere
creation of a cause of action does not subject a state to suit without its consent; the state may not be sued without its consent; not
clearly indicating whether Congress, by a clear statement, could abrogate states' state court immunity); contra Gibson, supra note
322, at 205-07 (relying on Hilton to conclude that once Congress creates a remedy against the states, the Supremacy Clause requires
state courts to enforce that remedy; implying that states' consent is not required).

683

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 1 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1040, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1586, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10999 (1976).

684

The Bankruptcy Code creates causes of action against states by including states within the definitions of “creditor” and “entity.” See
11 U.S.C. § 101(10), (15) (1994). Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that apply to “entities” include, for example, the automatic
stay (§ 362), and turnover of property to the estate (§ 542). Id. §§ 362, 542. Creditors are subject to a variety of actions, including,
for example, actions to recover preferential transfers. Id. § 547. Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code purports to abrogate states'
immunity, although it has been held to be unconstitutional to the extent that it attempts to abrogate states' immunity from suit in
federal court. Id. § 106(a); see supra note 331. Interestingly, § 106 does not refer to Eleventh Amendment immunity; rather, it states
that “[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated ....” 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).

685

Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Com'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116 L. Ed. 2d 560, 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1465
(1991); see Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1713-14.

686

502 U.S. at 199.

687

Id. at 201-03.

688

Id. at 201-03; see Parden, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).

689

Id. at 203-06; see Welch, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding that the Jones Act (which incorporates FELA's remedial scheme) does not
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).

690

Id. at 206-07.

691

Id. at 207 (citing Howlett, 496 U.S. 356, 367-68).

692

See supra note 674.

693

Id. at 202-03.

694

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202-05

695

Id. at 203, 205-06; Parden, 377 U.S. 184.
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696

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 203.

697

See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 85-87, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1664, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39067 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens). These Justices would have held that § 1983 created a cause of action against the states. They would have remanded for a
determination whether the state could assert sovereign immunity as a defense in state court. Among the issues this inquiry would
raise would be whether the state had waived its sovereign immunity, whether the state could waive immunity with respect to a state
law cause of action but refuse to waive immunity for a nearly identical federal law cause of action, and whether Congress could
abrogate immunity. Id. See also Meltzer, supra note 82, at 59 (suggesting that the anticommandeering principle of New York v.
U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 34 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1817, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 21082 (1992), might
prevent Congress from forcing state courts to enforce federal law against states).

698

See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890); see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (Iredell,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the judicial power did not contemplate suits unknown to law and forbidden by law).

699

See generally Hans, 134 U.S. 1.

700

See supra note 672, 691 and accompanying text.

701

This same broad concept has been expressed in other cases as well. See Melzter, supra note 82, at 57-60 (noting that Howlett's broad
supremacy argument echos earlier statements in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57-58, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L.
Ed. 327 (1912) and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393, 67 S. Ct. 810, 91 L. Ed. 967, 172 A.L.R. 225 (1947), but these cases involved
suits against private parties or local government or considered the issue of state discrimination against federal law as compared to
state law rights of action; other cases stating similar concepts dealt only with prospective relief versus officials, e.g., General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. Ed. 754 (1908); similarly, although Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S. Ct. 547,
130 L. Ed. 2d 454, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2377, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ¶ 94-7071 (1994), stated that a state's refusal to
provide a refund remedy for taxes obtained under an unconstitutional statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding
state traditional sovereign immunity, this comment was dictum because sovereign immunity was not the basis for the state's refusal
to provide procedural relief, and the claim was based on the Constitution, not a federal statute).

702

See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 369-72.

703

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

704

See infra notes 705-06.

705

See, e.g., Karchefske v. Department of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 1, 371 N.W.2d 876 (1985), judgment vacated, 429 Mich. 879,
415 N.W.2d 866 (1987); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 104 N.M. 302, 720 P.2d 1243, 33 Ed. Law Rep. 858
(Ct. App. 1986), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 201, 718 P.2d 1349, 34 Ed. Law Rep. 613 (1986); Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania
State College and University Faculties, 504 Pa. 92, 470 A.2d 482, 15 Ed. Law Rep. 1179 (1983); Kristensen v. Strinden, 343
N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1983); DeBleecker v. Montgomery County, Md., 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4461 (1982);
Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 423 N.E.2d 782 (1981).

706

See, e.g., Ortega v. Port of Portland, 147 Or. App. 489, 936 P.2d 1037 (1997); State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v.
Dopyera, 834 S.W.2d 50, 1993 A.M.C. 2985 (Tex. 1992); Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 409 Mass. 179, 565 N.E.2d
422, 65 Ed. Law Rep. 147, 1991 A.M.C. 1161 (1991); Port of Houston Authority v. Guillory, 814 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App. Houston
1st Dist. 1991), writ granted, (May 6, 1992) and judgment aff'd, 845 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1993), reh'g of cause overruled, (Mar. 3,
1993); State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Brown, 794 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1990); Trinity River Authority v. Williams, 689 S.W.2d 883
(Tex. 1985); Lyons v. Texas A and M University, 545 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1976), writ refused n.r.e.,
(Apr. 6, 1977); Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 1, 346 N.E.2d 305, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 905, 79
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33445 (1976); Weppler v. School Bd. of Dade County, 311 So. 2d 409, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 264, 77
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975); Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. Splendour Shipping &
Enterprises Co., Inc., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973); Gross v. Washington State Ferries, 59 Wash. 2d 241, 367 P.2d 600 (1961) Maloney
v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.Y.S.2d 465, 144 N.E.2d 364 (1957).

707

Jacoby v. Arkansas Dept. of Educ., Vocation and Technical Educ. Div., 331 Ark. 508 962 S.W.2d 773, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 686, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33658 (1998).

708

Id. at 514-15

709

Id. at 513-19.

710

Professor Vazquez argues that Seminole does not view the Eleventh Amendment as “a mere forum-allocation principle.” Rather,
he argues that the “consent to suit” language in Seminole indicates immunity-from-liability. “This suggests that a state may avoid
the exercise of federal judicial power simply by refusing to consent to a suit against it in its own courts ... in other words, that
the Court understands the Eleventh Amendment to establish that nothing in the Constitution requires or authorizes the courts (or
gives Congress the power to require the courts) to award damages against states for the violation of their federal obligations to
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individuals. States are free to award such damages if they wish, but they are not required to do so by federal law.” Vazquez, supra
note 626, at 1690.

711

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54, 72 (“unconsenting states”); id. at 71, n.14 (“where a state has consented to suit”).

712

Id. at 71 n.16

713

See Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1713-1720.

714

See id. 71, n.14 (suggesting that the Supreme Court may review a federal law determination made by a state court in a case in which
the state consented to be sued in the state court); id. at 157-58 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that abrogation in federal court is
necessary because if Congress cannot abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, then individuals
will have to sue states in state court, where the states will assert traditional immunity).

715

See Gibson, supra note 322, at 195, 204-05 (conceding that Seminole suggests that the state's consent is needed for suit in state
court, but arguing that Hilton and Howlett suggest that the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to create a federal remedy against the
states that is enforceable in state court notwithstanding state sovereign immunity); Monaghan, supra note 91, at 122-26 (arguing that
the Eleventh Amendment is simply a forum-selection clause). For an analysis of forum-allocation versus immunity-from-liability
arguments, see generally Vazquez, supra note 626 (arguing that there is a forum-allocation line of cases and an immunity-fromliability line; concluding that Seminole falls in the latter); see also Field, supra note 13, at 547 (suggesting that, in Parden, the
Court seemed to accept the assertion that a state court would not hear a federal question suit; in Hans, the Court suggested that
the consequence of federal court immunity would be to leave to the state legislature the option to waive immunity or not in state
court); Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21 (“But to deprive the legislature of the power of judging what that honor and safety may require,
even at the expense of temporary failure to discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater evils that such a failure can
cause.”); Parden, 377 U.S. at 190 n.8.

716

McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.
Ct. 2238, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1990).

717

Id. at 22.

718

Id.

719

Id. at 31.

720

Id. at 39 (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 285, 32 S. Ct. 216, 56 L. Ed. 436, 3 A.F.T.R. (P-H)
¶ 2861 (1912)).

721

Id. at 31.

722

Id. at 30-31.

723

Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S. Ct. 547, 130 L. Ed. 2d 454, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2377, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) ¶ 94-7071 (1994).

724

Id. at 108-09.

725

Id. at 109-10.

726

Id. at 111-13.

727

Id. at 111.

728

See Cohens v. Virgina, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821), discussed supra notes 373-375 and accompanying text.

729

See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26 (“Respondents first ask us to hold that, though the Florida courts accepted jurisdiction over this suit
which sought monetary relief from various state entities, the Eleventh Amendment nevertheless precludes our exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in this case. We reject respondents' suggestion.”) (emphasis added). The state in Reich apparently consented as well;
otherwise the suit could not have gone forward in the state court. See Reich, 513 U.S. 106.

730

See Amar, supra note 53, at 1484-92; Jackson, supra note 91, at 3, 50-51.

731

Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365-66, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 358 (1990).

732

See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct. 1182, 59 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979); see generally Stewart, supra note 632.
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733

See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 82, at 11-12; Jackson, supra note 91, at 32-39.

734

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 71, n.14. Note that this rule only applies to Supreme Court review, not to actions commenced in lower
federal court that challenge state court rulings. As to the latter, see generally Frazell, supra note 622 (considering circumstances in
which federal courts may review state court determinations of federal law); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed.
2d 206 (1983).

735

See supra Part IV.B.2; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821). The Cohens rule, which allowed Supreme Court
review in actions commenced by the state, subsequently was expanded to include actions in which the state consented to suit. See
generally Jackson, supra note 91, at at 13-39, 26-27 (discussing Cohens and the implications of federal courts' appellate review
of a federal question determined in a state court proceeding involving the state); see also Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
304 (1853).

736

See Field, supra note 13, at 549 n. 117

737

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). In Young, a federal court enjoined the state attorney general from
enforcing the penalties specified in a state statute pending the court's determination whether the statute violated the Constitution.
The attorney general ignored the injunction and was jailed for contempt of court. Id. at 126-41.

738

Id. at 166-67. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1963); David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 S.CT. REV. 149; Vicki C. Jackson,
Seminole Tribe the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495 (1997).

739

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 53, at 1478-79 (identifying Young as an example of the Court's limitation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity through “various doctrinal gymnastic and legal fictions”); Barsalou, supra note 563, at 584 (referring to Young as a legal
fiction) Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1040-41 (identifying Young as one of the most important fiction developed to avoid the effect of
the broad constitutional prohibition against suing states in federal court); LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 117, at 871 (suggesting
that Young rests on “fictional tour de force”); Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1728 (noting that Young's “authority stripping” rationale
rests on a fiction); see also Burnham, supra note 87, at 983-90 & n.22 (noting that the conduct enjoined is state action and that a
Young-type suit is in reality against the state itself).

740

See Young, 209 U.S. at 150-54; see also Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 S. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216 (1887); Hagood v. Southern,
117 U.S. 52, 6 S. Ct. 608, 29 L. Ed. 805 (1886); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Gibson, supra
note 322, at 212; Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 2246; Jackson, supra note 738, at 511 (“a state official who acts in violation of
superior federal law was not authorized by the State to do so because, as a constitutional matter, the State cannot so authorize”);
LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 117, at 871 (noting that Young strips an official of “representative character”); Vazquez, supra note
626, at 1728 (arguing the Young's “authority-stripping” rationale rests on a fiction that is necessary to give life to the Supremacy
Clause; the suit is really against the state but because the states lack power to authorize officials to violate federal law, the official
who does so does not act in the name of the state).

741

See Young, 209 U.S. at 150; see also Fiedler v. State of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Young does not apply
where the citizens did not sue individual state officials); Gibson, supra note 322, at 213-215 & nn.125-26, 129, 139 (arguing that
the Eleventh Amendment's bar applies to suits against state officials acting in their offical capacities because such a suit is truly
against and imposes liabilty on the state).

742

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (holding that a monetary award against a state
official is indistinguishable from an award against state, because it will be paid from the state treasury; Young does not permit suit);
see also Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1996 FED App. 253P (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1082, 137 L. Ed. 2d 217 (U.S. 1997) (holding that Young does not apply if the state official is not threatening to enforce the
allegedly unconstitutional statute); Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 51 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 147 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated in
part, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Young allows a suit to proceed against state officials for injunctive relief, but cannot
be used to compel reimbursement of money already paid to the state); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of
Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 102 S. Ct. 2325, 72 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1982) (the
Eleventh Amendment is not limited to money damages, it also prohibits injunctive relief against the states); see also Amar, supra
note 53, at 1479; Barsalou, supra note 563, at 584; Cordry, supra note 588, at 9; Fletcher, supra note 87, at 1041-42 & n.33, 1119-20;
Gibson, supra note 322, at 213; LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 117, at 871 & n.2 ; Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1686, 1727-30.
Several commentators have identified the unavailability of retroactive relief under Young as a major limitation on the rule of law and
on the ability to enforce federal law against the states. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 82, at 47-48 (discussing the need for retroactive
as well as prospective relief against states); Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1692 (proposing that McKesson be reinterpreted, but that
“its most important insight” which is “its recognition of the importance of retrospective relief for the violation of constitutional
rights” be preserved: Professor Vazquez would reinterpret McKesson to determine that there is a constitutional right to damages
from state officials who have violated the constitution, “rather than from the states themselves, a right of action having its source
in the Supremacy Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause.”).

743

Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1728; Cordry, supra note 588, at 9.
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744

See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73-75; cf. id. at 175-76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“No clear statement of intent to displace the doctrine
of Ex parte Young occurs in IGRA ...”). Some commentators fear that Seminole imposes a major limitation on Young and that the
Court may further whittle away Young in order to protect the states. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 738 (arguing that Seminole may
substantially limit the scope of Young). Others argue that Seminole's treatment of Young has little impact (particularly in bankruptcy
cases), or is simply wrong. See, e.g., Barsalou, supra note 563, at 584 & n.40; Gibson, supra note 322, at 213-15 (arguing that
Seminole is inconsistent with developed law under which a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against a state offical
for a violation of federal law, and that, notwithstanding Seminole's limitation, Young would still allow suit against a state official in
bankruptcy court to enjoin the state official from collecting a discharged debt because § 106, which allows suit against a state, does
not establish a “carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme”); Meltzer, supra note 82, at 33-46.

745

See, e.g., In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 888 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (warning states that they should not
precipitate suits against state officials by refusing to consent to suit in bankruptcy court); Browning, supra note 322, at 10 (noting
that state officials are unlikely to put themselves at personal risk by violating the automatic stay).

746

Barsalou, supra note 563, at 592-99 (identifying actions that can proceed against the states after Seminole); Browning, supra note
322, at 10 (arguing that the trustee may enforce the injunctive relief imposed by the automatic stay against state officials, but may
not recover money from the state for a violation; also arguing that, if property was seized in violation of the stay, and is identifiable,
then perhaps the equitable remedy of turnover may be available); Cordry, supra note 588, at 9 (arguing that the stay is enforceable
with respect to state actions against the bankruptcy estate's property, that bankruptcy court rulings concerning the allow-ability
and priority of claims, the confirmation of the plan and dischargeability are “controlling,” and that if the state ignores the stay and
continues its attempts to collect, the state official may be enjoined from collecting, and the state court can determine dischargeability);
id. at 10 (arguing that the trustee cannot recover from the state treasury for pre-petition or post-petition transactions, but perhaps can
impose contempt sanctions against a state official); Gibson, supra note 322, at 202 (noting that Seminole creates an “asymmetry”
because only states, not other creditors, including other governmental units, have immunity from actions such as preferences, stay
violations, and determination of the validity and priority of liens); Paskay, supra note 323, at 3 (arguing that the disallowance of a
tax claim or determination of the debtor's tax liability may proceed because these actions do not impose any liability on the state
for a monetary judgment); Special Report, Seminole: What it Means/Possible Defenses, 29 No. 8 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1, 10
(8/13/96) (noting that some commentators suggest that self-executing sections, such as § 724(b) concerning the priority of liens,
and § 546 concerning the invalidation of liens, might be enforced under Young).

747

See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1994).

748

See id. § 505.

749

See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 82, at 7-8 (noting that Young does not allow unlimited suits against state officials).

750

See supra note 70.

751

See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589a (1994); see also Browning, supra note 564 at 5 (dismissing the Siegel/Meltzer idea of having
the United States Trustee sue on behalf of the estate; citing California v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 409 U.S. 844, 109 S.Ct. 2228 (1989),
which held that states could tax liquidation sales even though states cannot tax the federal government because the tax would not be
viewed as a tax on the bankruptcy court or trustee); Cordry, supra note 621, at 10 (arguing that the trustee is not the United States).

752

On qui tam, see generally Jefferson D. Reynolds, Defanging Environmental Law: Extracting Citizen Suit Provisions Under Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71 (1997); Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for
Uncle Sam, 21 NOVA L. REV. 869 (1997); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).

753

See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress' Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539 (1995);
Meltzer, supra note 82, at 65.

754

Siegel, supra note 753; Melzter, supra note 82, at 55-57; see also Gibson, supra note 322, at 203 n.63 (federal government suit
against state is allowed even though the money recovered will be paid over to a private individual, who would be barred under the
Eleventh Amendment from suing the state directly).
Siegel admits that this plan may not work in bankruptcy because, “if a state is simply the creditor of the bankrupt party, it has not
thereby violated any of his or her federal rights. There would therefore be no cause of action against the state that the United States
could pursue by engaging the services of a private attorney.” Siegel, supra note 753, at 570 n.146. Professor Meltzer, however,
argues that “Siegel suggests that his approach may be inapt in bankruptcy, as ordinarily the bankrupt estate's claim against a state
does not rest on federal law .... But since the bankruptcy power authorizes federal legislation governing the administration of state
law claims in bankruptcy, I don't see any distinctive constitutional difficulties in this area.” Meltzer, supra note 82, at 65 n.264).

755

Siegel, supra note 753, at 568; Melzter, supra note 82, at 55-57

756

Siegel, supra note 753, at 568.

757

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1991).
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758

See id. at 785-86; see also Cordry, supra note 588, at 10 (arguing that suit by the trustee as the United States is questionable in light of
Blatchford); Readers Write About Seminole Decision and Forum Shopping, 29 No. 13 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 5 (Sept. 17, 1996)
(in letter to editor, Browning rejects the argument that the trustee acting as agent for the bankruptcy estate can be transformed into an
agent for the federal government; arguing that this would exalt form over substance); Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1792 (noting that
Blatchford refutes ability of federal government to allow private parties to sue the state in the federal government's name and retain
the damages awarded); see also Siegel, supra note 753, at 568 (acknowledging that Blatchford may make this impossible); Meltzer,
supra note 82, at 55-57 & n.261 (suggesting that this idea may be viable but noting that Blatchford may raise questions concerning
the ability of the United States to delegate to a private party its exemption from the restrictions that immunity poses on suing states).

759

See Meltzer, supra note 82 at 55-57 (suggesting that the United States trustee be appointed as the trustee or co-trustee; acknowledging
the real party in interest problem and noting that the Court may deem it a sham because the estate is the real party in interest).

760

See Vazquez, supra note 626, at 1792 (arguing that the Seigel approach would only work if the federal obligations had broad public
impact and if public interest organizations were willing to take on such suits, but would not work where only a discrete category
of individuals would benefit).

761

See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 82, at 61 (agreeing that no technique to impose liability on the states for a violation of federal law
is without legal or practical problems).

End of Document

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

57

